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1 INTRODUCTION 
This first chapter aims to provide an overview of the dissertation. First, the back-
ground to the study is introduced, and then its need is justified by pointing out 
gaps in the literature and previous studies. Based on the gaps, and to extend pre-
vious studies, research questions are constructed. Next, the present dissertation 
positions itself in relation to previous studies and thus points out its potential con-
tributions to the field in both theoretical and managerial aspects. The chapter also 
defines some important concepts of the present dissertation, before introducing its 
wider structure. 
1.1 Background and research gap 
As international business activities continue to grow, multinational firms around 
the world are establishing partnerships with firms from other nations (Vaidya, 
2000). International joint ventures (IJVs) have become a major strategic tool of 
firms entering international markets (Dunning, 1995). In the present dissertation, 
an IJV is regarded as a separate entity located in a foreign market formed by one 
(or more) MNC (s) and one (or more) local firm (s) whether through greenfields 
development or partial acquisitions. The literature of international business shows 
that one of the biggest challenges that the parent firms face when entering interna-
tional joint ventures is the control issue over the venture’s activities (Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Geringer & Hebert, 1991). This is because through participating 
in voluntary cooperative relationships in the IJVs, the foreign parent firms are 
exposed to the risk of opportunism (Zhang & Li, 2001). In addition, the operating 
environments in foreign markets sometimes are sometimes characterized by high 
levels of uncertainties because of weak legal systems, unstable political regimes. 
All of these make the issue of control of IJVs crucial. In this dissertation, IJV 
control is seen as the influence of foreign parent firms on IJV operations. Through 
exercising control successfully, the foreign parent firms make sure that their strat-
egies are effectively implemented and their resources are efficiently utilized (Lo-
range, Morton & Ghoshal, 1986). Lacking of proper control may result in lost of 
knowledge and capabilities to outsiders (Reich & Mankin, 1986; Geringer & He-
bert, 1989). Besides, the parent firms need to focus more on control over the 
IJV’s activities than they do with their wholly owned one (Anderson & Gating-
ton, 1986; Geringer & Hebert, 1991) since IJVs involve with other firms from the 
host countries. Researchers have pointed out that the failure rates of IJVs are quite 
high (Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Hennart, Kim & Zeng, 1998; Yaheskel, New-
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burry & Zeira, 2004). Some authors have suggested that control problems are one 
of the primary causes of IJV failure (i.e. Groot & Merchant, 2000).  
Despite the popularity and importance of IJVs and extensive research in the field, 
it is suggested that we have a limited understanding of how to manage them (Das 
& Teng 2001). Berry et al. (2008) maintain that management control continues to 
be a fertile field for research and suggest that much more research is needed to 
yield insights into how organizations can develop effective control systems. This 
is due to the fact that most previous studies contribute little knowledge of how to 
control IJVs, or about the relationship between parent firm control and IJV per-
formance (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). More than fifteen years ago, Shortell and 
Zajac (1988) suggested the need to study how to manage IJVs during their devel-
opment process and their relationship to IJV performance. Furthermore, Geringer 
and Hebert (1989) propose that future research should deepen IJV control in 
terms of mechanisms, control extent, and control focus. Later on, Ramaswamy, 
Gomes, and Veliyath (1998) also suggest the necessity to examine a wider array 
of control of IJV through in-dept investigations. Furthermore, previous research 
suggested that future research on IJV should focus on foreign parent firms’ adap-
tation of their strategies in response to the IJV’s operating environment (Niemi-
nen, 2003). Pangarkar and Klein (2004) suggest future research should explore 
the impact of parent firm’s characteristics such as prior multinational experience 
or experience in the host country of control and monitoring performance of IJVs. 
Berry et al. (2008) suggest that future research is necessary to investigate the con-
sequence of management control on performance. In the same vein, Chalos and 
O’Connor (2004) maintain that further research should explore the relation of 
controls to IJV instability and performance. Similarly, Barden, Steensma, and 
Lyles (2005: 170) suggest that researchers who search for a relationship between 
control structure and IJV outcome should reflect the complexity of the organiza-
tional structures, strategies, and environments. Männik (2006), who studies about 
the impact of the autonomy on performance in a multinational corporation’s sub-
sidiaries in transition countries, finds that the degree of control by parent firms is 
environment and firm dependent. Herath (2007) suggests that management con-
trol of an organization should be linked to its structure, strategy, culture, and in-
formation systems to achieve its objectives. Fang and Zou (2009) suggest future 
study should investigate on mechanism by parent firms that allow dynamic capa-
bilities to take place in IJVs.  
Concerning IJV structure stability, Franko (1971) concluded that policy changes 
in Multinational Enterprises were one of the reason leading to IJV instability, 
Moreover, Yan and Zeng (1999) and Zhang and Li (2001) argue that changes in 
government policies and the competitive environment lead to the evolution of the 
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control design. In addition, Kogut (2002) maintains that no matter what the initial 
agreement on control may have been at the start of a venture, environmental and 
strategic changes over time may lead to reconfiguration of the control design. 
This is because these environmental factors and strategic behaviors are crucial for 
an IJV’s stability (Harrigan, 1985). With respect to the dynamic in IJVs, Dymsza 
(2002), who discussed successes and failures of IJVs, maintains that local parent 
control generally expands over time as local parent firms gain technical, produc-
tion, marketing, financial, organizational, and other competencies. Furthermore, 
Chen (2004) proposes that future research should investigate the evolution of IJV 
governance along with IJV lifecycle. In particular, Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) 
suggest that further research should concentrate on IJV performance and other 
related processes such as control and the IJV development process. Similarly, 
Berry et al. (2008), who review the recent literature on management control and 
its effects on performance, suggest that there is very limited use of static analysis 
of the dynamic nature of control systems design. As a result, it seems that an IJV 
control structure is not stable over time due to changes of influential factors. 
Therefore, there is a need to investigate how and why the control structure exer-
cised by parent firms over their IJVs change. 
1.2 Research objectives and research questions 
The basic objective of the present dissertation is to build up a framework for con-
trolling IJVs operating in local markets from the viewpoint of foreign parent 
firms. First, the present study aims to analyze the influence of determinant factors 
on IJV control structure. The determinant factors include foreign parent firms’ 
internal factors such as their characteristics and strategies, and IJV operating envi-
ronment factors such as the target country’s degree of uncertainties. The second 
objective of the dissertation is to find out the relationship between selected for-
eign parent control structure and IJV performance. In addition, the dissertation 
aims to investigate whether the relationship between parent control structure and 
IJV performance change over time. The final objective of the dissertation is to 
identify the main cause of any such change. To be able to realize these objectives, 
the present dissertation aims to answer the research question: “How do foreign 
parent firms control their IJVs in foreign markets to achieve superior IJV 
performance?” The research question is further divided into the following sub-
questions, each of which will be answered in an individual article: 
  (1) How do foreign parent firms configure the control structure in 
  their IJVs to implement their strategies? (Article 1) 
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  (2) How do foreign parent firms design their control in order to cope 
  with the host country uncertainty? (Article 2) 
 (3) How do partners’ perceptions of differences in management 
 styles, joint venturing objectives, and business relatedness affect the 
 control they exercise in IJVs? (Article 3) 
 (4) What are the influences of foreign parent firms’ contributions and 
 IJV experiences on IJV control and performance? (Article 5) 
 (5) What are the relationships between foreign parent control and IJV 
 performance during the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle? How do 
 these relationships change during the post-formation stage of the IJV 
 lifecycle? (Article 4) 
By answering these questions, the present dissertation aims to provide a fuller 
understanding of IJV control through elaborating the link between foreign parent 
characteristics, operating environments, strategies and IJV control. More specifi-
cally, the study investigates how foreign parent firms determine the control to use 
with IJVs based on their characteristics, which include their IJV experiences, their 
critical resources, and the strategies implemented in IJVs. 
 
Figure 1.  The a priori theoretical framework 
 
 
Foreign parents’ 
characteristics 
(Article 3 &5) 
   
Parents’ strategies  
(Article 1) 
 
I       JV control 
   (Article 1,2,3,4,5) 
  IJV performance 
     (Article 1,2,3,4,5) 
 
Host countries’ 
uncertainties 
(Article 2) 
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Table 1. Key concepts in the present dissertation 
 
Concepts Definitions used in the present study 
Foreign parent firms Finnish firms having joint venture(s) with local firms. 
Local parent firms Firms from foreign markets that have joint ventures with Finnish firms 
International joint ven-
ture (IJV) 
A separate entity formed by foreign parent firms and local parent firms 
whether through greenfields or partial acquisition.  
IJV lifecycle stages The two different stages in an IJV’s life: a formation stage and a post forma-
tion stage 
IJV Control The influence of foreign parent firms on international joint venture operations 
through control mechanisms, control focus, and control extent. 
Control mechanisms Structural arrangement designed to determine and influence what organiza-
tion members do through a variety of mechanisms both formal and informal. 
Social control Mechanisms which are based on behavior control such as training, personal 
relationships, and informal communications, etc. 
Formal control Mechanisms which are based on activity control such as ownership, con-
tracts, key personnel appointments, right of veto, etc. 
Control focus The areas wheret foreign parents choose to concentrate their control in their 
IJVs including broad control and narrow control. 
Broad control Area of control which foreign parent firms exercise over their IJVs on more 
than three different areas. 
Narrow control Area of control which foreign parent firms exercise over their IJVs in three 
different areas or less. 
Control extent The tightness of foreign parent control exercised in their IJVs. It includes 
tight control and loose control. 
Tight control Control is tight if parent firms exercise more than three control mechanisms 
and broad control over IJVs. 
Loose control Control is loose if parent firms exercise three control mechanisms or fewer 
and narrow control over their IJVs. 
Parent firm’s strategies Strategies that parent firms implement in their IJVs. They include strategic 
motives, strategic importance, strategic focus, and competitive strategy. 
Host country uncertainty Complexity and volatility of environmental factors including cultural uncer-
tainty, environmental uncertainty, competitive uncertainty 
Parent characteristics Parent characteristics can be seen through their management style, business 
line, their contribution to IJVs, and their prior IJV experience 
IJV performance Level of goal achievement, measured by foreign parent satisfaction on both 
overall and financial performance of IJVs. 
In addition, the present dissertation investigates the link between host country 
uncertainty including cultural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, and com-
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petitive uncertainty and IJV control. The final sub-question is on the further in-
vestigation of IJV control in respect to performance. In more detail, the present 
dissertation tries to find out what the relationships are between initial control in 
terms of focus, mechanisms, and extent and IJV performance are in the formation 
stage of IJVs, and whether there are changes in IJV control structure during IJV 
development. The study also closely examines the influence of IJV performance 
during the initial stage on the reconfiguration of the IJV control structure in a lat-
ter stage. The research problems are summarized in a theoretical frame work in 
Figure 1. 
1.3 Positioning and contribution of the dissertation 
Most previous research on international joint ventures has focused on partners’ 
motives, partner selection, parental conflict, and performance measurement 
(Parkhe, 1993). In early IJV studies of IJV formation, partner selection, and nego-
tiation, researchers have focused on resources exchange and the value of the re-
sources utilized in IJVs (Duan & Chuanmin, 2007). Later, other researchers have 
focused on the interactive nature of cooperation between the venture’s partners 
(Pakhe, 1991, Saxon, 1997). Although IJVs are important to parent firms, IJV 
formation and its consequent performance is still an ambiguous issue. Research-
ers point out that IJVs often suffer a high failure rate and a high level of parent 
dissatisfaction (Kogut, 1989; Park & Russo, 1996; Chen, 2004). 
In looking for the answers to the questions about IJV performance, researchers 
have investigated ownership, national context, strategy divergence, prior relation-
ship, and trust between partners (e.g. Parkhe, 1991; Park & Russo, 1996; Hennart, 
Kim, & Zeng, 1998, Li, 2003, Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). These researchers 
maintain that conditional factors make the operation of IJVs difficult and thus 
affect IJV performance. These authors also suggest the importance of having suit-
able partners and favorable conditions in which to establish IJVs to achieve supe-
rior IJV performance. However, these authors have ignored the role of control of 
IJV operations which directly affects to IJV performance (Parkhe, 1996; Guidice, 
2001), as Baughn, Denekamp, Stevens, and Osborn (1997) argue that control is 
necessary to protect intellectual capital. This is also because IJVs operating in 
similar condition may not perform similarly, because they are managed differ-
ently. In addition, managing continuous interaction between parent firms and the 
joint venture becomes crucial to IJV performance (Chen, 2004). 
In spite of its important role in IJVs, there are a very limited number of studies 
focusing on control in existing joint venture literature. In IJV studies, Taco and 
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William (2004) review ten major journals for a period of 15 years between 1988 
and 2003, and identified 388 IJV studies. Among these, there were a few studies 
researching control (15/388), while most IJV studies focused on the entry mode 
strategy (57/388), the partner learning (39/388), and the partner selection 
(28/388). As a result, not much is known about IJV control, thus, it is necessary to 
further investigate parent control and its effect on IJV performance. The early 
research of IJV control focused on the relationship between the international 
strategy of the MNCs, the strategy of local partners, and the need for IJV control 
(i.e. West, 1959; Tomlinson, 1970; Franko, 1971; Behrman, 1977; Rafii, 1978). 
IJV control research was, then, continued through the works of Killing (1983), 
Schaan (1983), Beamish (1984), Mjoen (1993); Makino (1995),  Lee & Beamish, 
1995; Calantone & Zhao, 2001; Yan & Gray (2001a) (see Table 2.). Previous 
studies have addressed the importance of control mechanisms for IJV perform-
ance (e.g. Beamish, 1988; Sohn, 1994). In addition, they traditionally have been 
modeled by relative degree of ownership only (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). In addi-
tion, if control of IJVs is discussed alongside the ownership structure, most previ-
ous research has focused on only one dimension; mostly control mechanisms (e.g. 
Mjoen, 1993; Vryza 1997; Yan & Gray, 2001a; Xiansheng, 1998, Chang, Mellahi 
& Wilkinson, 2009). Moreover, most previous studies of the relationship between 
control and performance are based on only one stage of the IJV lifecycle (i.e. the 
formation stage or the post formation stage). 
As a result, the findings on the impact of control on performance have been con-
flicting and inconclusive (Chalos & O’Connor, 1998; Lecraw, 1984; Yan & Gray, 
2001b; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; and Groot & Merchant, 2000; Calantone & 
Zhao, 2001). Researchers have addressed different aspects of the relationship be-
tween control and performance: a positive relationship between foreign parent 
dominant control and IJV performance (Killing 1983; Lee & Beamish 1995; Ding 
1997; Luo, Shenkar & Nyaw, 2001); no relationship between foreign parent con-
trol and IJV performance (Kogut, 1988; Calantone & Zhao, 2001); a negative 
relationship between foreign parent control and IJV performance (Osland, 1994; 
Isobe et al., 2000, Boateng & Glaister, 2002; Child, Faulkner & Tallman, 2005); 
share control between foreign and local parent as positively related to IJV per-
formance (Beamish, 1985, 1993); and split control between foreign parent firms 
and local parent firms as leading to better IJV performance than shared and domi-
nant control variants (Beamish & Choi, 2004). 
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Contributions of the present dissertation 
Figure 2 shows quite clearly one of the main contributions of the dissertation. By 
establishing the link between factors, control structure and performance, the dis-
sertation gives a better view of the control issue and the overall outcomes of joint 
venture performance. 
However, to be able to address the control issues associated with the IJV thor-
oughly, Geringer and Hebert (1989) and Ramaswamy et al. (1998) propose that 
future research should examine a diverse array of control structures and their rela-
tion to performance, across three dimensions: focus, mechanisms, and extent. Lu 
and Hebert (2005) also suggest that further study should focus on control mecha-
nisms other than ownership or equity control. In the same vein, Guidice (2001) 
states that a firm does not need majority equity ownership to exercise managerial 
control. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Focus of the present dissertation compared to prior studies 
Das and Teng (1998) propose that to understand the relationship between IJV 
control and performance, future research needs to identify relevant contingency 
variables and allow for more complex types of effects. By investigating factors 
affecting the IJV control structure across the three dimensions of control, and by 
pointing out possible the structures potentially leading to better performance, the 
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present study, thus, contributes to a more comprehensive knowledge of IJV con-
trol theory.  
 
Table 2. Previous studies on control and performance of IJVs
1
 
Authors Number of  
IJVs 
Location of  
JVs 
JV Control Perspective Analysis  
Method 
Tomlinson 
(1970) 
71 IJVs 
 
Less developed 
countries 
Ownership, effective control, focus & 
extent of control 
Regression 
Franko 
(1971) 
159 JVs 
 
Cross countries Parent standardization, centralization 
& strategy 
Correlation 
Killing  
(1983) 
37JVs Developing coun-
tries 
Board, staffing, reward systems Two-group t-
test 
Schaan  
(1983) 
10 IJVs Developing coun-
tries 
Board, staffing, decision making, 
contracts, socialization 
Case analysis 
Beamish 
(1984) 
66 IJVs Cross countries Ownership, board, staffing, reward 
structure 
Correlation 
Lecraw 
(1984) 
153 JVs Less developed 
countries 
Ownership, extent & focus of control, 
overall  effective of control 
Correlation 
Mjoen   
(1993) 
49 IJVs Cross countries Ownership, specific activities, and 
overall control 
LISREL 
Makino (1995) 1,688 IJVs Cross countries Ownership Regression, 
Case- analysis 
Ding 
 (1997) 
34 IJVs Less develop 
countries 
Capital expenditure, product planning, 
pricing, export, import, wage and 
labor policy 
Regression 
Vryza 
(1997) 
140 IJVs 
 
Developed coun-
tries 
Formal, informal, and ownership 
control 
Regression 
Glaister & Buck-
ley (1998b) 
51 UK IJVs Developed coun-
tries 
Control mechanisms, extent, focus Regression 
Xiansheng 
(1998) 
1687 IJVs Less developed 
countries 
Board membership, key personnel, 
and ownership 
Regression, 
Case analysis 
Ramaswamy, 
at al. (1998) 
83 JVs Less developed 
countries 
Ownership control Regression 
Wang, Wee, 
Koh (1998) 
148 IJVs Less developed 
countries 
Share, right to appoint personnel to 
key positions, board meetings, capital 
budgeting, and resource allocation, 
policies, procedures 
Correlations 
Choi (2001) 71 IJVs New industrialized 
countries 
Amount of control, activities of 
control 
Correlation 
Guidice (2001) 58 IJVs Developed coun-
tries 
Board of director, staffing, socializa-
tion, trust 
Regression 
Yan & Gray 
(2001a) 
90 IJVs 
 
Less developed 
countries 
The number of directors from each 
side on IJV’ board, decision power of 
key personnel  
Regression 
Zhang & Li 
(2001) 
8 IJVs Less developed 
countries 
Formal and informal control Case analysis 
Fryxell, Dooley, 
Vryza (2002) 
129 IJVs Cross countries Formal and informal control Regression  
Li  (2003) 215 IJVs Less developed 
countries 
Ownership, influence on decision 
making 
Regression 
Lu, Hebert 
(2005) 
720 IJVs Less developed 
countries 
Ownership Correlation 
Brouthers & 
Bamossy (2006)  
8 IJVs Less developed 
countries 
Ownership, HRM policies, and key 
position appointment 
Case analysis 
Duan & Chuan-
min 2007) 
3 IJVs Less developed 
countries 
Ownership, control mechanisms Case analysis 
                                                
 
1
 
 
 
Criteria of choosing previous studies for this table base on: 1) IJV studies related to control and performance; 2) key studies by leading scholars 
in the field; 3) studies that cover different aspects related to IJV control and performance; 4) Studies that show continuous research stream of 
IJVs from very beginning up to now.
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In addition, the present dissertation is the first to examine the changes in IJV con-
trol during the development of IJVs, especially under the influence of overall 
performance, since “how control design of IJVs evolves over time remains un-
clear” (Zhang & Li, 2001: 342). This is important because it examines the organi-
zational process (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006).  
The research on process makes an important contribution because it explains how 
managers can influence firm performance through organizational control (Chak-
ravarthy & Doz, 1992), and vice versa. The present dissertation argues that the 
high failure rates of IJVs in foreign markets are caused by incompatibility be-
tween foreign parent firm strategies and their IJV control structure. In addition, 
the author maintains that the inability of previous studies to agree about the rela-
tionship between parent control and the IJV performance rests on the existence of 
gaps in the IJV literature. One such gap is the missing link between the foreign 
parent strategies and their IJV control structures. This link is crucial for both theo-
rists and practitioners since it identifies the appropriate control structure for for-
eign parent firms to be able to implement their intended strategies in IJVs, which 
allows IJVs to achieve the foreign parent’s goals. Therefore, establishing the link 
between the parent firm’s strategies (e.g. strategic motives, strategic importance, 
strategic focus, and competitive strategies) and IJV control is believed to be an-
other important contribution of the this dissertation.  
 
Finally, a fuller understanding of control issues and their relationship to perform-
ance will offer several advantages for practitioners. In fast changing environments 
in some countries, the need to protect and properly exploit competitive advantage 
seems to be of paramount importance. The present dissertation shows foreign 
parent firms how control activities fitting with their strategies will result in better 
performance. Moreover, it offers managers the possibility of having the tools to 
cope with target countries’ uncertainties which are known to be key obstacles for 
foreign firms to successfully operate in foreign markets. In other words, the pre-
sent dissertation helps managers to decide which IJV activities to control, what 
degree of control to exercise, and what control mechanisms to employ. Further-
more, it helps managers to know how these control structures should be changed 
over time to, on the one hand, minimize the cost of control and, on the other hand, 
maximize the performance of IJVs. 
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation 
 
The present dissertation is organized into two parts. The first part provides an 
overview of the dissertation. The first chapter introduces the background, research 
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objectives, and contributions of the dissertation. The second chapter elaborates on 
the previous literature related to IJV control and performance. The third chapter 
presents the empirical data. The fourth chapter summarizes the five articles. The 
fifth chapter includes conclusions, managerial and theoretical implications, limita-
tions, and some avenues for future research.  
 
The second part of the dissertation includes five articles. The first article dis-
cusses how parent firms can implement their strategies in their IJVs by exercising 
proper control over their IJVs. The second article examines how foreign parent 
control in their IJVs can help them to cope with uncertainty in the host country. 
The third article investigates the way in which foreign parent firms establish their 
control over their IJVs to deal with differences between partners in IJVs. The 
fourth article emphasizes the dynamic aspect of foreign parent control and its re-
lation to IJV performance. The fifth article expands on the link between foreign 
parent firms’ contribution to IJVs, their experience in IJVs and IJV control and 
performance (see Figure 3 for structure of the present dissertation). 
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Figure 3. Structure of the present study 
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FOREIGN PARENT CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE  
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and IJV performance 
Article 3: Do partners’ differences 
affect IJV control and performance 
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experiences, and international joint ven-
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will begin by reviewing the relevant literature related to IJV studies 
forming the background to this dissertation. Then, the chapter discusses theories 
used in different articles of this dissertation as fundamental bases for the argu-
ments. Then, the chapter expands on IJV control concepts and IJV control dimen-
sions used in the five articles. 
2.1 Past research on IJVs 
Research on IJVs has been growing significantly in recent years. There are sev-
eral important topics of discussion in IJV research. They are the motives for IJV 
formation, partner selection, trust and commitment, learning in IJVs, control 
(Parkhe, 1996; Taco & William, 2004), cultural issues, environmental issues in 
IJVs (Taco & William, 2004) (see Figure 5 in section 2.1.9) 
2.1.1  Motives for IJV formation 
A number of previous studies have tried to answer the question of why partner 
firms enter into IJVs (Parkhe, 1996). Harrigan (1995) finds three main motives 
that encourage firms to enter into IJVs - internal benefits, competitive benefits, 
and strategic benefits. Steven and Garry (2005) discern three main motives for 
American firms to enter into IJVs with Chinese firms - knowledge acquisition, 
cost savings, and strategic positioning. 
Contractor and Lorange (1988) specify seven different IJV formation motives 
including risk reduction, economies of scale, technology exchange, co-opting or 
blocking competition, overcoming government investment barriers, expansion to 
international markets, resources exchange. Kogut (1988) asserts that motives for 
IJV formation are to reduce the cost of production; to respond to external envi-
ronmental pressures; to acquire knowledge and know how from partner firms. 
Glaister and Yu (1993) find that the main force motivating UK firms to form joint 
ventures is to gain faster entry to the Chinese market and access to largely 
intangible inputs that they would otherwise have difficulty acquiring. In addition, 
they find that direct access to physical inputs and financial incentives provided by 
central and local government play a relatively minor role in the motivation behind 
joint ventures in China. 
Parkhe (1996) suggests that IJV motivation must be viewed in line with its loca-
tion because it may vary in developed countries and developing countries. Taco 
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and William (2004) maintain that multinational companies are often motivated by 
local market access and local market knowledge. On the other hand, local partners 
enter to IJVs to acquire new skills and technologies (Taco & William, 2004). Al-
Khalifa and Peterson (1999) propose that the motivation to enter into a joint 
venture must be distinguished from the motivation involved in partner selection. 
Zineldin and Dodourova (2005) demonstrate that strategic and managerial 
motivations for entering joint ventures are more important than financial and 
technological motivations. On the other hand, motives for entering IJVs can differ 
according to the size of the firms. Millington and Bayliss (1995) find that large 
firms engage in JVs in response to competitive pressures within an increasingly 
unified single market which small and medium-sized firms get involved in JVs in 
order to penetrate different foreign markets. 
2.1.2  Partner selection 
Another stream of IJV research relates to the selection of suitable IJV partners. 
This is an important aspect for IJV success, and as Arino et al. (1997) and Vaidya 
(2000) maintain one of the reasons for IJV failures is the selection of an incom-
patible partner, due to partners having a number of different goals. Differences in 
these goals can cause the venture to break up (Vaidya, 2000). Lane and Beamish 
(1990) argue that one of the most important factors in establishing an IJV is iden-
tifying and selecting partners. In addition, Geringer (1991) finds that when firms 
look for complementary partners, they need to determine the specific task-related 
complementary element that is the basis for the partnership. Geringer (1988) di-
vides partner selection criteria into two dimensions namely task related and part-
ner related. Beamish (1994) and Cullen et al. (1995) emphasize the aspect of trust 
in partner selection. In their recent study on the role of the host country legal 
environment on IJV partner selection, Roy and Oliver (2009) find that host 
country rule of law perceptions positively influence partner-related criteria. 
Based on a survey of 42 international joint ventures in Bahrain, Al-Khalifa and 
Peterson (1999) suggest that partner- related factors are more important than task-
related factors in selecting a partner. Glaister and Yu (1993) find that when 
selecting a Chinese partner, the most important characteristic is the partner's 
ability to negotiate with the host government. Larimo and Rumpunen (2006), 
based on a sample of 60 IJVs established by Finnish companies in various foreign 
countries during the 1990s, find that IJV location- specific and investment-
specific variables had influenced the relative importance of the partner selection 
criteria used by the Finnish companies. They also suggest differences in the 
relative importance of the selection criteria between better and poorly performing 
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IJVs. In the same vein, Salavrakos and Stewart (2006), who assess the association 
between performance of IJVs and the partner selection criteria of Greek firms in 
Centre and Eastern Europe, find that careful selection of partners can secure the 
future prospects of their IJVs. From an analysis of 66 joint ventures in developing 
countries, Beamish (1994) finds that multinational executives in the high-
performing ventures select their local partners enlisting greater contributions from 
general managers, functional managers, knowledge of current local business 
practices, and general knowledge of the economy. In contrast, multinational 
executives in low-performing ventures choose their local partners to be able to 
satisfy existing/expected government requirements for local ownership or to 
avoid political intervention (Beamish, 1994).  
2.1.3  Trust and commitment 
Discussing the major determinants of IJV success and failure, Chowdhurry (1989) 
proposes that commitment and inter-partner trust play crucial roles. Commitment 
can be defined as an enduring design to maintain a value relationship (Moorman 
et al., 1993), a sign of willingness to provide, on a continual and long term basis, 
resources and capabilities for the specific needs of the IJV operation (Chodhury, 
1989). Relational commitment between parents and their IJVs occurs because the 
relationship is important to their overall company performance, and thus warrants 
substantial maintenance efforts (Yeheskel at al., 2004). Therefore, committed 
partners expect long-term profits than short-term gains. This leads to less fre-
quency and less intense conflicts, and the more partners commit to the IJVs, the 
better the IJV’s performance will be (Demirbag & Mirza, 2000). With regard to 
the relationship between commitment and performance, on the basis of a study of 
880 Japanese IJVs, Cullen et al. (1995) find that performance and expected out-
comes pay off with a greater commitment of partners to the IJVs. The same study 
also point out that the more important the IJVs are to their parents, the more 
committed that parent firms are to the IJVs. In addition, Isobe et al. (2000) find 
that foreign parent firms’ commitment to technology transfer to IJVs has a posi-
tive effect on IJV performance. Besides, a commitment to IJVs can help partners 
achieve individual and joint goals without fear of being taken advantages of.  
As with commitment, mutual trust between partners appears to be an important 
condition in an IJV relationship. Trust can be defined as the mutual confidence of 
the partners that none of them will exploit the other’s vulnerabilities (Zhang & Li, 
2001). Harrigan (1988) maintains that trust plays significant role in IJV perform-
ance. A long-term exchange between partners cannot function effectively in the 
absence of trust (Chowdhury, 1989). Inter-partner trust can reduce the costs in-
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herent in shared ownership and improve coordination of efficiencies when part of 
a  partner’s objective for the  IJVs (Parkhe, 1993; Yan & Gray, 1994), and corre-
lates with IJV structure (Chowdhury, 1989). Researchers suggest that trust be-
tween partners must to be built over a period of time (Madhok, 1995) and it helps 
to reduce friction between partners (Parkhe, 1993). To sum up, partner trust and 
commitment are important to IJV success.  
2.1.4  Cultural influences 
Cultural difference between partners and its impact on IJV performance are the 
most common issues found in IJV research (Li et al., 2001). Cultural similarity 
may help IJVs to avoid problems and facilitate trust and cooperation between 
partners. Differences in cultural backgrounds between partners have been per-
ceived as a threat to the survival of IJVs (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997). Howe-
ver, a similar culture is not always the most valuable resources in terms of effect 
on IJV performance (Li et al., 2001) or may not affect IJV performance at all 
(Beamish & Fey, 2001). Li et al. (2001) show that despite their large cultural dis-
tance from their Chinese partners, IJVs established by Western partners perform 
better than IJVs established by partners from East Asia. In research on culture in 
IJVs, researchers examine the influences of both national and organizational cul-
tures on IJVs. When organizational cultures show differences, misunderstanding 
and mistrust often arise (Pothukuchi et al., 2002).  
In cultural research in IJVs, researchers have also been looking for the relation-
ship between cultural differences between partners and IJV longevity. Interesting-
ly, the results of these studies contradict each other. Beamish and Fey (2001) find 
that the home base of the foreign parent operating a JV in Russia did not affect 
IJV longevity. Park and Ungson (1997) maintain that cultural distance in general 
did not have an effect on dissolution of IJVs, but US-Japanese joint ventures 
lasted longer than US-US joint ventures. In the same vein, Li et al., (2002) argue 
that two little cultural distance might generate inadequate innovation or construc-
tive conflict to influence IJV the overall outcome. In contrast, Hennart and Zeng 
(2002) find that IJVs that have parent firms from different countries will expe-
rience greater conflicts and therefore, have a shorter life than those with partners 
from the same countries.  
In summary, cultural differences seem to have a strong influence on IJV opera-
tions. However, whether the degree of difference of cultures between partners 
results in a positive or a negative effect or indeed has no effect on IJV perform-
ance is still open to question.  
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2.1.5  Learning in IJVs 
According to Kogut (1988) and Lyles (1988) and Hamel (1991) one of the most 
popular reason for firms to form IJVs is learning. In an IJV two or more organiza-
tions are brought together because of their complementary features and differen-
ces (Inkpen, 1997). The differences in partner’s skill areas are fuel for partners to 
learn to achieve certain goals. This learning process can be expected to result in 
improving IJV performance (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Child & Yan, 2003). More spe-
cifically, Kogut (1988) maintains that learning is a process of improving an or-
ganization’s actions through knowledge transfer and acquisition of a better un-
derstanding of its environments. Hyder (1999) distinguishes two types of learning 
including technological learning, which relates to production or technology and 
market-based learning which relates to local market knowledge. According to 
Child and Yan (2003) there are three aspects of learning including learning from 
experience, formation learning, and operational learning. Learning from expe-
rience involves parent company personnel gained from their previous contact with 
IJVs and international business being transferred to a new IJV. Formation lear-
ning is what partners learning, during the process of forming IJVs, and might in-
clude such elements as the process for seeking and negotiating with potential 
partners. Operational learning is learning to work effectively with partners in the 
daily operational activities of an IJV. However, the influence of knowledge from 
learning from experience on performance may decrease over time as the IJV 
meets its original needs and begins to develop its own capabilities (Lane, Salk, & 
Lyles, 2001).  
Inter-partner learning can reduce one partner’s dependence on another’s knowl-
edge (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Inkpen and Beamish (1997) argue that once an 
IJV is established, the foreign partners attach, a higher value to the acquisition of 
local knowledge, and that results in an increased probability of the IJVs instability 
increasing. When inter-partner learning is unbalanced, the fast learners tend to 
leave the IJVs. Even though partners are willing to learn, the degree of learning 
varies from partners to partners due to the differences in partners’ ambitions, or-
ganizational size, complexity, and learning capacity of the partners (Hyder, 1999: 
446). As a result, the role of learning of partners seems to positively affect the 
financial performance of IJVs, while it may have a negative influence on the sta-
bility and survival of the hybrid of organization. 
2.1.6  Environmental issues 
In addition to the internal factors those researchers have focused on discussed in 
the previous section environmental issues have also been a key topic in IJV re-
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search. Environment is a very important issue in IJV research because it sets the 
context in which to evaluate the relationships between strategy and performance 
(Prescott (1986). The environmental factors often consist of host government be-
haviors, economical factors including exchange rate, inflation, and resource scar-
city and the level of competition in the environments (Shortell & Zarac, 1988). 
Unexpected changes in local government policy can change the resources de-
pendence pattern and cause a shift in the parent´s relative bargaining power, 
which in turn changes IJV stability (Yan & Gray, 1994; Yan & Zeng, 1999). 
Hennart and Zeng (2002) mention that IJV parents need to adjust their strategies 
to unexpected changes in the external economic environment, and this may affect 
the survival of IJVs. In addition, industry dynamics can influence performance of 
IJVs. According to Kogut (1988) and Hennart et al. (1998), IJVs are less stable in 
industries that experience intensive consolidation of volatile growth. Ozorhon et 
al. (2007) finds no relationship between host countries related risks and IJV per-
formance. The relationships between environmental issues and IJV performance, 
in summary, is one of the important topics in IJV research, however, the issues 
have not attracted much attention from academic researchers, resulting in limited 
knowledge of the area. 
2.1.7  Control in IJVs 
The previous sections have introduced the different factors focused on in previous 
IJV studies that may influence IJV operations and performance. However, these 
studies have neglected the role of control of IJV operations. The IJV control issue 
is important because even when IJVs operate in similar conditions they may not 
perform equally because they are managed differently (Chen, 2004). Vaidya 
(2000) proposes that it is important to manage a partner relationship effectively. 
Geringer and Hebert (1989) suggest that control is multi-dimensional and inclu-
des control focus, extent, and mechanisms According to Zhang and Li (2001), IJV 
control can be classified into different streams. The first stream considers the pa-
rent firm´s equity share in the IJV as an indicator of its control over IJVs. The 
second stream relates to parent firm control over the specific operational activities 
of the IJV. The third stream is strategic control over the IJV.  
One of the first studies of IJV control was by Stopford and Well (1972) on US 
multinational firms. That suggests that global integration and rapid technological 
development require parent firms to have more control over foreign subsidiaries. 
In addition, they also point out that the need for local resources can lead to con-
trolling power being lost to local firms. In the same vein, Aiken and Hage (1968) 
suggest that a degree of control must be sacrificed if the firm wishes to benefit 
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from the resources contributed by other partners. In the same vein, Reynold 
(1984) suggests foreign firms may be willing to give up their dominant control to 
gain entry into markets that would otherwise be inaccessible. Subsequently, other 
researchers pointed out new markets that determine IJV control such as parent 
characteristics, strategic postures and environmental variables (e.g. Fagre & 
Wells, 1982; Franko, 1987, Gomes-Casseres, 1990).  
Mjoen (1993) maintains that firms protect their proprietary knowledge by control-
ling specific activities of JVs. Moreover, Mjoen suggests that input provided by 
the parents influences their bargaining power, and that bargaining power is used 
to increase the parent’s level of control over IJVs. Similarly, Li (2003), Kam-
minga and Meer-kooistra (2006) and Selekler-Göksen and Uysal-Tezölmez 
(2007) find that local parents were able to acquire control over their IJVs through 
the contribution of various resources. Therefore, bigger firms may prefer greater 
ownership control over their IJVs (Lecraw, 1984). In addition, Kobrin (1988) 
finds that firms that invested more in research and development and expertise 
prefer to have more ownership control over their IJVs. In contrast, Stopford and 
Haberich (1978) find that research and development intensive firms with a greater 
product diversity were more willing to accept less ownership control of their 
IJVs. They argue that these firms lack the ability to exploit their technical edge 
across many products in foreign markets and thus local firms may have better 
value in marketing expertise (Voris, 1998). Birnberg (1998) proposes five ele-
mental factors to be considered in designing IJV control namely degree of com-
mitment; degree of objective alignment; degree of environmental uncertainty; 
degree of trust between partners; and age of the relationship. Chen (2004) sug-
gests important factors affecting IJV control design include the parent firm’s in-
tention, resource commitment, general competence, partner’s trust, goal incon-
gruence, and importance of IJVs, reliance of IJV on the parent firm, IJV life 
stage, and market growth. 
Related to the dynamics of control in previous studies, Lynch (1993) proposes 
that IJV control evolves along parent strategy. The author suggests the four R’s as 
determinants of IJV control, these are: responsibilities, resources, risks, and re-
wards. In addition, the author maintains that an IJV control structure should be 
flexible and change over time as strategic conditions change. In short, designing a 
control mechanism structure is complex and multidimensional (Kumar & Seth, 
1998) and existing research tends to only consider one or two control dimensions 
simultaneously with limited attempts at integration (Geringer & Hebert, 1989).  
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2.1.8  IJV performance 
The concept and measurement of organizational performance have been a contro-
versial topic for organizational researchers. Due to the lack of consensus on this 
concept, the extant empirical research has not produced theory of performance 
measurement that can be applied across organizations (Tatoglu & Glaister, 1998).  
In addition, IJVs are not always formed to achieve conventional business goals 
such as profit and market share, but are set up for qualitative objectives such as 
organizational learning, co-opting or blocking competition (Contractor & Lo-
range, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988). Some researchers have defined per-
formance as the ultimate test of a firm’s strategy (Schendel & Hofer, 1979), and 
also as multidimensional construct (Vryza, 1997).  
Measurement of the performance of IJVs has become an important research topic 
in international business (Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Yan & Zeng, 1999). There 
are two main ways to measure IJV performance. The first way uses objective 
measures of performance including a variety of traditional financial indicators 
such as profitability, growth and cost position, the survival of the IJV (e.g. Killing 
1983), its duration (Kogut, 1988), the instability of its ownership (Gomes-
Casseres, 1987), the renegotiation of the IJV contract (Blodgett, 1992), and disso-
lution (Park & Ungson, 1997; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Objective measures 
have several limitations: measurements such as financial measures of perform-
ance are not always appropriate to the effective assessment of IJV performance 
(Killing, 1983). They are only good to explain the past performance of IJVs but 
fail to reflect the long term objectives of IJVs (i.e. reputation) (Anderson, 1990). 
Therefore, choosing performance measures depends on the parent firm’s objec-
tives (Lyles et al., 2000). Anderson (1990) argues that strategic decisions based 
on a one year old experience seem to be an antiquated mode of management. Fur-
thermore, Lyles et al. (2000) maintain that the notion of performance should be 
understood in a real time framework. Moreover, the absence of concrete goals and 
actual motivations of parent firms makes it difficult to evaluate JV results 
(Parkhe, 1996). In addition, since most IJVs do not need to publish results, and 
those that are available are often tainted by problems of transfer pricing and tax 
shifting, reliable data on IJV performance is difficult to get (Zeng 1998). IJV sur-
vival and duration may also not be associated with IJV success (Parkhe, 1996). It 
may be a result of barriers to existence so a short lived IJV does not necessarily 
mean it is a failure (Harrigan, 1988). When parents firms’ objectives are met, end-
ing the IJVs would be normal method of termination (Lyles et al., 2000).  
The second way is subjective measurement using the assessment of parent’s satis-
faction with IJV performance (Killing, 1983; Beamish & Banks, 1987) and the 
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achievement by parent firms of their strategic goals (Yan & Gray, 1994) which is 
considered to be more closely related to parent objectives. Subjective measure-
ment is also quite popular in IJV research because of the problem of data access 
and measurements of object measurements. The measurements can be made by a 
managerial assessment when a foreign parent firm is satisfied with the venture; or 
when a local parent firm is satisfied with the venture; or when both partners are 
satisfied with the venture (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Killing, 1988; Parkhe, 1996). 
Geringer and Hebert (1991) find a significant correlation between the parent’s 
assessment of IJV performance and that of the IJV’s general manager. Peng and 
Luo (2000) also point out that a high correlation between self-reported data and 
archival data in China. Beamish and Delios (1997) conclude from their review 
that perceptual and objective measures of IJV performance generally correlate. 
These considerations suggest that perceptual measures of performance are suit-
able for IJV research.  
 
Figure 4. IJV performance measurement 
2.1.9  Relationships between parent control and IJV performance 
Researchers have paid considerable attention to the relationship between parent 
control and IJV performance. However, the results are not consistent. Killing 
(1983) who investigates 37 IJVs located in North America and Western Europe, 
finds that dominant foreign parent control results in better IJV performance than 
shared management control. Schaan (1983), who examines 10 IJVs in Mexico, 
finds that IJV performance will be better if parent firms focus control on the areas 
that are most important it. Lecraw (1984), who uses 153 subsidiaries of multina-
tional firms located in the US, Europe, and Asia, concludes that the more impor-
tance the multinational places on the control of a subsidiary, the better the per-
formance of its subsidiaries. In the same vein, Mjoen (1993) finds that a higher 
level of foreign parent control is associated with better IJV performance.  
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However, other researchers find contradictory results indicating that shared con-
trol or local parent dominated control systems lead to better IJV performance 
(Beamish, 1985; Geringer and Hebert, 1991, Tomlinson, 1970). Further, other 
researchers suggest that specific control by parent firms lead to better IJV per-
formance. Supporting for this, Awadzi (1987), who uses a sample of 40 IJVs lo-
cated in the United States, finds that high IJV performance relates to foreign par-
ent firms having more control over accounting procedures, export and import, 
production, budgeting, training, and wages. On the other hand, high IJV perform-
ance relates to foreign parent firms having less control over pricing, purchasing, 
administration, costing methods, and quality control. In the same vein, Choi 
(2001) using 71 IJVs in Korea finds that split control by parent firms leads to bet-
ter IJV performance than dominant and shared control. Zhang and Li (2001) con-
trary to all other viewpoints, propose that IJV performance is better if both for-
eign firms and local firms grant more autonomy to the IJV management team. In 
addition, Luo, Shenkar, and Nyaw (2001) study a dual parent perspective on con-
trol and performance using 295 IJVs in China. They find that both overall and 
specific controls are associated with performance for foreign parents, while only 
specific control is associated with performance for Chinese parents. In addition, 
they specified that under goal incongruity, Chinese parent control was associated 
with foreign dissatisfaction with IJV performance, but not vice versa. Li (2003), 
who studies the effect of parent control on Japanese-Chinese JV performance 
from the Japanese viewpoint, finds that control by Japanese parent firms is sig-
nificantly linked to the export oriented IJVs but not to local- market oriented 
ones.  
In an attempt to further the knowledge of IJV control, other researchers have tried 
to establish the links between different influential factors on parent control and 
IJV performance. Guidice (2001) studies the impact of parent firms’ experience, 
strategic interdependence and control on IJV performance. Guidice finds that 
goals are most likely to be achieved when experienced parents use more control 
mechanisms while limiting the amount of interdependence among parties. In con-
trast, goals are least likely to be realized when inexperienced parents use fewer 
control mechanisms to manage heightened degrees of interdependence. Li (2002) 
conducts research on control, trust, and performance, finds that trust is more sig-
nificant to IJV performance than control and that performance effects of control 
are contingent on the parent firm’s distinct objectives for the IJVs. In contrast 
with the viewpoint that parent control influences IJV performance, some re-
searchers such as Janger (1980), Tillman (1990), and Ding (1993), Xiansheng 
(1998) Duan and Chuanmin (2007) find no direct relationship between parent 
control and performance.  
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A review of the literature to date reveal there is no consensus about the relation-
ship between parent control and IJV performance. The unresolved question for 
future study is whether there is a relationship between parent control and IJV per-
formance, and if dominant control, equal control, minor control, or split control 
by foreign parent firms leads to better IJV performance. In addition, it has been 
noted in the literature that IJV control would evolve over time but it was not clear 
how IJV control changes and under what influences. Previous research topics on 
IJVs are summarized in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Areas of focus in previous IJV studies 
To summarize, as discussed above and shown in Figure 5 previous research on 
IJVs has focused on different topics – from the motives of partners firms entering 
IJVs, and partner-selection (see 1), to different factors affecting IJV control such 
as ownership, a firm’s resources, and cultural factors (see 2); and how environ-
mental factors affect the interactions between partners and also the survival and 
performance of IJVs (see 3). In addition, previous research focuses on analyzing 
how inter-partner relations are influence by different factors like partner control 
(see 4) and inter-partner trust and commitment (see 5). Furthermore, previous 
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research targets attempts to find out how inter-partner relations relate to IJV sur-
vival or IJV performance (see 6), and what IJV performance means to parent 
firms (see 7). In the IJV development process, researchers have also investigated 
the learning perspectives of partners in IJVs. From Figure 5 above we can see  
absence of a study that provides a direct link between parent characteristics, con-
tribution, strategies to IJV control, and IJV performance. In addition, there is no 
study that has focused on the link between the influences of host countries’ envi-
ronments on parent control exercised over their IJVs, and how this affects IJV 
performance. In addition, Figure 5 above also illustrates that while there have 
been studies on how parent control influences IJV performance there is no study 
that examines the reversed effects of IJV performance on parent control over their 
IJVs. This dissertation attempts to build these missing links. 
2.2  Foundation theories of IJV control 
There are sveral theoretical perspectives on management control such as agency 
theory (e.g., Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994; Roth & O’ Donnell, 1996; Sanders & Car-
penter, 1998) transaction cost theory (e.g. Hennart, 1982; Hennart & Park, 1994; 
Hymer, 1960), resource dependence theory, the organizational learning perspec-
tive (Hedlund, 1986, 1994), and network theory (e.g., Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). 
However, not all theories are able to explain the complexity of IJV control. 
With regard to agency theory  O’Donnell (2000) who studied how MNCs manage 
foreign subsidiaries found that agency theory is limited in its ability to fully ex-
plain the phenomenon of foreign subsidiary control (O’Donnell, 2000: 525)- Re-
garding the use of agency theory to understand the parent-IJV relationship, Free-
land (1999) maintains the theory is incomplete and inaccurate. Network theory 
views MNCs as the foci centre for interactions with other firms rather than for 
inter-firm relations or relations within MNCs. In the context of IJVs (e.g., 
Mainela, 2002), network theory views MNCs as a whole, and feels they can bene-
fit greatly from transferring resources and competencies that were originally de-
veloped at different international locations within the firm (O’Donnel, 2000). This 
theory is not suitable for the study of IJV control within the parameters of this 
work, since the relationships between different subsidiaries knowledge transfer 
between headquarters and subsidiaries and between subsidiaries is excluded.  
The theories, therefore, in JV literature that may help explain IJV control design 
and its evolution over time are resources dependence theory, transaction cost the-
ory, organizational learning perspective (e.g. in Parkhe, 1996; Zhang & Li, 2001; 
Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). In this chapter, first, resource dependence theory, 
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transaction cost theory, and the organizational learning perspective are reviewed 
in connection with IJV research, specially, IJV control and performance. After 
that, they are integrated and justified for use as foundation theories in the present 
dissertation. 
2.2.1  Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory was developed by Emerson (1963) and further pro-
gressed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who proposed that control over critical 
resources by one organization can make another firm dependent on it. Critical 
resources may include technology, management know how, global service sup-
port, local knowledge, product distribution, material procurement, and equity sha-
re (Yan & Gray, 2001a). Resource dependence theory assumes that even when 
operating in the same industry, firms are heterogeneous in terms of their resources 
and capabilities. In addition, in competitive environments, to survive, organiza-
tions are dependent on each other for critical resources. By controlling resources, 
a firm can minimize the dependence on other firms and maximize the dependence 
of other firms on it. (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
Resource dependence theory has viewed an IJV as a combination of parent firm 
resources, tangible and intangible, which create competitive advantages. In some 
countries such as China, an IJV is known as a marriage of a foreign firm’s tech-
nology and a local firm’s country specific knowledge, such as local economy, 
culture, and politics. In IJV research, resource dependence theory provides not 
only an explanation of why IJVs are formed but also why control is needed and 
accomplished by parent firms. Resource dependence theory is appropriate for 
examining IJVs because parent firms use IJVs to access valuable resources that 
they do not own (Chen & Chen, 2003). The power that comes from controlling 
the resources the dependent party needs can increase the bargaining power of the 
controlling party, allowing it to negotiate greater control over the IJV activities 
(Mjoen & Tallman, 1997).  
In addition, Emerson (1962) argues that power is a property of social relation-
ships. The power among partners could be balanced if each depends on the other 
in similar manner but not necessarily for the same things. In IJVs, power is 
needed to reduce uncertainty about a partner’s behavior and expected contribu-
tions of resources. Further, if resources are not exchanged as stated in IJV con-
tracts, then IJV performance may not be as expected. Besides, withholding infor-
mation is likely to result in inappropriate resource allocations, thus threatening to 
make the relationship futile. As a result, where there is a high level of dependence 
between partners, there is the need for information to be freely exchanged be-
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tween parties (Guidice, 2001). Partners in IJVs want to control and maintain an 
uninterrupted supply of the resources and information that they are unable to pro-
cure on their own (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Resource dependence theory has emerged as an important explanation for persis-
tent firm level performance by emphasizing a firm’s ability to create and sustain 
competitive advantage by acquiring and defending advantageous resource posi-
tions (Leiblein, 2003). In an IJV, the existing resources of one firm are expanded 
by the resources of the other parent. Resource dependence theory suggests that 
the choice of activities of control is important to JV performance (Choi, 2001). 
Parent firms engaging in IJVs face the problem of protecting the integrity and the 
use of the resources they supply, and therefore they have a motive to seek a cer-
tain level of control over IJVs (Child et al., 2005). Resource dependence theory 
highlights the importance of maintaining power over key resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Resource dependence theory also suggests that insufficient con-
trol over an IJV can lead to parent firms being unable to protect or efficiently util-
ize the resources they provide. Resource dependence theory assumes that firms 
within the same industry are heterogeneous in terms of their resources and capa-
bilities; all assets cannot be bought or sold in markets; decision makers are sub-
ject to bounded rationality; and strategy is used to achieve a competitive advan-
tage (Peteraf, 1993). The competitive advantage of a firm is the result of a strat-
egy that utilizes its unique resources and skills.  
The application of resource dependence theory will, therefore, deepen our under-
standing of what resources parent firms prefer to control and how they control 
them. In particular, the resources that partners contribute give them power bases 
for their control over IJVs or in other words, resource dependence theory suggests 
that parent firms who contribute more unique resources or more significant re-
sources to IJVs maintain better positions in the control IJVs. It is also recognized 
that an IJV control structure will change as one parent’s dependence on the other 
parent’s resources changes over time (Zhang & Li, 2001). 
2.2.2  Transaction cost theory 
In addition to resource dependence theory, it is transaction cost theory (William-
son, 1985, 1988) that has attracted the most attention and contributed greatly to 
IJV research (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Buckley & Casson, 1988; Gomes-
Casseres, 1990; Hennart, 1988; and Parkhe, 1993). Transaction cost theory has 
not only successfully explained why IJVs are formed (Zeng, 1998) but also been 
extended to study how foreign partners can manage IJVs through appropriate con-
trol. According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), the use of transaction cost theory 
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in the investigation of control and performance of IJVs is one of the most promis-
ing research avenues that can help clarify and resolve empirical inconsistencies.  
Transaction cost theory assumes that parties are bounded rationally and suscepti-
ble to opportunistic behavior. Bounded rationality means that all possible future 
contingencies cannot be foreseen and contracts remain incomplete. Incomplete 
contracts create the opportunity for opportunism too. Transaction cost theory ar-
gues that governance forms vary on a continuum from market to hierarchy, with 
various hybrid forms in between (Williamson, 1991). The choice of governance 
form is based on the efficiency of production and transaction costs (Williamson, 
1975, 1985) and the need to control the behavior of transacting parties (Provan & 
Skinner, 1989). 
According to transaction cost theory, the three factors that drive transaction costs 
are asset specificity, transaction frequency, and uncertainty over the outcome of 
the transaction (Williamson, 1985). While internalization appears to be desirable 
under certain conditions, complete movement to the hierarchical end of the con-
tinuum is not always necessary or possible (Guidice, 2001). In such cases, the IJV 
form is suggested to be the most efficient and effective means of reducing oppor-
tunism (Ramanathan, Seth & Thomas, 1997). In IJVs, sharing equity and asset 
investment holds each party mutually hostage (Kogut, 1988).  
In general, transaction cost theory suggests that to curb opportunism, the use of 
governance mechanisms such as contracts, monitoring, shared ownership, and 
reputation effects (Williamson, 1975, 1985) is necessary. Provan & Skinner 
(1989) find a positive relationship between control over decisions by a partner 
and the tendency to behave opportunistically against that partner. Besides, trans-
action cost theory also argues that the more critical the resources contributed by a 
foreign parent firm to the IJV, the greater the need for control. 
2.2.3  The organizational learning perspective 
The organizational learning perspective is important in IJV literature (Guidice, 
2001). Learning or knowledge acquisition is a way to achieve competitive advan-
tage and enhance organizational performance (Leventhal & March, 1993). Fiol 
and Lyles (1985: 811) define organizational learning as the development of in-
sights, knowledge of past actions, the effectiveness of those actions and of the 
future actions. Regarding learning in IJVs, Child & Yan (2003) point out three 
aspects of learning including learning from experience, formation learning, and 
operational learning. Learning from experience is the transfer of relevant knowl-
edge gained from previous experience of IJVs by parent firms. Formation learn-
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ing takes place when parent firms seek and negotiate terms with new partners. 
Operational learning is learning how to work effectively with local parent firms in 
the subsequent operation of an IJV. (Child & Yan, 2003: 287-288) 
Organizational learning can help to explain how parent firms develop knowledge 
about IJV management, and how knowledge influence IJV performance (Simonin 
1997). Organizational structure is an important variable in the learning process 
(Senge, 1990). Organizations learn to adopt the structure that is suitable to their 
operating environment (Nicolini & Meznar, 1995). In the same vein, Hedberg 
(1981) maintains that during their development, IJVs adjust themselves to reality 
and knowledge is used to improve the fit between their organizations and their 
operating environments. From the organizational learning perspective, an IJV can 
be described as a race to learn. Inter-partner learning can shift the relative power 
between the partners and thus make initial control unsuitable, leading to realloca-
tion of control (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). This change is needed because inter-
partner learning rates are different and learning can reduce one parent’s depend-
ence on the other parent’s knowledge.  
Entering a new market through IJVs, the foreign parent firms certainly spend a 
great deal amount of time learning about their local partners. In their learning 
process from identifying suitable partners to the formation process of IJVs, the 
foreign parent firms face certain universal barriers to working and making IJVs a 
success with the local parents. Based on an organizational learning perspective in 
IJVs, the post-formation process approach by Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) 
highlights the learning process that IJVs undergo after they are formed to over-
come barriers to success. Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) categorize three main 
types of barriers to IJV success: national cultural differences that affect the part-
ners’ communications; the ability to create and maintain trust within IJVs; the 
establishment of a control mechanism that promotes cooperation.  
In addition, Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) argue that most countries in Eastern 
Europe had long worked under centrally planned economies or centralized control 
structures which discouraged managers from communicating openly employees 
or each other. Instead, they just did what they were told to do and had little say in 
production and had almost no idea of international marketing activity. The main 
purpose of control in the system here was to report to the “central committee” or 
state the plan and instructions had been followed. A part of such organizational 
control was a system of reward which also emanated from central command and 
rarely promoted cooperation within an organization. According to Brouthers and 
Bamossy (2006) all of these heritages issues form barriers to IJV success. Hence, 
the design control in IJVs has to allow IJVs to go through the learning process in 
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their development to overcome barriers to success. As a result, an IJV control 
structure needs to leave room to encourage local partners to learn how to work 
more effectively.  
2.2.4  Toward an integrated approach 
Previous research has pointed out the necessity of using different approaches to 
describe IJV behaviors (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1977). This is because each theory 
considers different organizational sides and aspects that are related to IJV control 
structure. Mjoen and Tallman (1997) have proposed the combination approach 
between transaction cost and resource dependence in IJV research. They maintain 
that specialized control design would provide foreign parent firms with protection 
and enable exploitation of key resources, and that it could be done through in-
creasing bargaining power. The core research task of the present dissertation is to 
investigate foreign parent control in IJVs and how control exercised over IJVs by 
foreign parent firms influences IJV performance. For this purpose, transaction 
cost and resource dependence theory help to explain why IJVs are formed to max-
imize gains and minimize costs and to resolve the question of whether firms 
should “make” or “buy”. Thus, it helps to explain how the initial design of control 
structures in IJVs should be arranged in order to, on the one hand, ensure the as-
sure foreign parent’s objects are met and interests are pursued, and on the other 
hand, to avoid misuse and unintended exposure of their resources contributed.  
Transaction cost theory also helps to a proposed IJV governance structure to pre-
vent opportunistic behavior by local partners, so that foreign parents become 
more willing to contribute their resources, especially technology, and manage-
ment know-how, thus resulting in better performance. Resource dependence the-
ory helps to explain the capabilities of foreign parent firms to exercise control in 
IJVs.  Both resource dependence theory and transaction cost theory are very much 
static and therefore do not explain fully the dynamic nature of IJV development. 
In addition, whereas transaction cost theory holds that IJV performance is deter-
mined by the nature of the transactions to be performed, resource dependence 
theory emphasizes the significant role of parent firms’ resource alignment (Chen 
& Chen, 2003). 
Organizational learning theory, on the other hand, does not provide many expla-
nations for the existence of, or the design of, the initial control structure of IJVs. 
However, the theory plays a very important role in offering a foundation to ex-
plain the changes in and dynamic aspects of IJVs. More specifically, organiza-
tional learning theory suggests that organizations are learning. Parent firms learn 
and acquire knowledge through IJVs. When knowledge acquisition shifts the bal-
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ance of bargaining power between partners, mostly toward Western firms (Yan & 
Gray, 1994), IJV structural change may result (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997).  
To summarize, each theory has it own limitations and the use of one single theory 
in previous research about IJV control and performance has produced conflicting 
results. Thus an integration of multiple approaches to enhance better understand-
ing of IJV control is necessary (see e.g. Yan & Gray, 1994; Kogut, 2002).  
Table 3. Foundation theories of IJV control in the present dissertation 
 
 
Implications of 
the theory in  
the dissertation 
 
 
Transaction Cost  
Theory 
 
Resources Dependence 
Theory 
 
Organizational Learning 
approach 
 
Motives of IJVs 
exist 
 
 
Hybrid organization is 
more efficient than mar-
ket and hierarchy alone 
 
 
Organizations are de-
pendent on each other 
for critical resources 
 
A means to acquire new skill 
and routines 
 
Initial control 
design 
 
 
To reduce opportunistic 
behavior and decrease 
transaction costs 
 
 
To command resources 
that are vital for the 
success of IJVs 
 
Promoting knowledge transfer 
and learning to take place 
 
Change in control 
design 
 
Need to reduce control-
ling costs taking into 
account performance 
overtime 
 
Due to increasing inde-
pendent from local 
partner’s resources over 
time 
 
Accumulating local experi-
ences & specific knowledge 
leading to shift in bargaining 
power and adaptive actions 
over time needed to streng-
then performance 
 
As Parkhe (1996: 451) states: “While each theory provides a useful lens, no the-
ory alone is sufficient to encompass the complexity of JVs”. Therefore, in the 
present dissertation transaction cost theory, resource dependence theory, and the 
organizational learning perspective are integrated and applied to thoroughly in-
vestigate IJV control design (in three dimensions including control focus, control 
extent, and control mechanisms) and their relationships to IJV performance over 
time. The integration of the foundation theories is summarized in Table 3.  
2.3 Conceptualizations of control in IJVs 
In the organizational literature, management control means the process by which 
an organization influences its members and its units to work in ways that meet 
organizational objectives (Glaister & Bluckley, 1998a). According to Child et al. 
(2005:15), control is a central aspect of management, and essential in any system 
 Acta Wasaensia     31 
  
that holds managers accountable for their actions and decisions. Ouchi (1977: 95) 
suggests that “control can be conceptualized as an evaluation process which is 
based on the monitoring and evaluating of behavior or of outputs”. These papers 
reveal how control can be used to manage individuals and subunits. Doz and Pra-
halad (1984) suggest that management control of multinational operations is often 
required to balance conflicting priorities between responsiveness at the national 
subsidiary level and the central coordination of global competitiveness.  
In IJVs, because there are two or more parties involved, management control is 
complex (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). The main purpose of control in JVs is to 
attain predictability and critical information on IJV operation through some regu-
latory means (Merchant, 1984; Makhija & Ganesh, 1997), thus it protects the par-
ent firm’s interests.  
Killing (1983) focuses on the IJV control structure. He proposes that control is a 
relative phenomenon. Killing (1983) is followed by the works of Schaan (1983), 
Beamish (1984), Lecraw (1984), Geringer and Hebert (1989), Blodgett (1991), 
Yan (1993), Yan and Gray (1994) and some other recent research (see Table 2 
and Table 6). This stream of work, however, does not share a consistent notion of 
control. Killing (1983) defines control as the amount of decision power that each 
parent exercises over the daily operations of an IJV.  
Hebert and Beamish (1994) define control as the process by which the behaviors 
and outputs of the IJVs are influenced by parent firms. Yan and Gray (1994) con-
ceptualize management control of IJVs in three ways: making strategic decisions, 
managing the venture’s routine operations, and designing the venture’s structure 
and procedures. Harrigan (1985) and Williamson (1997) suggest that partners 
have to exert control and influence over IJV’s decision – making to ensure that 
their goals pursued and to curb opportunism by other parent firms.   
In the present dissertation, IJV control is defined as the influence of foreign par-
ent firms on IJV operations. Furthermore, as suggested by previous studies (see 
e.g Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Das & Teng, 1998; Ramaswamy et al.,1998; Lu & 
Hebert, 2005) this dissertation adopts a multi-dimensional approach to control by 
Geringer and Hebert’s (1989). According to Geringer and Hebert (1989), to be 
able to run an IJV successfully, IJV control should consist of three dimensions- 
control mechanisms, focus, and extent. This section, addresses control dimen-
sions. 
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2.3.1  Control mechanisms  
In general control mechanisms are structural arrangements deployed to determine 
and influence what members of an organization do (Fryxell et al., 2002). Control 
mechanisms consist of a variety of mechanisms including formal and social con-
trol (see Table 4) that are available to firms to exercise effective control (Fried-
man & Beguin, 1971; Behrman, 1977) to protect their interests in IJVs (Groot and 
Merchant, 2000). Although both formal and social control mechanisms are orga-
nizational arrangements set up to influence members of IJVs, they differ in their 
impact on organizational behavior (Fryxell et al., 2002). 
Formal control depends on hierarchies, standards, (Perrow, 1972) codifies rules, 
procedures, goals, and regulations that specify desirable patterns of behavior (Das 
& Teng, 1998). They are explicit in their prescription of behavior and in their 
means of enforceability (Das & Teng, 1998). They are aimed directly at protect-
ing the assets of parent firms (Fryxell et al., 2002). Formal control mechanisms 
help to decrease the potential for opportunism by controlling the assets through 
hierarchical means (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). Foreign parent firms exercise for-
mal control mechanism primarily through major ownership, the power of veto, 
formal plans, budgets, reports, agreements, and approval of the composition of a 
venture’s board and also through control of strategic decisions (Schaan, 1983). 
Formal control mechanisms are usually agreed upon and imposed by both parent 
firms (Fryxell et al., 2002). In terms of formal control, prior research points out 
that foreign parent firms often favor the use of majority equity as the main control 
mechanism of IJV activities.  
This, however, does have some limitations such as when: a majority equity share 
is not available; the decisions of an IJV’s board of directors cannot be expected to 
reflect a majority equity position without qualification; or when it may not be an 
effective means of control, for example- where the protection of core knowledge 
and its effective use come into play (Child et al., 2005). To enhance control of 
IJVs, in addition to majority equity shareholdings, parent firms use different for-
mal and informal mechanisms including formalizing planning and approval proc-
esses for capital budgeting and resource allocation, and laying down procedures 
and routines for IJVs. The use of contracts to restrict an IJV´s use of technology 
and brand name, as well as access to suppliers and markets, is another important 
weapon in the battle to control any unexpected behavior of local parents.  
In addition, the board of directors is one of the most important control mecha-
nisms foreign parent firms utilize in their IJVs due. An IJV board of director’s 
role is seen as vital to achieving the IJV’s goals as set by parent firms (Guidice, 
2001) through monitoring, evaluating and guiding IJV activities.  
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Table 4. Previous studies of IJV control mechanisms  
In addition, the board of directors can exercise control by exercising its power of 
veto and influence in strategic deliberations and the decision making process 
(Kumar & Seth, 1998). In the relationship to parent firms, Shortell and Zajac 
Control  
mechanisms 
Studies Results 
 
Formal 
1. Ownership  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Board of director 
 
 
 
 
3. Appointment of 
key personnel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Strategic plan 
 
 
5. Setting up poli-
cies and procedures 
 
6. Partner right to 
veto IJV manage-
ment 
 
 
      Killing (1983), Schaan (1983), 
Lecraw (1984), Blodgett (1992), Hebert 
& Beamish (1997), Lee et al. (1998), 
Ramaswamy et al. (1998), Xiansheng 
(1998), Wang et al. (1999), Li (2003) 
Dhanaraf & Beamish (2004) Child et al 
(2005), Glaister et al. (2005), Lu & 
Hebert (2005). Selekler-Göksen & Uysal-
Tezölmez, (2007). Duan & Chuanmin 
(2007). 
      Child et al. (1997), Kumar & Seth 
(1998), Child & Yan (1999), Groot & 
Merchant (2000), Glaister et al. (2005). 
Selekler-Göksen & Uysal-Tezölmez, 
(2007).  Duan & Chuanmin (2007). 
      Child et al. (1997), Kumar & Seth 
(1998), Child & Yan (1999), Wang et al. 
(1999), Groot & Merchant (2000), Li 
(2003), Kabst (2004), Glaister et al. 
(2005). Selekler-Göksen & Uysal-
Tezölmez, (2007). Whitelock & Yang 
(2007). Duan & Chuanmin (2007). 
 
 
    
   Child et al. (1997), Ramaswamy et al. 
(1998), Xiansheng (1998), Child & Yan 
(1999), Li (2003). 
       Glaister (1995), Calantone & Zhao 
(2001), Glaister et al. (2005). Whitelock 
& Yang (2007). 
      Child et al. (1997), Kumar & Seth 
(1998), Groot & Merchant (2000), 
Glaister et al. (2005). 
 
 
    Equity share plays an important role in 
the level of IJV control but it may not 
equate with the constitution of the IJV 
board. 
 
 
 
 
     
 
  Mix results with the control of propor-
tion of ownership in IJVs by foreign 
parent firms and IJV performance.  
 
 
      Positively related to strategic de-
pendence between parents and IJVs. As 
an effective mechanism to make or ap-
prove all major policy in the IJV-whether 
financing, investment, or HR. Foreign 
parent firms need to fill key positions in 
areas where they bring specific assets to 
the IJVs. IJV managers act as links to and 
informers for parent firms. 
 
      An important means for foreign 
parent firms to achieve their established 
goal for their IJVs. 
     As a condition for success of tech-
nology transfer from foreign parent firms 
to their IJVs.  
     An effective mechanism when part-
ners are minor shareholders. 
 
Informal/Social 
1. Communication 
 
 
2. Personal relation-
ship 
3. Training 
 
 
 
4. Social knowledge 
 
 
 
     Shenkar & Zeira (1992), Das & Teng 
(1998), Glaister et al. (2005), Gong et al. 
(2005), Kamminga & Meer-Kooistra 
(2006). 
      Groot & Merchant (2000), Child & 
Yan (2003), Glaister et al. (2005).  
      Dianne (1997), Makhija & Ganesh 
(1997), Das & Teng (1998), Kumar & 
Seth (1998), Li (2003), Gong et al. 
(2005), Brouthers & Bamossy (2006), 
Welch & Welch (2006). 
       Makhija & Ganesh (1997), Das & 
Teng (1998), Kumar and Seth (1998), 
Lyles et al. (2000), Lu & Hebert (2005). 
 
 
      Effective communication is important 
in fast changing environments related to 
decision making process. 
      Important mechanisms IJV control in 
later IJV development process. 
An Effective way to motive local em-
ployees, to promote corporate culture, 
and to improve effectiveness of human 
capital. 
 
      Important aspect for parents to deal 
with IJV managers, and employees. 
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(1988) suggested that an IJV board of directors should work closely with their 
parent firms to enhance the potential for useful interaction. 
The appointment of key personnel is also an important control mechanism be-
cause it ensures that the IJV’s management team has the required skills to run the 
IJV effectively (Kumar & Seth, 1998). It is important to have IJV managers from 
foreign parent firms because they transfer the foreign parent firm’s values, objec-
tives, and ways of doing things to the IJVs (Killing, 1983). 
These IJV managers can also serve as the direct information link between parent 
firms. They foster smooth communication and provide parent firms with a chan-
nel for face to face interaction (Geng, 2004). The smooth communication, the 
frequently repeated face to face interaction, and the opened exchange of informa-
tion enhance mutual understanding. This helps to reduce uncertainty and unpre-
dictability, and promote cooperation among parent firms (Gulati, 1998). How-
ever, foreign parent firms do not need to appoint large numbers of their loyal fol-
lowers to exert a significant control influence (Groot & Merchant, 2000). 
The term “social control” has been used interchangeably with “informal control,” 
and “normative control” (Leifer & Mills, 1996). Social control is designed to 
promote expectations and mutual commitments through which IJV managers 
learn to share common attitudes and knowledge of the organization (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). Social control mechanisms permit the evolution and inculcation 
of norms and values through structural personal interaction and training (Fryxell 
et al., 2002). Social controls refer to mechanisms such as informal communica-
tion, information exchange and training, mentoring, and development of a com-
mon organizational culture – one that fosters shared values and norms without 
explicitly restricting the behavior of the people targeted by those social controls 
(Schaan 1983; Chalos & O’Connor, 1998; Das & Teng, 1998). Thus, social con-
trol can foster a sense of respect between the IJV and its parents (Lyles et al., 
2000). When exercising social controls parent firms provide their IJVs with clues 
to the confidence they have in their IJV’s integrity (Larson, 1992; Chen, 2004).  
In addition, foreign parent firms use social control to promote their corporate cul-
ture to IJVs (Child et al., 2005), thus increasing foreign parent firms’ confidence 
in IJVs (Chen, 2004). A lack of understanding of the other partner’s culture and 
policies, may lead to misunderstandings and problems. Therefore, social control 
is one of the most important IJV controls (Das & Teng, 1998) that helps, on the 
one hand, to increase the IJV management’s loyalty and align the IJV’s opera-
tions with its parent’s interests (Chen, 2004). On the other hand, social control 
may have a strong impact on activity coordination and resource exchanges (Lyles 
et al., 2000). Parent foreign firms use social control to control IJVs by rotating 
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personnel between the IJVs and parents or inviting IJV managers to parent train-
ing sessions and seminar. In this way, foreign parent firms are able to integrate 
their culture and the culture of the IJV and enhance the commitment of IJV man-
agers from local parents (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991). 
Maintaining effective communication between parent firms and IJVs is also an 
effective informal control mechanism. Previous research points out that a lack of 
communication between parent firms and IJVs may delay the decision-making 
process slow down IJVs operation due to the need to wait for approval and the 
increase the possibility of misunderstandings (Shenkar & Zeira, 1992). Delaying 
the decision-making process may have serious consequences in fast changing 
markets such as the emerging Chinese market (Gong et al. 2005). 
Another way to obtain control over IJV activities is by developing regular per-
sonal relations with the IJV’s senior managers and local parent’s representatives 
in the IJV. So in this mechanism, foreign parent representatives are assigned with 
sufficient time not only to monitor the IJV progress but also to create the neces-
sary personal contacts to support IJV activities. Informal control mechanisms 
such as technical advisory and managerial inputs offered to IJVs on a continuing 
non-contractual basis have considerable potential to enhance control over IJV 
activities. This is because through working together, discussing issues, and trans-
ferring technology and management know how to the IJV team, a foreign parent 
can increase the skills of the IJV team and make sure the IJV staffs and products 
are up to their standard. An added benefit is that the foreign parent can monitor 
the behavior of IJV staff and thus take appropriate action (Child et al., 2005). 
Training employees in IJVs is also a rather important form of social control that 
may influence IJV performance. This is because existing employees are more 
liable to bring with them attitudes and work practices from the old traditional sys-
tems to IJVs (Warner, 1995). A lack of training for function can reduce the effec-
tiveness of human capital of IJVs as employee skills cannot be properly exploited, 
leading to reduced competency in IJVs and indirect to reduced motivation levels 
(Gong et al., 2005). 
Compared to formal control mechanisms, social control mechanisms have the 
potential to reduce monitoring and contracting costs and permit the flexibility and 
adaptability that are critical to IJV performance in the later stage (Dyer, 1997). 
However, social control alone may not be enough to deliver parent firms their 
objectives for the IJVs since it may not exist or be very limited in the early stages 
of the IJV lifecycle. 
36      Acta Wasaensia 
In short, as summarized in Table 4, the term control mechanism as used in the 
present dissertation consists of formal control and social control.  The main for-
mal control mechanisms consist of ownership, composition of the board of direc-
tors, appointment of key personnel, strategic planning, setting up policies and 
procedures, right of veto and score IJV management. The social control mecha-
nisms include communication, personal relationships, technological and manage-
rial training and social knowledge. 
2.3.2  Control focus 
In the area of control focus, partners can choose to have a broad control focus and 
attempt to exercise control over the entire range of the IJV’s activities, or they can 
have a narrow control focus and confine their control activities to performance 
dimensions they consider to be the most critical (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Groot 
& Merchant, 2000, see Table 5). Child et al. (2005) maintain that depending on 
factors such as a parent firm’s competencies and the critical nature of such activi-
ties, parent firms may focus their control on activities related to technology in one 
case, but on market related activities in another. In addition, foreign parent firms 
often see it as important to focus their control on financial and accounting areas 
by having their own financial manager in IJVs in order to ensure accurate report-
ing (Child & Yan, 1999).  
Human resource activities may determine the extent to which the intended objec-
tives of control are achieved (Geringer & Frayne, 1990). IJVs often pose prob-
lems for human resource (i.e. see Beamish, 1988; Bleeke & Ernst, 1991) as usu-
ally the dominant partner tries to impose personnel policies on the other partner.  
Control extent refers to the tightness of control which is exercised (Geringer & 
Hebert, 1989). Tightly controlled organizations tend to be strict with respect to 
their employee’s dress code, punctuality, and cost-consciousness (Hofstede, Neui-
jen, Ohayv & Sanders, 1990) and detail oriented and precise in operation matters 
(O’Reillly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991).  
However, parent firms’ objectives are likely to be achieved only if the joint ven-
ture is staffed with qualified personnel. Thus strategic management of human 
resources is crucial for parent firms to maximize performance (Rao & Teegen, 
2001). Through controlling the human resources department of IJVs, foreign par-
ent firms can select the key management of the in IJV.  
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This permits greater control over IJV activities in the way that parental values are 
directly transferred into the IJV (Killing, 1983) so that the parent’s interests are 
observed and achieved (Guidice, 2001).  
 
Table 5. Previous studies of IJV control focus 
 
Areas of control focus Studies Results 
 
1. Marketing, sales, and 
distribution 
 
2. Procurement 
 
3. General management 
and operation 
 
 
 
4. Finance and account-
ing 
 
 
 
5. R & D and develop-
ment 
 
 
6. Production and quality 
 
 
7. Human resources 
 
Child et al. (1997), Li (2003), Kabst 
(2004), Glaister et al. (2005). 
Whitelock & Yang (2007). 
Calantone & Zhao (2001), Craig & 
Aron (2004), Glaister et al. (2005). 
Awadzi (1987), Child et al. (1997), 
Chalos & O’Connor (1998), Child & 
Yan (1999), Groot & Merchant 
(2000), Calantone & Zhao (2001), Li 
(2003), Glaister et al. (2005). White-
lock & Yang (2007). 
Awadzi (1987), Child & Yan (1999), 
Craig & Aron (2004), Kabst (2004), 
Barden et al. (2005), Kamminga & 
Meer-Kooistra (2006). 
Calantone & Zhao (2001), Li (2003), 
Kabst (2004) Child et al. (2005). 
Whitelock & Yang (2007). 
 
Zeira et al. (1997), Li (2003), Kabst 
(2004), Child et al. (2005). Whitelock 
& Yang (2007). 
Harrigan (1988), Frayne & Geringer 
(1990), Nam (1995), Rao & Teegen 
(2001), Geng (2003), Geng (2004), 
Child et al. (2005), Selekler-Göksen & 
Uysal-Tezölmez, (2007). 
 
 
. Important areas for IJV performance 
with domestic market oriented IJVs 
 
. To maintain stable and quality input 
supplied at a low cost level 
. Important lever for control in its own 
right against opportunistic behavior. 
 
 
 
. To ensure accurate reporting, and 
performance measurement and avoid 
possible conflicts in profits repatria-
tion  
 
. Important area to maintain parent 
firm’s competitive edge and against 
opportunistic  behaviors 
 
. Key area to control in manufacturing 
IJVs to ensure the IJV’s output meets 
parent firm’s plan & standards   
. To make sure key positions are filled 
by qualified personnel: to promote 
more commitment; selective control 
via gatekeepers as an efficient mecha-
nism to reduce opportunistic behavior. 
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In the same vein, Kabst (2004) proposes that through staffing of functional gate-
keepers, foreign parent firms can protect their specific investment in IJVs. Ac-
cording to Kabst (2004), if foreign parent firms have brought R & 
D/production/marketing/sales-specific assets into the IJVs, then they exercise 
control by filling those R & D/production/marketing/sales positions. This staffing 
creates provides protection against counter opportunism and thus monitoring and 
governing agency problems (Gong et al., 2005).  
Zeira et al. (1997), who studied IJVs in Hungary, found that the application of the 
Human Resource Management practices of the host culture increase the effective-
ness of IJVs. Staffing gaps may exist when foreign parent firms over staff IJVs 
with their own superfluous personnel or when foreign parent firms fail to make 
vital human resource available to the ventures (Harrigan, 1988). Staffing gaps 
result in lower productive capabilities, leading to lower IJV performance (Gong et 
al., 2005). In short, the areas of control focus in the present dissertation consist of 
marketing, sales, and distribution, procurement, general management and opera-
tion, finance and accounting, R & D and development, production and quality, 
human resources. In the present dissertation, the control focus is considered to be 
broad when it is based on more than two areas, and narrow when it is based on 
only one or two areas.  
2.3.3  Control extent 
Tight control can be effected through any mechanism that provides a partner with 
a high degree of certainty that personnel in the IJV will act as the given partner 
wishes. Control is tight from a partner’s perspective if that partner has the right to 
make or approve the key decisions (Geringer & Hebert, 1989), or if approval re-
views are frequent, detailed and performed by a knowledgeable person, the part-
ner trusts (Child et al., 2005). 
Control is considered to be tight if the IJV staff is held strictly accountable for 
adhering to a complete set of prescribed actions such as policies and procedures. 
According to Child et al. (2005), tight control is a reflect on of frequent and pre-
cise reporting. Control is tight if measurements of result are objective and also 
often include significant rewards or punishments that are definitely linked to the 
accomplishment of or failure to accomplish targets on a short term basis. A defi-
nite link between results and rewards means that no excuses for missing perform-
ance targets are tolerated (Groot & Merchant, 2000).  
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Table 6. Recent studies on IJV control (1995-2007)
2
 
 (*) M: Manufacturing C-S: Cross section S:  Service  NA:  Not available 
                                                
 
2
 Studies here selected based on current studies related to different dimensions of IJV control 
studies  
Studies Sample  
Size 
IJV Location, 
Industrial type 
(*) 
Factor Influence Control Choice Data collection,  
Method of 
Analysis 
Findings 
Glaister 
(1995) 
94 UK- 
IJVs 
. UK 
. C-S 
Contract form, equity share, time 
period of IJV formation, nationality of 
foreign partner, industry group, broad 
purpose of the venture 
. Survey 
. Chi-squared 
test 
No significant evidence of variation in the dimensions of 
control across characteristics of sample but equity share. 
Parents seek to focus their influence on particular decisions 
and activities rather than attempting to extend their control 
over the whole venture. 
Ding (1997) 34 IJVs .Cross nations 
. C-S 
Equity ownership, staffing, wage & 
labor policy, product development, 
product quality.  
. Survey 
. Regression  
Dominant managerial control exercised by foreign parent 
firms has a positive impact on the IJV performance. 
Mojen & 
Tallman 
(1997) 
102 
Norwe-
gian IJVs 
. Cross nations 
. C-S 
Culture, experience, strategies, laws, 
bargaining power, relative contribution, 
equity share 
. Survey 
. t-test, two 
tailed test 
Bargaining power is used to increase level of control over 
specific activities and overall control. 
Chalos & O’ 
Connor 
(1998) 
4 Sino-
US JVs 
. China 
. M 
Strategic objectives, transaction costs, 
cultural factors 
. Survey 
. Correlation 
The control systems of young IJVs are embryonic and 
evolved. No significant cultural differences found in the 
preference for management controls. The more comple-
mentary strategic objectives of parents, the better perform-
ance.  
Kumar & 
Seth (1998) 
64 US 
IJVs 
. US 
. M 
Strategic interdependence, environ-
mental uncertainties 
. Survey 
. Correlation 
The importance of the degree of strategic interdependence 
and the moderating role of environmental uncertainty 
influence the design of control mechanisms. 
Wang, Wee, 
& 
Koh (1998) 
148 Sino-
Singapore 
IVs 
. China 
. C-S 
Major share holding, capital, and 
resource allocation, technology and 
management advantages 
. Interview, 
survey 
. t-test 
Greater control associated with the right to appoint the 
general manager, chairman of the board, and financial 
manager. 
Chang & 
Taylor 
(1999) 
107 
MNC’s 
subsidiar-
ies 
. Korea 
. M 
Ownership, subsidiary’s relative 
importance, Nationality 
. Survey 
. Correlation 
The size of the subsidiary relative to the MNC, moderates 
the relationship between the degree of ownership and 
amount of output control. The national culture accounted 
for the type of control exerted. 
Child & Yan 
(1999) 
67 IJVs . China 
. M 
Non-capital resources, ratio of IJV 
board members, key executive 
position, strategic and operational 
control, cultural and informal mecha-
nisms. 
. Interviews 
. t-test, correla-
tions 
Equity share is the major lever to exercise strategic and 
operational control through its effects on the appointment 
of board members and key executive positions. Non capital 
resources have a direct effect on operational control.  
Groot & 
Merchant 
(2000) 
3 IJVs . Cross nations 
. M 
Parent’s objectives, IJV´s fit with the 
parent’s units, trust in other partners 
. Interviews 
. Comparative 
case analysis 
Control tightness related to the parent’s unique knowledge 
and capacity, management style, pressure for short-term 
performance, but negative with regard to the level of trust. 
Control focus related to the breadth of parent’s, parent 
objective, parent’s know-how. Control mechanisms related 
to parent’s level of trust. 
Johnson et 
al. (2001) 
153 
Japanese 
IJVs 
. Cross-nations 
. Cross-section 
Direct and indirect factors  such as 
national culture, experience of firms, 
resources 
. Survey 
. Regression 
Significant variation in control by national culture for the 
effects on the control of IJV experience, strategic impor-
tance, product similarity, and resource dependence. 
Yan & Gray 
(2001a) 
90 US-
Chinese 
IJVs 
. China 
. M 
Control strategic, operational, struc-
ture. Bargaining power: alternatives, 
strategic important, capital resources, 
non-capital resources.  
. Survey 
. Descriptive  
statistics 
Bargaining power derived from the negotiation context and 
from contributing with critical resources is the determining 
factor in management control. 
Fryxell, 
Dooley, & 
Vryza 
(2002) 
129 US-
IJVs 
. US 
. C-S 
Trust, age of IJVs . Survey 
. Regression 
analysis 
Formal control and IJV performance were found to be 
positively related in young IJVs but negatively in more 
mature IJVs. Social control and IJV performance were 
positively related in the presence of trust between parents. 
Mohr (2003) 137 
German-
Chine-
seJVs 
. China 
. NA 
Trust, contributed resources. . Interviews, 
survey 
. Correlation 
Trust is significantly negative with strategic and opera-
tional control 
Li  (2003) 215 
Japanese 
Chinese 
JVs 
. China 
. M 
Equity ownership, interdependence 
between parent firms and IJV, monitor-
ing by parent firms 
. Survey 
. Regression 
Ownership ratio, interdependence in physical-process 
resources, strategic monitoring are significant factors for 
control. 
Chalos & O’ 
Connor 
(2004)  
117 US-
Chinese 
JVs 
. China 
. M 
Equity ownership, partner knowledge, 
asset specific investment. 
. Survey 
. Correlation 
Partner knowledge and specific asset investments influ-
enced a broad set of control.  
Pangarkar & 
Klein (2004) 
76 
Singapore 
based 
IJVs 
. Cross nations 
. S and M 
Size of the IJV, equity ownership, 
cultural differences. 
. Survey 
. Regression 
Prior relationships with local parents lead to less control 
over the IJV. No significant relationship found between 
parent differences and control 
Lu & Hebert 
(2005) 
720 IJVs . Less developed 
Asian countries 
. Cross-section 
 Equity ownership, culture distance, 
country risk, IJV size, 
. Data mining 
. Correlation 
Social knowledge can serve as substitute for equity 
control. High level of foreign equity control leads to high 
IJV survival rate 
Brouthers & 
Bamossy 
(2006) 
8 IJVs . Central & 
Eastern Europe 
. Cross section 
Ownership, social, formal control Interviews 
Case analysis 
Performance is dependent on firms overcoming barriers to 
success created by ownership positions and control 
mechanisms. 
Whitelock & 
Yang (2007) 
61 IJVs .China 
. M 
IJV Strategies, objective, and daily 
Operations 
Regression different strategic objectives of foreign partners have 
different performance outcomes based on the degree of 
control exercised by the partner and the focus on different 
IJV activities 
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Controls can be tightened by more intensive training of IJV employees in produc-
tion and management techniques (Van Sluys & Schuler, 1994).  However, tight 
control may have side effects as Child et al. (2005) argue that if controls are exer-
cised too frequently and in a domineering manner, it is likely to lead to significant 
ill will and the eventual breakdown of IJVs. 
For foreign parent firms, the important issue is how to choose a set of control me-
chanisms, control focus, and control extent that produces good control. Groot & 
Merchant (2000) maintain that parent control should bring more benefits to IJVs 
than its costs (e.g. governance costs, limitation of IJV’s flexibility and re-
sponsiveness). While previous research has not provided evidence directly ex-
plaining how parent firms make control structure choices (Groot & Merchan, 
2000); it has suggested some possible determinant factors. They include parent 
firm’s characteristics (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Blodgett, 1991; Werner, 2002), 
strategies, and local uncertainties (i.e. Parkhe, 1996; Vryza, 1997; Chalos & 
O’Connor, 1998; Lyles et al., 2000; Calantone & Zhao, 2001). These issues will 
be analyzed further in the articles.  
In summary, this section has discussed three dimensions of IJV control in detail. 
These three dimensions of IJV control will be used as the IJV control structure 
when discussing the determinant factors of IJV control through out the articles in 
this dissertation. They are also used when investigating the relationship between 
foreign parent control and IJV performance. The following chapter will expand 
on about the methodology of the present dissertation including research strategy, 
data collection, and data analysis. 
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3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter first explains the research strategy of the dissertation. Then it elabo-
rates on the data collection process, and the measurement of variables. Finally, it 
deals with the mythology of the data analysis. 
3.1  Research strategy  
The present dissertation has with a clear purpose of discovering things in a sys-
tematic way (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009) and of developing useful 
knowledge to support organization problem solving in the field (Huff, Tranfield 
& van Aken, 2006) and is based on logical relationships and not just on beliefs 
(Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005). The study employs a quantitative approach to con-
ducting the empirical part of the study because it is helpful when trying to de-
velop knowledge such as cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific vari-
ables, hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and testing (Creswell, 
2003). In addition, a quantitative approach is particularly suitable for the present 
dissertation because this approach works best to identify factors that influence an 
outcome (i.e. here factors that affect control and performance), the utility of an 
intervention (i.e. here environmental factors), or understanding the best predictors 
of outcomes (i.e. here prediction of IJV performance) (Creswell, 2003: 21-22).  
In quantitative research, investigators apply research questions and hypotheses to 
declare the focus of the work and examine the relationships between variables to 
answer research question and hypotheses (Creswell, 2003). In addition, the pre-
sent dissertation uses the five sequential stages proposed by Robson (2002) to 
conduct scientific research namely deducing hypotheses;  expressing the hypothe-
ses in operational terms; testing these operational hypotheses; analyzing the re-
sults; and confirming or /modifying the theories in accordance with the findings.  
Each of the articles in part two of the dissertation consists of theoretical and em-
pirical analyses of factors influencing foreign parent control structures in their 
IJVs and their relationship to IJV performance. The study of IJV control and per-
formance is highly firm specific and often not available through secondary data. 
To test the articles’ hypotheses requires perceptual data from managers of Finnish 
parent firms. This type of strategy data cannot be addressed through any secon-
dary data sources (Slater & Atuahene-Gima, 2004)  
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To collect the required data, a mail survey is used rather than interviews. This is 
because survey research is a valuable and valid method for conducting research 
on strategy related issues (Slater & Atuahene-Gima, 2004). In addition, data col-
lected through a survey is to test a given model (Noushi, 2004) and the recent 
state of research on IJVs has gone beyond clarifying the definition of key con-
structs and produced mixed finding concerning the relationship between IJV con-
trol and its relation to IJV performance (Choi, 2001). To clarify such controver-
sial findings from previous studies and to be able to draw conclusions about the 
joint venture control, a considerable sample size quantitative study is required.  
In addition, the use of a survey approach provides an opportunity to test the exist-
ing knowledge in a rigorous manner, and to assess causal relationships (Jick, 
1979; John & Phil, 1997). This method permits a description of the overall picture 
of a phenomenon, problem, or issue by questioning a cross section of a population 
at specific moments in time (Jesson, 2001). Furthermore, survey research en-
hances the generaliz ability of the results from a sample to a population leading to 
the ability to infer some characteristics and behaviors of the population (Babbie, 
1990).   
3.2  Data collection 
This dissertation is part of a research project focusing on IJV behavior, strategies, 
partner selection, control structure, and performance of Finnish firms. The target 
firms and investments were identified firstly from the FDI data- base compiled by 
the project leader since the late 1980s, and based on press releases on IJVs pub-
lished in leading business magazines and newspapers. The second major source 
was the annual reports and websites of the 250 largest Finnish firms and the third 
was the records of the project leader of his earlier surveys focusing on IJVs and 
WOS by Finnish firms. 
The sample had to meet the following criteria: firstly the IJVs had to operate in 
the manufacturing sector; secondly they were to be equity IJVs; and thirdly one of 
the partners in the IJV had to be from Finland. Candidate IJVs were selected only 
from manufacturing industry because a single industry provides a better degree of 
control over market and environmental peculiarities and increases the internal 
validity of a study (Guidice, 2001). For the second point in the criteria, the rea-
soning is that all equity IJVs have standardized structures, similar management, 
control mechanisms, and goals (Guidice, 2001). Therefore, the findings will be 
comparable (Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Park & Russo, 1996).  
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The third point in the criteria is necessary because by looking at foreign partners 
from only one country, Finland, the influences caused by national cultural differ-
ences and political conditions occurring when foreign partners come from diverse 
countries is reduced. Besides, this was a prerequisite due to financial restrictions 
preventing the author from collecting data from different countries. In collecting 
data for the present study, the author has excluded the viewpoint of local partners. 
Although, some researchers suggest that consulting local partners is a necessity to 
consult local partners, Geringer and Hebert (1991) maintain that collecting feed-
back from both foreign and local partners can be logistically infeasible and quite 
costly. Moreover, they find a positive correlation between IJV manager’s evalua-
tions of performance and that of foreign and local parent companies. 
From the resources and the criteria, we identified 340 IJVs qualifying for this 
study; they were founded by 200 Finnish parent firms since 1988 and in operation 
at least until 2002. Among these 200 firms, several firms were very difficult to 
contact either because they had been restructured or gone out of business. While 
searching for informants, we found that in some firms there was no longer anyone 
with sufficient knowledge required for the study. This left a total of 161 Finnish 
parent firms. To maximize ability to answer the questionnaires for the respon-
dents, both postal questionnaire and online web survey are used to gather the data.  
The questionnaire is carefully designed based on prior literature and surveys in a 
manner that is intelligible to respondents (John & Phil, 1997). Most of the items 
in the questionnaires are derived or adapted from prior studies conducted by Ger-
inger and Hebert (1989), Killing (1983), Schaan (1983), Voris (1993), Mjoen, 
(1993), Xiansheng (1998), Vaidya (2000), Guidice (2001), Choi (2001) and Chen 
(2004). The criterion for generating questionnaire items is that the items have to 
capture the key structures of the study at least twice in previous research (Choi, 
2001). In addition, this dissertation adopts questionnaires mainly from these par-
ticular studies because first, they all focused on IJV control and its relationship to 
IJV performance; second the sample selection criteria studied are quite similar of 
those of the present dissertation; and third, the stated purposes of the question-
naires in these studies are similar to those of the present dissertation in that they 
seek causal relationships between independent and dependent variables. To en-
sure content validity, a group of IJV researchers reviewed the initial questionnaire 
and made suggestions for improvement. 
The informants were those managers who were directly involved in the IJV’s es-
tablishment and operations. They are the most knowledgeable people in the firms 
to provide accurate data for the study (Slater & Atuahene-Gima, 2004). To en-
hance the quality of the data, the respondents were contacted by phone in Decem-
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ber 2006 to explain the key points of the study and the questionnaires. In ex-
change for their participation in the study and to ensure accurate responses, the 
respondents were assured of their anonymity promised a summary report of the 
findings (Glaister & Buckley, 1999) and participated in a draw for three gifts. 
After one reminder at the end of January 2007, at the end of February, 54 ques-
tionnaires were returned of which 5 questionnaires were not usable. 
Thus, the final sample was 49 IJVs including 40 Finnish parent firms. The re-
sponse rate was 24.84%, which is relatively similar to that of earlier respective 
studies in Finland (see Larimo & Rumpunen, 2006). The sample size is small but 
similar to that of Mjoen (1993) with 49 IJVs and Glaister & Buckley (1998b) with 
51 IJVs. In addition, this small sample size is acceptable given that the increas-
ingly common use of mail surveys and the intensified pace of globalized business 
has reduced the willingness of potential participants to respond (Harzing & Noor-
derhaven, 2006). Characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7. Characteristics of sample 
Years of  
establishment 
1988-1995 
45% 
1996-2006 
55% 
Mode of entry Acquisitions 
53% 
Greenfields 
47% 
Number of  
partners in IJVs 
Two partners 
76% 
Three partners 
17% 
Intended  
Duration of IJVs 
Indefinite duration 
61% 
Less than 5 years 
22% 
More than 5 years 
17% 
Distribution of 
ownership 
Finnish minority  
ownership 
41% 
Equal ownership 
10% 
Finnish majority  
ownership 
49% 
Location of IJVs 
 
Developing countries 
71% 
Developed countries 
29% 
Type of IJV 
products 
Industrial products 
63% 
Consumer products 
27% 
Both types of  
products 
10% 
 
As we can see from Table 7 the majority of Finnish IJVs have two partners, loca-
tion in developing countries, indefinite duration, and industrial products. In addi-
tion, more than half of the amount of IJVs was established through acquisitions 
and have equal or Finnish majority ownership.  
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The sample was carefully examined for any systematic response bias using t-tests. 
Respondents and non respondents were compared across their age, size, interna-
tional experience, and IJV experience. No statistically significant difference was 
found. Thus, there was no response bias to be found in the final sample.  
3.3 Variables 
This study adopts measures already established in previous studies on parent con-
trol, IJV performance, host country uncertainty, parent strategies implemented for 
IJVs, parent contributions to IJVs, and parent prior IJV experience . 
3.3.1  Dependent variables 
The primary dependent variables for this study are IJV control and performance. 
Following prior studies of parent control and IJV performance (Geringer & He-
bert, 1989; Hébert, 1996; Xiansheng, 1998; Choi, 2001; Buckley et al., 2005), 
measures of control and performance are adopted. 
Control mechanisms: Measured on a 5 point-scale, the respondents were asked 
to assess the methods of monitoring and control used in the IJVs. The mecha-
nisms evaluated were. 
Formal control: a) Control based on equity share; b) participation in a venture’s 
board meetings; c) appointment of key venture personnel; d) taking part in plan-
ning JVs budgets; e) incentive plans for top management; f) financial reports; g) 
JV general manager participating in parent meetings worldwide; h) Parent-
venture face to communication and formal meetings; i) participation in JV’s deci-
sion-making; j) exercising rights of veto  at  board meetings. 
Social control: k) Informal communication; l) Parent-venture informal socializa-
tion, personal relationship (informal phone calls, outdoor activities); m) Parent 
training of venture managers. Control mechanism is formal if parent firms resort 
to more on formal mechanisms (such as those from a. to j. with a response value 
equal or greater than 3. On the other hand, the control mechanism is social if par-
ent firms exercise more on those from point k) to m) with a value from 3 to 5. 
Control focus: Measured on a 5 point-scale, the respondents were asked to assess 
their monitoring and control of the IJVs on the focus areas: a) International mar-
keting; b) Local marketing; c) Domestic sales; d) Human resources; e) Procure-
ment; f) Production; h) Quality control; h) Prices and costs; i) Financing and ac-
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counting; j) Research and development; k) Local government relations; l) General 
management. 
Control focus is narrow if the parent firms exercise it over some selected areas 
(from 1 to 3 areas from the above list). On the other hand, control is broad if they 
exercise it over more than 3 of the aforementioned areas or all areas of IJV activ-
ity from a) to l). 
Control extent: the degree of control which is exercised over the IJVs based on 
control mechanism and focus. Control extent is tight if parent firms exercise 
more than three control mechanisms and broad control. Control is loose if parent 
firms exercise less than three control mechanism and narrow control. 
Performance: was measured on 5 point-scale with 1=“very unsatisfied” to 5= 
“very satisfied”. Respondents were asked if they were satisfied with the overall 
performance of the IJV also with its financial performance in the third year after 
IJV establishment and at the current time. The advantage of using an overall per-
formance measure is that it conveys the idea of how much the IJV has been meet-
ing the parent company’s overall objective, which quite often goes beyond profit 
maximization (Schaan, 1983; Choi, 2001). 
3.3.2  Independent variables 
The primary independent variables for this study are host country uncertainty, 
foreign parent strategies implemented for IJVs, partner’s differences, partner’s 
contribution, and partner’s prior IJV experiences. Following prior studies of the 
relationship between parent characteristics IJV control and IJV performance 
(Mjoen, 1993; Voris, 1993; Xiansheng, 1998; Choi, 2001; Guidice, 2001; Chen, 
2004), the following measures of independent variables have been adopted: 
Uncertainty dimensions: (Perceiving cultural, environmental, and competitive 
uncertainty) were measured on an ordinal scale from 1= “very high” to 5= “very 
low”.  
Host country uncertainty: is a mean of cultural uncertainty, environmental un-
certainty, and competitive uncertainty. 
Strategies (motive, importance, focus, competitive) are measured on a 5 point 
scale, respondents were asked to evaluate their strategies used in IJVs with 1= 
“not important at all” to 5= “very important” 
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Management style: is measured on a 5 point-scale with 1= “strongly disagree” to 
5= “strongly agree” about the partner’s perceptions of organizational similarity, 
similar management styles. 
Objectives set for the joint ventures: respondents were asked to evaluate if the 
objectives set for IJVs are different between partners. They are measured on a 5 
point-scale with 1= “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”. 
Partners’ business relatedness: respondents were asked to evaluate how similar 
their business is to the other partners and the IJVs. It is measured on a 5 point-
scale with 1 = “completely different” to 5 = “exactly the same” 
Partner contributions: respondents were asked if they are contributors of finan-
cial resources, technology, management know how, trademark, key personnel. 
They are measured on a 5 point-scale with 1 = “very weak” to 5 = “very strong” 
Parent firm’s experience in IJVs: respondents were asked to rank their prior IJV 
experience at the time of IJV establishment from no prior IJV experience, to 1-4 
years experience, to 5-10 years experience, to more than 10 years experience.  
3.4  Data analysis 
The data analysis process was firstly to check the validity of the. The validity of a 
measure includes content and constructs validity (Churchill, 1991). Content valid-
ity is acceptable when the correct procedures are used to develop the measure-
ment instrument (Churchill, 1991). Because all items used in this study had been 
developed and validated by previous researchers and adapted for used here, there 
is a strong argument in favor of their content being valid. 
Next, construct validity which establishes that the measure captures the character-
istic, construct, or trait that it is intended to capture was examined. Construct va-
lidity requires that the operationalization of a variable not be broad in scope, oth-
erwise it may capture elements of other variables not intended to be captured, 
leading to difficulties in interpretation of the results. The construct validity in the 
present study was obtained by conducting an extensive review of the literature 
and by using measures that had been developed and used by previous researchers 
(Johnson, 1997).  
Then, Cronbach’s alpha was used to test the reliability of multi-item reflective 
measures. The results of alpha levels were all above the accepted level of 0.70 
(Nunnally, 1978). Besides that, the validity of the present dissertation rests mostly 
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on the precision and thoroughness with which the construct domain is established 
and tapped (Cullen et al., 1995). In addition, validity was achieved by grounding 
the construct item in the literature as well as by the author and colleagues inspect-
ing the items to ensure that they adequately embodied the construct domain.  
After the reliability and validity of the data were checked, and following analysis 
techniques tested in complex situations and with limited sample size in interna-
tional joint venture research, descriptive statistics (e.g., Glaister & Yu, 1994; 
Vanhonacker & Pan, 1997; Hennart, Roehl, & Zietlow, 1999; Hennart & Ishii, 
2008), correlations, and Chi-square tests (e.g. Bloggett, 1991; Beamish & Inkpen 
,1995; Dussauge & Garrette, 1997; Glaister, 1995; Ramaswamy, Gomes; Vieli-
yath, 1998) were used to test and analyze the data in order to establish the rela-
tionship between the independent and dependent variables. The above method has 
a proven ability to quantify and test hypotheses, measure strength of association, 
and predict the value of a dependent variable given the level of an independent 
variable.  
The focus of analysis of the present dissertation is summarized in Figure 6 (see 
next page). As we can see from Figure 6, the present dissertation aims to analyze 
relationships between influenced factors such as parent strategies, uncertainties in 
the host countries, differences between partners, and parent firms’ contributions 
and experiences in IJVs, and parent control choices exercised over their IJVs. In 
addition, the study also investigates about the link between influenced factors, 
parent control, and IJV performance. Because in each influenced factors (i.e. par-
ent strategies, uncertainties in the host countries, differences in partners, parents’ 
contributions and experiences in IJVs) include several sub-factors (see Figure 6), 
and in addition, parent control structure consists of three different dimensions (see 
Figure 6), in order to realize relationships between influenced factors and the 
choices of IJV control structures, each influenced factor and its relationship to 
parent control structure choice, and how this relationship affect IJV performance 
were examined separately in different article. 
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Figure 6. Focus of analysis of the present dissertation 
Parent contributions, experi-
ences 
T: Technical contribution 
Fi: Financial contribution 
M: Management know-how 
contribution 
Tr: Trademarks contribution 
P: Trained personnel contri-
bution 
HE: high IJV experiences; 
LE: Less IJV experiences 
 
 
Parent strategies 
I: Strategic importance of IJVs 
Di: Differentiation strategy 
L: Low cost strategy 
Ex: Export focus strategy 
D: Domestic focus strategy 
A: Obtaining local access strategy 
E: Gaining economies of scales,  
scope strategy 
 
Uncertainties in host countries 
Cu: Cultural uncertainty 
En: Environmental uncertainty 
Co: Competitive uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Differences between partners 
M: Partner’s differences in 
management style 
O: Partner’s differences in ob-
jectives in IJVs 
B: Business relatedness between 
partners 
 
IJV control dimensions 
 
F: Formal control; S: Social 
control; B: Broad control; N: 
narrow control; T: Tight con-
trol; L: Lose control. 
 
50      Acta Wasaensia 
The article 1 deals with the influence of parent strategies and parent control and 
IJV performance. The article 2 focuses on the relationship between the uncertain-
ties of the host countries and parent control and IJV performance. The third article 
elaborates the differences between partners and parent control and IJV perform-
ance. The fourth article emphasizes on the analysis of the dynamics between par-
ent control and IJV performance. The fifth article discusses about the relationship 
between parent contributions and experiences in IJVs and parent control and IJV 
performance. 
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4  SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLES 
This chapter is a summary of the five articles of the present dissertation. In each 
article, purposes, main findings, theoretical and managerial contributions are 
briefly presented. 
 
 Table 8. Theoretical approaches used in the articles 
 
   Theoretical approach 
 
       Article 
 
 
4.1  Article 1 “Foreign Parent Strategy, Control, and 
International Joint Venture Performance”.  
In this article, an important linkage is developed which illustrates the connection 
between foreign parent strategies, their control and the performance of interna-
tional joint ventures (IJVs). As such, the article takes a step on from those just 
concerned about parent firms’ strategies, and moves towards understanding how 
to realize these strategies through proper control. Parent firms’ strategies refer to 
strategic motive, importance, focus, and competitiveness. Foreign parent control 
is conceptualized across three dimensions including control mechanism, control 
focus, and control extent. The purpose of the present study is to analyze the rela-
tionships between foreign parent strategies, control and performance in IJVs. The 
research puzzle is addressed through the following questions: 
1) How do foreign parent firms configure the control structure in their IJVs 
to implement their strategies?  
2) What are the relationships between foreign parent control structure in IJVs 
and the IJV’s performance? 
 Transaction 
cost theory 
Resources 
dependence 
theory 
Organizational 
learning ap-
proach 
Article1 X X  
Article 2 X X  
Article 3 X  X 
Article 4 X X X 
Article 5 X X X 
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The empirical evidence shows that different strategies used in IJVs by foreign 
parent firms required different control structures. In addition, the firms that 
adapted control structure in their IJVs according to their strategies were more 
satisfied with their IJV performance than those who did not. The article contrib-
utes to the existing IJV knowledge by proposing a link between parent strategy-
and controls. In more detail, most foreign parent firms want a high level of con-
trol that is consistent with their bargaining power (Calantone & Zhao, 2001). 
However, the present article suggests that, to succeed in target markets, the for-
eign parent firms must have an IJV control structure appropriate to their strate-
gies. This finding is consistent with Lynch (1993) and Kumar and Seth (1998) 
who argued that the IJV control structures reflect the parent firm’s strategy. 
Moreover, this study extends the previous research by specifying what kind of 
control structure would fit different strategies. More specifically, for the purpose 
of gaining economies of scale and scope when joint venturing with local firms, 
the article suggests that the foreign parent firms should focus their control on the 
most critical issues in IJVs, such as product quality control.  
Other than these critical areas, the foreign parent firms can allow the local firms 
to be in charge of other areas in the IJVs, thus they can reduce the costs associ-
ated with an excessive control structure, and at the same time, motivate the local 
parent firms to utilize their expertise. The foreign parent firms often use the IJV 
as a base for manufacturing units and then export the outputs to other markets. 
The study points out that it is more efficient for the foreign parent firms to domi-
nate the IJV operation in that case. This is because managers in some countries 
such as in the Central and Eastern Europe, are often technically proficient, but 
inexperienced with market oriented management functions, such as strategic 
planning and marketing mix which are fundamental to successfully exporting to 
developed markets. Thus, the study suggests that broad and tight control help the 
foreign parent firms not only to keep the IJV’s outputs meeting the international 
quality standards but also to be able to utilize their advanced export management 
knowledge. For the foreign parent firms that are focused on the local market, the 
present study suggests a formal control mechanism is also needed.  
For the IJVs that are strategically important to the foreign parent firms, broad, 
formal, and tight controls are likely to be the effective choice. This finding con-
firms Johnston’s (2005) work maintaining that when the subsidiaries are big and 
play an important role, the parent firms impose progressively more hierarchical, 
or formal control mechanisms on their subsidiaries. Regarding the competitive 
strategy, for the IJVs which are adapted to a low cost strategy, the parent firms 
tend to utilize narrow, formal control and loose control in their IJVs. However, 
when the foreign firms adopt product differentiation as the main competitive 
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strategy for their IJVs, broad, formal, and tight control may be the most effective 
to manage the IJVs. Differentiated products are the result of a complex interplay 
between all the parts of the firm, so that the foreign parent firms need to act as 
foci for tapping into the resources of the total network.  
As a result, intensive control is deemed necessary. Social control mechanisms 
cannot be used in both strategies because it may take longer to build, and be ex-
tremely costly (concerning social events, such as outdoor activities, parties, ex-
tensive training, building personal relationship, etc.). The findings support previ-
ous studies by Männik (2006) and Whitelock (2007) that parent control is de-
pendent on their strategy. In addition, the finding extends the previous research by 
Gullander (1976), Männik (2006) and Whitelock (2007) who suggest that an ap-
propriate control structure allows parent firms to integrate the IJV activities with 
their strategies. This article has specified which kinds of IJV control design struc-
tures are suitable for different strategies. On the other hand, the finding contra-
dicts Johnston’s argument that when subsidiaries pursue a cost leadership strat-
egy, the headquarters maintain tight control over the subsidiaries’ activities 
(Johnston, 2005: 36). 
4.2  Article 2: “Governing for success: The host 
country uncertainty and the design of foreign 
parent control in the international joint ventures”  
The article develops a model of the international joint venture (IJV) control which 
deals with the uncertainty measure of the host country. Host country uncertainty 
is characterized by cultural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, and competi-
tive uncertainty. Following Geringer and Hebert (1989), Buckley, Glaister, and 
Husan (2005), parent control is conceptualized across three dimensions- mecha-
nism, focus, and extent. The primary objective of the present study is to build up a 
framework for managing IJVs from the viewpoint of the foreign parent firms, in 
their endeavor to cope with uncertainties in the host countries. In order to accom-
plish this goal, we strive to answer the following research question: How does 
host country uncertainty influence the foreign parent firms’ choice of control 
structure in the IJVs? The research puzzle is addressed through the following 
questions: 
1) How do foreign parent firms design their IJV control in order to cope with 
the uncertainty inherent in the host country? 
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2) What are the relationships between the foreign parent control structure in 
IJVs and the IJV performance? 
The results show that in arenas of high cultural uncertainty and high competitive 
uncertainty, parent firms preferred to exercise broad, formal, and tight control 
over their IJVs. In contrast, in arenas of high environmental uncertainty, to react 
quickly to the changes in the environment, most firms preferred narrow and loose 
control. The study contributes to IJV control theory by offering a model of link-
age between host country uncertainty and parent control. In other words, most 
foreign parent firms want a high level of control that is consistent with their bar-
gaining power (Calantone & Zhao, 2001).  
However, this article suggests that, in order to operate successfully in foreign 
countries, foreign parent firms need to have a comparable IJV control structure 
that fits the IJV operating environments. This finding is consistent with the work 
by Lynch (1993) and Männik (2006), in which the author maintained that the par-
ent control has to agree with the risk and uncertainty of external environments. 
Previous researchers, for example Birnbirg (1998) analyzed the uncertainty which 
may occur when involved in partnerships but without assessing how firms can 
cope with it. This article also extends the previous studies by specifying which 
control structure could be implemented in the IJVs to deal successfully with dif-
ferent kinds of uncertainty. In particular, in high uncertainty countries, parent 
firms will need to exercise formal, broad, and tight control over their IJVs to 
achieve high levels of IJV performance. On the other hand, IJVs will perform 
better when parent firms exercise social, narrow, and loose control in a low uncer-
tainty country.  
4.3  Article 3: “Do partners’ differences affect 
international joint venture control and 
performance” 
The study investigates whether or not partner’s differences influence IJV control 
and performance. Parents’ differences are categorized into differences in business 
relatedness, objectives of when entering IJVs, and management orientations. IJV 
control dimensions are based on the work of Geringer and Hebert (1989) and in-
clude control mechanism, control focus, and control extent. This article aims to 
further analyze the influence of foreign partners´ differences on IJV control and 
performance. The general research question of this article is “How do partners’ 
differences influence IJV control and performance?” In more detail, the article 
addresses the questions: 
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1) How do partners’ perceived differences in management style, joint ventur-
ing objectives, and business relatedness affect their control of IJVs?  
2) What are the relationships between partners’ differences, IJV control, and 
IJV performance? 
The results show that partners’ differences have strongly influenced IJV control 
and thus IJV performance. The results reveal that partners perceiving themselves 
as highly different from one other require formal, broad, and tight control exer-
cised over their IJVs. The results, in addition, indicate that in the case of high 
degrees of difference between partners, formal, broad and tight control by foreign 
partners leads to better IJV performance. In contrast, in the case of low differ-
ences between partners, social, narrow, and loose control by foreign partners 
leads to better IJV performance.  
This study provides an empirical framework as an important extension of current 
joint venture theory on control perspectives. It provides new insights into the way 
partners cope with internal uncertainty caused by partners’ differences, and the 
resultant joint venture performance. The findings extend the existing research and 
contribute considerably to the understanding of the phenomenon of international 
joint venture control 
4.4  Article 4: “Parent control dynamics and 
international joint venture performance”  
In recent years, the IJV has become a major strategy vehicle for firms entering 
international markets; however, they eventually demonstrate a high rate of break 
down. The international business literature shows that one of the toughest chal-
lenges parent firms have to face when entering IJVs is the control issue over the 
joint ventures. The purpose of this article is to analyze the relationships between 
foreign parent control and IJV performance during the IJV lifecycle. Parent con-
trol in IJVs is conceptualized across three dimensions including mechanism, fo-
cus, and extent. As foundational theories, the article uses transaction cost, re-
source dependence and organizational leaning theories. The purpose of the article 
is, therefore, addressed through the research question:  
(1) what are the relationships between foreign parent control and IJV performance 
at the formation stage of the  IJV lifecycle?  
(2) Why and how do these relationships change at the post formation stage of the 
IJV lifecycle?  
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The result shows that the relationship between the control design and its perform-
ance is not just one way, but reciprocal and dynamic. With an initial control de-
signed by foreign parent firms, there will be two situations affecting IJV perform-
ance. In the first case, when the performance is negative, foreign parent firms will 
respond to this situation by exercising more control over an IJVs to restore order 
and make sure that the IJV achieves its planned targets. However, control also 
brings costs, especially with broad control and tight control. In addition, foreign 
parent firms may also signal distrust of local parent firms by imposing a host of 
procedures and paperwork found with formal control and tight control. Therefore, 
when IJV performance is positive, foreign parent firms may prefer to exercise less 
control over IJVs to create trust with local parent firms and to reduce costs.  
The first contribution of this article to IJV theory is to fill this gap by increasing 
understanding of the multiple-dimensions of parent control and their influence on 
IJV performance. In addition, the study is the first to examine the change of IJV 
control during the IJV lifecycle since “how control design of IJVs evolves over 
time remains unclear” (Zhang & Li, 2001: 342). This is important because it ex-
amines organizational process. The research process makes an important contri-
bution because it explains how managers can influence firm performance through 
organizational control (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992). In the relationship between 
IJV control and performance the study points out that the conflicting results from 
previous studies are, perhaps, because they have assumed a monotonic relation-
ship between control and performance (Fryxell et al., 2002). 
Taking a step on from this approach, the article proposes that the relationship be-
tween IJV control and performance depends on both which stage IJVs are at in 
their lifecycle, and the results of IJV performance from the previous stage. In par-
ticular, this article proposes that when foreign parent firms choose to exercise 
broad, formal, and tight control at the formation stage of IJV lifecycles, IJV per-
formance is likely to be positive. In contrast, if foreign parent firms choose to 
exercise narrow, social, and loose control over IJVs at the formation stage, IJV 
performance is likely to be negative. In addition, foreign parent firms will redes-
ign their control exercised over IJVs over time in accordance with IJV perform-
ance.  
In the post-formation stage, when IJV performance is negative, foreign parent 
firms need to exercise more control in an attempt to improve performance. When 
IJV performance is positive foreign parent firms may reduce their control over 
IJVs in order to reduce the costs associated with control and to promote more 
trust. This finding is consistent with Zhang and Li’s (2001) research in which they 
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found that during the IJV development process, IJV performance becomes a mo-
tivating force to stimulate the evolution of IJV control design.  
The article extends this by specifying the particular control structure needed in 
such circumstances. In short, we can conclude that there is no optimal choice of 
IJV controls that are stable over time. Control of IJVs needs to be re-adjusted 
over time in accordance with IJV performance. As a result, this study may help to 
explain previous conflictual results on why in some cases dominant control yields 
better performance, while in others it is less effective than minor control or shared 
control. This finding contradicts Glaister and Buckley’s (1998a) stud,y in which 
they maintain that the nature of management control does not vary with the de-
velopment of IJVs.  
4.5  Article 5: Foreign parent Contributions, and 
Experiences on International Joint Venture Control 
and Performance 
Researchers have pointed out that between 30% and 70% of all international joint 
ventures (IJVs) established eventually break up (Yaheskel et al., 2004; Hennart et 
al., 1998). Some authors have suggested that control problems are one of the pri-
mary causes of IJV failures (Groot & Merchant, 2000). Despite the popularity and 
importance of IJVs and extensive research in the field, it is suggested that we 
have a limited understanding of how to manage them (Das & Teng 2001). In par-
ticular, most previous studies provide little knowledge about how to control IJVs 
and the relationship between control structure and IJV performance (Geringer & 
Hebert, 1989). Furthermore, Geringer and Hebert (1989) and Ramaswamy et al. 
(1998) proposed that future research should deepen IJV control in terms of 
mechanisms, extent, and focus. While previous research has not provided evi-
dence directly explaining how parent firms make control structure choices (Groot 
& Merchan, 2000); it has suggested some possible determinant factors such as 
parent firms’ experience (Peng & Health, 1996; Guidice, 2001) and their contri-
butions (Blodgett, 1991; Yan & Gray, 1994; Isobe et al., 2000). Pangarkar and 
Klein (2004), and Berrell (2007) suggested that further studies are needed to ex-
amine factors that influence IJV control and performance.  
This article aims to further analyze the influence of foreign parent firms on the 
control and performance of their IJVs. More specifically, the article aims to an-
swer the research question: How do foreign parent firms’ contributions and IJV 
experiences influence IJV control and performance? 
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The result shows that in determining foreign parent control structures in IJVs, the 
characteristics of foreign firms play a crucial role at the formation stage of IJVs. 
Foreign parent firms are likely to exercise broad, formal, tight control over IJVs 
when: they are the key suppliers of technology for IJVs, and lack international 
experience. In contrast, foreign parent firms will use narrow, social, and loose 
control in IJVs if they have experience in foreign markets. The findings confirm 
that most foreign parent firms want a high level of control that is consistent with 
their bargaining power (Calantone & Zhao, 2001). On the other hand, in regard to 
the influence on international experience of IJV control, the finding contradicts 
the work of Makino and Delios (1996). In their work, Makino and Delios (1996) 
find that when foreign parent firms accumulate experience about the host country, 
they become less reliant on local parent firms, and thus exercise more control 
over their IJVs. 
With regard to IJV performance, the results showed that foreign parent firms’ 
contributions and experience directly influence not only IJV control but also IJV 
performance. In particular, IJV performance is stronger in the cases where foreign 
parent firms have had more than 5 years IJV experience and exercised narrow, 
loose, and social control over their IJVs. With foreign parent firms who have less 
than 4 years IJV experience, IJV performance is higher if foreign parent firms 
exercise formal, broad, and tight control. As for foreign parent contributions to 
IJVs, the results indicate that foreign parent firms who have provided essential 
technology for IJVs are more satisfied with IJV performance when they exercised 
formal, broad, and tight control over their IJVs. 
The present study helps managers to deploy their control structure in their IJVs 
not only to gain high IJV performance but also to protect their core technology 
from the risk of appropriation by local parents or leakage to their competitors. In 
foreign markets, especially those like China, is not unusual for there to be no es-
tablished system for the effective protection of intellectual and commercial rights. 
Therefore, when foreign parent firms bring advanced technology into IJVs, to 
reduce related risks, the study proposes that they should adopt hierarchical or 
formal control over their IJVs. This will be carried out by establishing specific 
rules, regulations, and procedures for technological transfer.  
In addition, to curb opportunism and prevent unauthorized technology leakage, 
especially when technology transfer in IJVs involves a high level of tacit knowl-
edge and skill that is not protected by law, this study suggest that foreign parent 
firms should maintain tight and broad control over their IJVs. Through tight con-
trol, foreign parent firms are able to make or approve the key decisions in IJVs. 
An added benefit is that foreign parent firms are able to keep up to date with what 
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is happening in their IJV operations through frequent and precise reporting from 
the IJV management team. Also by utilizing tight control, foreign parent firms 
send a message to the IJV management team that significant rewards and punish-
ments are definitely linked to the accomplishment or failure to accomplish the 
desired results as well as to the proper utilization of key technology. Summary of 
the findings from article 1 to article 5 is presented in Figure 7. 
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Parent strategies 
I: Strategic importance of IJVs 
Di: Differentiation strategy 
L: Low cost strategy 
Ex: Export focus strategy 
D: Domestic focus strategy 
A: Obtaining local access strategy 
E: Gaining economies of scales,  
scope strategy 
 
Uncertainties in host countries 
Cu: Cultural uncertainty 
En: Environmental uncertainty 
Co: Competitive uncertainty 
 
 
Parent contributions, experi-
ences 
T: Technical contribution 
Fi: Financial contribution 
M: Management know-how 
contribution 
Tr: Trademarks contribu-
tion 
P: Trained personnel contri-
bution 
HE: high IJV experiences; 
LE: Less IJV experiences 
 
 
Differences between partners 
M: Partner’s differences in 
management style 
O: Partner’s differences in ob-
jectives in IJVs 
B: Business relatedness between 
partners 
 
IJV control dimensions 
 
F: Formal control; S: Social 
control; B: Broad control; N: 
narrow control; T: Tight con-
trol; L: Lose control. 
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5  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 5.1 Summary of the present dissertation 
IJVs have played and continue to play an important role in the global economy. In 
joint venturing in foreign markets, parent firm control is not only indispensable 
for a successful IJV but also to parent firms as well. However, previous research 
has failed to specify the complete picture of IJV control, leading to controversy 
surrounding the relationship between parent control and IJV performance.  
In addition, when examining the control structures implemented by foreign parent 
firms in their IJVs, previous research has primarily focused only on one control 
dimension: the control mechanisms. Thus, another two important dimensions of 
IJV control - control focus and control extent - have been ignored. This study 
further investigates the IJV control issue and its relationship with IJV perform-
ance, in which IJV control is fully investigated through its three dimensions: con-
trol mechanism, control focus, and control extent. Moreover, in exploring the true 
nature of IJV control, the present dissertation takes the time factor into considera-
tion, or in other words, it investigates foreign parent control and IJV performance 
during the different stages of the IJV lifecycle.  
The present dissertation aims to answer the question “How do foreign parent 
firms control IJVs to achieve superior IJV performance?” The research question 
is further divided into sub-questions:  
(1) How do foreign parent firms configure the control structure in their strategies? 
(Article 1) 
(2) How do foreign parent firms design their control structures in order to cope 
with the host country uncertainty? (Article 2) 
(3) How do partners’ perceptions of differences in management styles, joint ven-
turing objectives, and business relatedness affect the control they exercise in 
IJVs? (Article 3) 
(4) What are the influences of foreign parent firms’ contributions and IJV experi-
ence on IJV control and performance? (Article 5) 
(5) What are the relationships between foreign parent control and IJV perform-
ance during the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle? How do these relationships 
change during the post-formation stage of the IJV lifecycle? (Article 4)  
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To answer the research questions, the present dissertation takes a step on previous 
research that used a single theory only, employing and integrating three different 
theories, namely transaction cost, resource dependence theory, and the organiza-
tional learning perspective. Since each theory considers a different aspect of an 
organization and each theory has its own strengths and weaknesses, the combina-
tion of different theories allows a researcher to see the whole picture of IJVs and 
results in a better understanding of IJV control. 
Supported by these theories, the dissertation analyzes several important factors 
that determine IJV controls including a foreign parent firm’s characteristics, strat-
egies, and host country uncertainty uncertainties. As for foreign parent firms’ 
characteristics, the study concentrates on analyzing the most relevant determinant 
factors to foreign parent control, being the parent firm’s management style, objec-
tives of entering IJVs, their business relatedness, their contributions to IJVs, and 
IJV experience. For parent strategies, the study focuses on strategic objective of 
forming IJVs, strategic importance of IJVs, competitive strategies of IJVs, and 
strategic focus of IJVs on whether to sell the products of IJVs in domestic mar-
kets or to export them to international markets. For host country uncertainty, the 
study stresses on cultural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, and competitive 
uncertainty. 
Further to the investigation of factors affecting foreign parent control, the present 
dissertation also focuses on the relationship between foreign parent control and 
IJV performance. In this relationship, the dissertation examines two avenues of 
influence: how foreign parent control structure (consisting of three dimensions: 
focus, mechanisms, and extent) in the formation stage affects IJV performance 
and how IJV performance in the formation stage, in turn, affects foreign parent 
control structures in the post formation stage.  
5.2  Theoretical implications 
The findings have confirmed the efficacy of transaction cost theory, resource de-
pendence theory, and the organizational learning perspective. In particular, the 
findings from article 2 and article 3 support transaction cost theory (Wiliamson, 
1985, Henart, 1988) in that when IJVs face with high external uncertainty (article 
2) and high internal uncertainty, foreign parent firms prefer to exercise more con-
trol over their IJVs. The article 5 also confirms transaction cost, and resource de-
pendence theory that when foreign parent firms are the main contributors of criti-
cal resources (technology resource and financial resources) for IJVs, they have a 
greater need for control over their IJVs. The findings from article 4 and 5 support 
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the organizational learning perspective that organizations learn from their past 
IJV experience, and apply it to their current IJVs. This is explained by the result 
that IJVs whose parent firms have prior IJV experience perform better than those 
whose do not. In addition, IJVs learn during their development. It is evident that 
in the post formation stage IJV partners have learnt how to work together, and 
IJV members have learnt how to run IJVs. Thus if IJV performance during the 
formation stage is positive, foreign parent firms will not need to exercise exten-
sive control over their IJVs.  
In determining foreign parent control structures in IJVs, foreign parent firms’ 
characteristics play a crucial role at the formation stage. Foreign parent firms are 
likely to exercise broad, formal, and tight control over IJVs when: they are the 
key suppliers of technology for IJVs, and lack IJV experience. In contrast, foreign 
parent firms will use narrow, social, and loose control in IJVs if they have IJV 
experience. The conclusions here about the effects of a foreign parent firm’s in-
ternational experience on the control structure it utilizes, contrast with the find-
ings of Makino and Delios (1996). In their work, Makino and Delios (1996) find 
that when foreign parent firms accumulate experience about the host country, they 
become less reliant on local parent firms, and thus exercise more control over 
their IJVs. 
Most foreign parent firms want a high level of control that is consistent with their 
bargaining power (Calantone & Zhao, 2001). However, the present dissertation 
suggests that in order to obtain improved performance, parent firms have to exer-
cise their control over the IJVs in accordance with the strategies they apply IJVs. 
This finding is consistent with Gupta’s (1987) that the subsidiaries have a rele-
vance to how parent firms control their subsidiaries. 
For IJVs that are strategically important to foreign parent firms or highly interde-
pendent with other units of foreign parent firms, broad, formal and tight control 
are likely to be exercised. This finding confirm Johnston’s (2005) work which 
maintains that when subsidiaries are big and play an important role, parent firms 
impose progressively more hierarchical or formal control on their subsidiaries.  
Turning to the strategic focus of IJV, for export oriented IJVs that must strictly 
follow international standards and rely more on foreign parents’ expertise to mar-
ket IJV’s products abroad, foreign parent firms are likely to exercise broad, for-
mal, and tight control over the IJV. On the other hand, for domestic oriented IJVs 
which require more involvement, and expertise from local parent firms to serve 
local markets, foreign parent control over the IJVs should be social, narrow, and 
loose control. 
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Regarding competitive strategy, for the sake of gaining superior performance, 
foreign parent firms also need to exercise different control structures over IJVs 
according to whichever competitive strategy (such as low cost strategy or differ-
entiation strategy) is being pursued. For IJVs that have adopted a low cost strat-
egy, foreign parent firms tend to use narrow, formal, loose control. For IJVs 
which have adopted a differentiation strategy, foreign parent firms will impose 
broad, social, and tight control. This finding, on the one hand, extends previous 
research by Gullander (1976) which suggests that an appropriate control structure 
allows the parent firms to integrate the IJV’s activities with their strategies. The 
present study has specified what kinds of IJV control structures match which for-
eign parent firms’ strategies. On the other hand, the finding contradicts Johnston’s 
(2005) research that when subsidiaries pursue a low cost strategy, parents main-
tain tight control over subsidiaries’ activities (Johnston, 2005: 36)  
In addition to adapting control structures to their strategies, foreign parent firms 
need to adjust their control over the IJVs according to local uncertainties to cope 
with cultural differences, and frequently changing legislation and policies of local 
government policies. For foreign parent firms joint venturing in territories dis-
playing large-scale cultural differences from their country of origin, broad, for-
mal, and tight controls can help to reduce uncertainties in the IJV’s daily activi-
ties. This finding contradicts Meschi (1997), who suggests that cultural differ-
ences may never be properly managed unless autonomy is granted to IJVs in their 
development process.  
Moreover, to deal with frequently changing local legislations, IJVs need more 
flexibility to be able to react promptly to the situations, thus they benefit from less 
control from their foreign parent firms. This finding contrasts with that of Beam-
ish (1993). Beamish proposed that when IJV’s operating environments are af-
fected by an unstable political and economic environment, foreign parent firms 
are likely to control all the major activities and functions to ensure their own prof-
its and high performance. Further, while previous studies (e.g. Shortell & Zajac, 
1988) suggest that parent firms have to adapt IJV structures to changing external 
environments, the present dissertation extends this by specifying which particular 
control structure is needed in the face of such changes. 
In addressing the relationship between foreign parent control and IJV perform-
ances this study points out that the conflicting results from previous studies are, 
perhaps cause by the assumption of a monotonic relationship between control and 
performance (Fryxell et al., 2002). Moving a step further from on this approach, 
the present dissertation proposes that the relationship between parent control and 
IJV performance depends both on which stage IJVs are at in their lifecycle, and 
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on the results of the IJV performance achieved at the previous stage. In particular, 
the present dissertation proposes that when foreign parent firms choose to exer-
cise broad, formal, and tight control at the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle, 
IJV performance is likely to be positive. In contrast, if foreign parent firms 
choose to exercise narrow, social, and loose control over IJVs, at the initial stage 
of IJV development, IJV performance is likely to be negative. This finding con-
firms at of Robins at al. (2002) that, foreign parent firms tend to attempt to exert 
tight control in the initial stage of forming IJVs.   
In addition, foreign parent firms will redesign the control exercised over IJVs in 
accordance with IJV performance. In the post formation stage of the IJV lifecycle, 
when IJV performance is negative, foreign parent firms tend to exercise more 
control over IJVs in an attempt to improve performance. When IJV performance 
is positive foreign parent firms are likely to reduce their control over IJVs in order 
to reduce the costs associated with control and promote more trust, already earned 
during the formation stage through good performance. This finding is consistent 
with Zhang and Li’s (2001) in which they find that during the IJV development 
process, IJV performance becomes a motivating force to stimulate the evolution 
of IJV control design.  
In short, it can be concluded that there is no optimal choice of foreign parent con-
trol structures in IJVs that are stable over time. Control of IJVs needs to be re-
adjusted over time according to influential factors such as changing local operat-
ing environments and IJV performance. As a result, this dissertation may help to 
explain the conflicting results of previous studies that in some cases find domi-
nant control yields better performance, while in others minor control or shared 
control was more effective. This finding contradicts Glaister and Buckley’s 
(1998b) which maintains that the nature of management control does not vary 
with the development of IJVs.  
Finally, the present dissertation proposes a foreign parent control and IJV per-
formance models (Figure 7 and Figure 8) for use with further empirical exam-
ples from both qualitative and quantitative data. Figure 8 shows that at the forma-
tion stage of an IJV lifecycle, control structures of foreign parent firms are influ-
enced by the foreign parent firm’s characteristics, strategies and local environ-
ments. Then these control choices, in turn, determine IJV performance in the for-
mation stage of the IJV life cycle. At the post formation stage, control structures 
of foreign parent firms are not only influenced by these different factors, as in the 
formation stage, but also by IJV performance from the formation stage. 
As a result, at different points in time the foreign parent firm’s choices of control 
are different due to the changes of influential factors and IJV performance. This 
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finding is consistent with Zhou, Tse, and Li (2006) who propose that the motiva-
tion for organizational change is the performance. The present dissertation ex-
tends this by specifying how changes in organization should take place in re-
sponse to the past performance. 
 
 
 Figure 8. IJV control dynamics 
5.3  Managerial implications 
With an increasingly important role in the global economy, IJVs will continue to 
be an important mode of market entry and also a challenge for firms wanting to 
expand their operations abroad. The present dissertation offers valuable insights 
into these challenges and successful operations in foreign markets, through sug-
gesting a relevant dynamic control structure for foreign parent firms, since know-
ing what structure to adopt and how to change it successfully has become critical 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Feldman, 2004).  
More specifically, the present dissertation helps managers to deploy a control 
structure in their IJVs not only to make gains in IJV performance but also to pro-
tect their core technology from the risk of appropriation by local parents and from 
leakage to their competitors. In some countries, there is not yet an established and 
effective system to protect intellectual and commercial rights. Therefore, when 
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reduce related risks, the present dissertation proposes that foreign parent firms 
should adopt hierarchical or formal control over their IJVs. This will be carried 
out by establishing specific rules, regulations, and procedures for technological 
transfer. Besides, to ensure the best interests for of foreign parent firms, this study 
suggests that top management position in IJVs should be filled from the foreign 
parent firms. 
In addition, to curb opportunism and prevent unauthorized technology leakage, 
especially when technology transfer in IJVs involves a high level of tacit knowl-
edge and skills that are not protected by law, the present dissertation suggests that 
foreign parent firms should maintain tight and broad control over their IJVs. 
Through tight control, foreign parent firms are able to make or approve the key 
decisions in IJVs. Foreign parent firms would also be able to keep up to date with 
what happens in IJV operations through frequent and precise reporting from the 
IJV management team. Also by exercising tight control, foreign parent firms send 
a message to the IJV management team that significant rewards and punishments 
are definitely linked to the accomplishment or failure to accomplish the desired 
results as well as to the proper utilization of key technology.  
The present dissertation offers foreign parent firms suggestions on how to imple-
ment their strategies in their IJVs successfully by having a proper IJV control 
structure. For foreign parent firms that aim to gain access to a local firm’s country 
specific knowledge, the present dissertation suggests that in the formation stage, 
foreign parent firms should focus their control on some important areas, and let 
local parent firms have exercise more general control in the IJVs.  
Similarly, for the purpose of gaining economies of scale when joint venturing 
with local firms, the present dissertation suggests that foreign parent firms should 
focus their control on the most critical issues in IJVs such as product quality con-
trol. Beside these critical areas, foreign parent firms could let local firms take 
charge of other areas in IJVs, thus they can reduce costs associated with excessive 
control structures at the same time, motivate local parent firms to utilize their ex-
pertise.  
The present dissertation also suggests that as the size of an IJV increases the risk 
of opportunism intensifies. This is an especially important issue when IJVs play a 
very important role in the foreign parent firm’s value chain, or impact on a core 
competence. In these cases, the present dissertation points out the foreign parent 
firms need to be more involved in the day-to-day operations of the IJV. The pre-
sent dissertation also specifies that in these cases, foreign parent firms should 
have more personnel placed in key positions in the IJV so that they can maintain 
broad and tight control IJV. 
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Foreign parent firms often use IJVs as manufacturing bases prior to exporting 
their products to other markets in developed countries. This study points out that 
in such case it is more efficient for foreign parent firms to dominate the IJV op-
eration. This is because manufacturing IJVs are often located in low cost labor 
markets such as in China and those of Central and Eastern Europe. In these terri-
tories, managers are often technically proficient but inexperienced in market ori-
ented management functions such as strategic planning, and the marketing mix, 
which are fundamental to successful exporting to developed countries. As a re-
sult, the present dissertation proposes that broad and tight control help foreign 
parent firms not only to keep IJV’s outputs meeting international quality stan-
dards but also to be able to utilize their advanced export management knowledge. 
In contrast to export oriented IJVs, with local market oriented IJVs, the study 
points out that commitment and cooperation from local parent firms are critical. 
Local parent firms often bring to IJVs knowledge about local tastes, or local 
needs, that enable suitable adaptation and probably bring advantages to the IJVs. 
Besides, local parent firms are expert on the local infrastructure, labor forces, raw 
materials, and local legislations and have an established relationship with local 
governments. Thus, the present dissertation suggests foreign parent firms should 
let local parent firms have more control in local market oriented IJVs so they need 
just maintain narrow and loose control over their IJVs.  
In a similar manner, when foreign parent firms select a low cost strategy as the 
competitive strategy for their IJVs, the findings of the present dissertation suggest 
that foreign parent firms can realize this strategy through focusing their control on 
just some of the most important areas, loosing their control and using formal con-
trol. This narrow, loosening, and formal control will help foreign parent firms and 
IJVs lower their management costs, thereby adding less cost to the final outputs 
of the IJVs. In addition, the present study also points out that social control me-
chanisms may take a long time to build up and could incur tremendous costs as 
with approaches like outdoor social activities, partying, extensive training, and 
investing in personal relationship.  
On the other hand, when foreign parent firms adopt product differentiation as the 
competitive strategy for their IJVs, the present dissertation suggests that broader 
control and tight control are the most effective in managing IJVs. IJVs which a  
differentiation strategy also have a unique production and marketing  task as dif-
ferentiated products are the result of a complex interplay, where all parts of for-
eign parent firms to act as foci for tapping the resources of the total network. Thus 
intensive control is necessary. Moreover, the present dissertation suggests that 
when IJVs aim to produce unique and high quality product, social control is more 
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effective, especially when IJVs focus on complicated production and marketing 
work. 
Another important implication of the present dissertation is that it points out how 
foreign parent firms should construct their control in IJVs by considering the 
IJV’s operating environment. This is important for managers in foreign parent 
firms since the operating environments of IJVs in foreign markets are quite dif-
ferent from those in the parent firms’ home markets. In particular, in countries 
characterized by frequent changes of legislation, and trade policies, this study 
points out that excessive control from foreign parent firms can be a problematic 
because they may not be fully aware of the complexity of the environments. 
In addition, the present dissertation points out that to react quickly to the changes, 
IJVs may need to be ready to adapt to changing external environments and be 
flexible. Since local parent firms are closest to changing environments and there-
fore have the best knowledge of developing situations, the foreign parent firms 
should exercise loose control and narrow control over the IJVs. In addition, the 
present dissertation proposes that in these circumstances, cultural mechanisms or 
social control will be more effective than formal control- that often has difficulty 
fitting in with rapidly changing environments. 
The final and the most important implication of the present dissertation for practi-
tioners is that the foreign parent control structure exercised over IJVs should not 
remain rigid during the lifecycle. Foreign parent firms should be more willing to 
redesign their control structure to fit with local environments and especially to the 
result of IJV performance from the previous lifecycle stage. However much a 
foreign parent believes its initial control structure fit its IJV activities, the foreign 
parent firms need to redesign IJV control structures in the post formation stage 
when the IJV performance in the previous stage was negative. More specifically, 
in these cases broader, tighter, and formal control are needed. It is also important 
to point out that even when IJV performance in the formation stage was positive, 
a foreign parent’s control structure may still need to change. As discussed earlier 
the change is needed to promote trust and commitment from local firms on the 
one hand, and on the other, it may reduce the costs associated with control. Table 
6 above provides a summary of the findings of the present dissertation.  As sug-
gested by many previous researchers, IJV performance is decided by the ability of 
a foreign parent to manage and control the IJV properly according to the strate-
gies and the changing operating environments.  
Another point of interest arising from this study is how managerial factors influ-
ence foreign parent control structures in IJVs during the IJV’s lifecycle focusing 
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on parent control in IJVs. The following section analyzes the relationships be-
tween foreign parent control and IJV performance.  
In short, performance is an important issue in strategic management (Venkatra-
man & Ramanujam, 1986). Furthermore, both scholars and managers are inter-
ested in the impact of a firm’s strategies on the outcome of IJV performance (Gui-
dice, 2001). Previous research on the control and performance relationship has 
been dominated by a static approach (Zhang and Li, 2001). However, in order to 
understand the complex nature of the control and performance relationship, this 
study suggests that a dynamic perspective may help to investigate how control 
dimensions affect performance, and performance, in turn, affects the IJV control 
decisions of parent firms. In the same vein, previous researchers proposed that 
“the control system at a relatively young IJV should be viewed as embryonic and 
should evolve over the life of the venture” (Chalos & O’Connor, 1998: 64). 
5.4  Limitations of the present dissertation and 
implications for further research 
The ability to generalize the findings of this dissertation is limited due to a num-
ber of reasons. First, this dissertation includes only manufacturing equity IJVs, 
thus the findings may not generalize to other non equity and service IJVs. Second, 
small sample is another setback of this dissertation to generalize the findings. 
This, however, has been noticed getting data (Kogut, 1988) and identifying IJVs 
is one of the biggest issues in research of this nature (Guidice, 2001). Third, the 
data of this dissertation is collected through only from Finnish parent firms. 
Therefore, the findings may not be applicable to other foreign firms which have 
different cultural and institutional backgrounds such as American parent firms or 
Japanese parent firms. Fourth, data is collected through single source-the expert 
managers from Finnish parent firms. The reliance on a single source, however, 
accepted in IJV research when the informant is regards as a key stakeholders 
(Ding, 1997). 
There are several important research directions that can continue from this disser-
tation. Researchers have pointed out that trust between foreign parent firms and 
local parent firms is one of the important factors that influence the control struc-
ture foreign parent firms exercise over IJVs (Noorderhaven, 1995; Brouthers & 
Bamossy, 2006; Madhod, 1995; Ring, & Van de Ven, 1994; Inkpen & Currall, 
1997). However, the present dissertation excluded this factor because the com-
plexity and controversial nature of the research related to trust would have made 
the dissertation unmanageable. The issues surrounding control and performance 
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are already complex, and omitting the trust issue made it possible to investigate 
deeply and other factors such as parent characteristics, parent strategies and local 
uncertainties. This trust issue could be one of the future opportunities for further 
research in that research could focus on how the development of trust between 
foreign parent firms and local parent firms influences the design of control me-
chanism in IJVs over time. 
In addition to trust, the commitment of local parent firms may influence control 
redesign during the development of IJVs. Since the present dissertation excluded 
this, further research could explore the commitment of parent firms via their con-
tinuous ex ante support and specific investment into IJVs that determine IJV con-
trol and performance. Even though the foreign parent firms may have more bar-
gaining power than the local parent firms, due to their advanced technology and 
management knowledge, the configuration of the IJV control structure often in-
volves interaction with the local parent firms.  
In the present dissertation, IJV control structures are commented on solely from 
the perspective of foreign parent firms. This is due to the fact that collecting feed-
back from local firms from many different countries demands a lot more time and 
resources and is thus unfeasible and quite costly (Geringer & Hebert, 1991). Con-
sequently- further research could investigate the determinants of IJV control 
through the interaction between foreign and local parent firms. Similarly, IJV 
performance is here measured from the perceptive of foreign parent firms. It 
would be interesting to know if the results would be the same if IJV performance 
were measured from the perspective of local parent firms and the IJV manage-
ment teams. Moreover, as IJV operating environments change, foreign parent 
firms’ strategies may also change. Further empirical study using the presented 
framework to investigate the fit between the foreign parent strategies and the IJV 
control during IJV’s lifecycle may be of great interest. It would also be interesting 
to know whether the link between the foreign parent strategies and the control 
structure utilized in the IJVs would be affected by, for example the national cul-
tural background of the foreign parent firms (e.g. France vs. Finland), the types of 
IJVs (e.g. majority foreign ownership, 50/50 IJVs with a local parent, or minority 
foreign ownership), or the timing of entering into the IJVs (e.g. early 1980-90s, 
1990s-2000, or more recent).  
In addition, future research could examine the links between the foreign parent 
firm’s control structure and IJV performance using IJV samples from various 
generic industrial environments. This would provide valuable insights into wheth-
er the findings of the present dissertation differ depending on industry 
‘characteristics. Furthermore, concerning IJV performance measurement, future 
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research on parent control and IJV performance using the presented framework 
could use both objective and subjective measures to capture the whole picture of 
the issue. Thus, the research would yield more generalizable results. Finally, the 
present dissertation has provided a framework for the link between foreign parent 
control and IJV performance during the IJV lifecycle which stresses the changes 
and development process of foreign parent control. Therefore, future research 
using this framework would benefit from longitudinal data obtained through 
qualitative method with a case study approach, so as to capture the dynamic na-
ture of control in IJVs.  
In terms of data analysis methodology, this study analyzes different independent 
variables in relation to dependent variables separately. A future study with a larg-
er sample size might use more powerful statistical techniques (e.g. structural equ-
ation modeling (LISREL)) to analyze how different independent variables affect 
each other and which of them are the key influencers or determinant on IJV 
control and performance. 
Despite of having some limitations, this dissertation is believed to have under-
gone a significant effort to expand our knowledge of factors influence parent con-
trol in IJVs and their relationships to IJV performance. Although different influ-
enced factors are analyzed separately in different articles, a fit between control 
structures by foreign parent firms exercised over their IJVs, and influenced fac-
tors leads to successful IJV performance. 
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Abstract 
This paper develops and expands upon an important connection between foreign parent firm strategies, the manner in 
which they control their international joint ventures (IJVs), and the performance of those IJVs. Parent firms’ strategies 
refer to strategic motives, importance, focus, and competitiveness. Foreign parent firm control is conceptualized across 
three dimensions including the control mechanism, the control focus, and the extent of control. Our empirical evidence 
is based on the survey data collected from Finnish firms that established IJVs with local firms in the 1990s. The
empirical evidence show different strategies used in IJVs by foreign parent firms required different control structures in 
IJVs. In addition, the firms that adapted control structure in their IJVs according to their strategies were more satisfied 
with their IJV performance than those who did not. As such, the paper takes a step further from just being concerned 
about parent firms’ strategies and moves our thinking toward understanding how to realize such strategies through 
proper control.  
Keywords: Strategy, Control, International Joint Venture, Performance
1. Introduction 
In the last decades, establishment of IJVs has become a major strategy for firms entering international markets (Ding, 
1997; Duan, 2007; Dunning, 1995; Li, 2003; Meschi & Riccio, 2008), and an important strategic approach for coping 
with global competitive pressure (Kwon, 2008). However, researchers have pointed out that between 30% and 70% of 
the total number of IJV established eventually break up (Hennart, Kim & Zeng, 1998; Yeheskel, Newburry & Zeira, 
2004). The literature of international business shows that control is one of the biggest challenges that parent firms face 
when entering IJVs (Geringer & Hebert, 1991), and plays an important role in IJV successes, or failures (i.e. Groot & 
Merchant, 2000). Already more than 15 years ago, Geringer and Hebert (1989) proposed that future research should 
broaden the critical considerations and implications of control in terms of mechanisms, control extent, and control focus. 
Later on, Raswamy, Gomes, and Veliyath (1998) have also suggested the necessity to examine a wider array of IJV 
control through in-dept investigations. More recently Barden, Steensma, and Lyles (2005) have added to the debate and 
suggested that further research is needed to investigate the “fit” between parent firms’ strategies and their control 
systems.  
The purpose of the present study is to analyze the relationships between foreign parent strategies, control and 
performance in IJVs. The research puzzle is addressed through the following questions: 
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Vol. 2, No. 1                                                            International Business Research
4
1) How do foreign parent firms configure the control structure in their IJVs to implement their strategies?  
2) What are the relationships between foreign parent control structure in IJVs and the IJV performance? 
In the present study, an IJV is regarded as a separate entity formed by a multinational company (MNC) or multinational 
companies and a local firm or local firms either through greenfield investment or partial acquisitions. In the following 
sections, we conceptualize the IJV control along three dimensions including mechanism, focus, and extent. Then, we 
develop hypotheses regarding foreign parent strategies, IJV control and performance. We conclude by pointing out the 
implications for researchers and managers, and indicate some opportunities for future research.   
2. Conceptualization of IJV control 
In the organizational literature, management control means the process by which an organization influences its 
members and units to work in ways that meet the organizational objectives (Glaister & Buckley, 1998). According to 
Child et al. (2005: 15), control is a central aspect of management, and essential in any system that holds managers 
accountable for their actions and decisions. The main purpose of control is to attain predictability and critical 
information on IJV operation through some regulatory means (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997), and thus to safeguard the 
parent firm’s interests. In the present study, the control of IJVs is defined as the influence of the foreign parent firms on 
the operations of the IJVs (Ding, 1997). Furthermore, researchers have acknowledged that control systems are complex 
and multidimension (see e.g Das & Teng, 1998; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Lu & Hebert, 2005). Unfortunately, existing 
research tends to focus on only one dimension. To be able to capture the dynamic nature of IJV and conduct IJV control 
research thoroughly, this study adopts the multidimensional approach of control (mechanism, focus, and extent) 
advocated by Geringer and Hebert’s (1989). In this section, these control dimensions are elaborated upon. 
2.1 Control mechanisms 
Control mechanisms are structural arrangements deployed to determine and influence what an organization’s members 
do (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Control mechanisms consist of a variety of mechanisms including formal and social 
controls that are available for firms exercising effective control to protect their interests in IJVs (Geringer &Hebert, 
1989; Groot & Merchant, 2000). Formal control depends on hierarchies, standards, codified rules, procedures, goals, 
and regulations that specify desirable patterns of behavior (Das & Teng, 1998) aimed directly at protecting the assets of 
parent firms (Fryxell et al., 2002). Formal control mechanisms help to decrease the potential for opportunisms by 
controlling the assets through hierarchical means (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). Social control is designed to promote 
expectations and mutual commitments through which the IJV managers learn to share the common attitudes and 
knowledge of the parent organization. Social control refers to mechanisms such as personal relations, informal 
communication, information exchange and training, mentoring, and development of a common organizational culture 
that foster shared values and norms without explicitly restricting the behavior of the targeted people by those social 
controls (Schaan, 1983; Das & Teng, 1998; Fryxell et al., 2002).  
2.2 Control focus 
Regarding the control focus, partners can choose to have a broad control focus and attempt to exercise control over the 
entire range of the IJV’s activity, or they can have a narrow control that focuses on only one or two areas in IJV 
activities which they consider the most critical (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Groot & Merchant, 2000). The most critical 
areas in IJVs are often: 1) Marketing, sales, and distribution; 2) Procurement; 3) General management and operation; 4) 
Finance and accounting; 5) R & D; 6) Production and quality; and 7) Human resources (Glaister et al., 2005). 
Depending on factors such as the parent firm’s competencies and the goals of IJV activities, parent firms may focus 
their control on technology-related or market related activities (Child et al., 2005). 
2.3 Control extent 
Control extent refers to the tightness of control which is exercised (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Tightly controlled 
organizations tend to be strict with respect to their employee’s punctuality, and detail oriented, and precise in operation. 
Tight control can be effected through any mechanism that provides a partner with a high degree of certainty that 
personnel in the IJV will act as the given partner wishes. According to Child et al. (2005), the tightness of control is 
reflected in frequent and precise reporting. Controls can be tightened by more intensive training of IJV employees in 
production and management techniques.  These dimensions of IJV control will be used as the IJV control structure 
when we discuss how foreign parent firms strategies determine the IJV control structure in the following section.  
3. Foreign parent strategies and IJV control 
Gaining management control over an IJV is one way to ensure that one’s strategic objectives are actively pursued, and 
to actively monitor and curb possible opportunism by one’s partner. Johnston (2005) argued that different subsidiary 
tasks are associated with different levels of parent control. Previous researchers proposed that foreign parent firms 
entering into IJVs should design their IJV control structure based on their strategic motives, strategic importance 
(Chalos & O’Connor, 1998), strategic focus (Li, 2003), and competitive strategy (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). 
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However, the existing research does not show any links between the partner’s strategies and the choice of the IJV’s 
control system (Groot & Merchant, 2000: 583; Barden et. al, 2005). This section, therefore, attempts to fill in this gap.
3.1 Strategic motives  
Previous researchers suggested that the strategic motives of parent firms determine their control in IJVs (e.g. Calantone 
& Zhao, 2001). Foreign parent firms enter into joint ventures with different motives. According to Harrigan (1985), 
foreign parent firms form IJVs to generate internal benefits, competitive benefits, and strategic benefits. Kogut (1988) 
suggests three main motives for IJV formation including cost reduction, strategic behavior, and learning. To find a link 
between parent strategies and their control within the scope of this paper, we adopt the classification of motives 
proposed by Makino (1995): 1) accessing the partners’ proprietary resources, and 2) achieving economies of scale and 
scope.  
The primary motive for foreign parent firms forming IJV is to gain access to a local firm’s proprietary resources 
including both firm-specific knowledge and country specific knowledge. Whilst, local firms may lack management 
know-how and technology (Luo et al., 2001), they often contribute their country specific knowledge, land, and 
manufacturing facilities (Killing, 1983). According to resource dependency theory, if the access that local parent firms 
contributing to the IJVs have is critical to the IJVs success, the local parent firms have a better position from which to 
negotiate for more control over IJVs (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). Thus, they leave foreign firms less control in the IJVs. 
Foreign firms, as a result, acquire their control through social control and by concentrating their control on the areas 
where they contribute most to the IJVs.  Therefore, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Foreign parent firms entering into an IJV to gain access to local parent firm proprietary resources are 
more likely to use a narrow, social, and loose form of control over the IJV. 
Another common motive for a foreign parent firm to enter IJVs with local firms is to gain economies of scale and scope.
For this purpose, foreign parent firms are often manufacturing firms and they just expect the local parent firms to 
merely supply them with cheap labor, and existing facilities such as land and/or a factory (Killing, 1983). This 
contribution by local parent firms can simply help to reduce the production costs of the IJVs (Kogut, 1988). For foreign 
parent firms entering into IJVs with this motive, the most important issue is the quality of the product of the IJV 
(Chalos & O’Connor, 1998). In addition, the success of a joint venture depends on the fit between the parent criteria for 
success and how well the parent control specific activities related to its criteria for success (Schaan, 1983). Thus, 
foreign parent firms may narrow down their control to focus on the quality issue of the IJVs’ output. Furthermore, by 
focusing their control on some specific activities and loosening control over the rest of the IJV activities for local parent 
firms, foreign parent firms give incentives for local parent firms more chance to involve in and contribute to the 
activities of the IJVs. Giving up overall control and maintaining formal control in just some key areas of the IJV also 
helps to reduce the costs associated with excessive control. This may help to reduce the level of conflict and increase 
the cooperation between foreign and local parent firms. As a result, we propose: 
Hypothesis 1b: Foreign parent firms entering to IJVs with local firms to gain economies of scale and scope are likely to 
exercise narrow, formal, and loose control over IJVs. 
3.2 Strategic importance 
An IJV can play an important role in the parent’s value chain when it is a vital source for the parent firm’s output, or a 
repository for the parent firm’s core competencies (Johanson et al., 2001). Therefore, IJVs may be established to 
improve the strategic positioning of the foreign parent firms (Glaister & Buckley, 1996). With respect to the strategic 
importance, researchers (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Koza & Lewin, 1998) have previously argued that IJV parents do 
not often deem the partnership to be of equal important in their overall strategic portfolio, and that a partner that has a 
large strategic interest in an IJV may indeed prefer a broad control. According to Yan and Gray (2001), those firms for 
which the IJVs are of greater strategic importance than for their partners will have a greater stake in the venture and 
may negotiate strongly for control. Green and Welsh (1988) pointed out that when the IJVs play a key role in the parent 
firm’s revenue or their inputs supplying, the parent firms will try to maintain such inputs and revenue under their tight 
control. In the same vein, Hennart (1988) suggested that the parent firms will seek for dominant control over the IJVs or 
convert these into wholly owned subsidiaries when the IJVs become strategically important to them.  
Merchant and Groot (2000) found that when the foreign parent firms had a broader set of objectives for an IJV, their 
focus on control was broad. In contrast, they also argued that when firms use an IJV to diversify their offerings, they 
tend to employ a relatively loose control. Boyacigiller’s study (1990) found that the greater the interdependence 
between the IJV and the headquarters, the more U.S. nationals were placed in the high-level positions in the subsidiary 
to manage the uncertainties. In summary, as suggested by the transaction cost theory, if an IJV is strategically important, 
the foreign parent firm will protect its position and reduce uncertainty to safeguard its interests. Thus, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: The more important the IJVs are to the foreign parent firms, the more likely the foreign parent firms are 
to exercise broad, formal, and tight control over them.  
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3.3 Strategic focus 
3.3.1 Domestic focus
Domestic market oriented IJVs are those that direct most of their activities towards the markets (Chalos & O’Connor, 
1998) where the IJVs are located, thus commitment and cooperation from the local partners are more important. 
Because foreign parent firms are probably not familiar with local tastes and local unique customer needs. The 
knowledge of the host environment provided by the local partners may enable suitable adaptation; and bring advantages 
to the IJVs (Johnston, 2005). Previous research also points out that less control from the foreign parent firms, and more 
influence of the local parents, are factors necessary for better performance of IJVs (Li, 2003). This is especially 
important in those countries such as China where the local governments play an important role in joint venture activities 
(Beamish, 1993). Information about the local economy, politics, culture and business customs, consumer’s demands and 
tastes, the labor force, infrastructure, raw materials, and other factors required for the operation of joint ventures are 
likely to be delegated to the local partner (Makino & Delios, 1996).  
In addition, Bai, Tao, and Wu (2003) found that if the sales of the IJVs’ products are mainly focused on local markets, 
the control of the foreign parent firms decreases with the need for local marketing knowledge of their products. This is 
because the IJVs in the countries like China are often a marriage of foreign technologies and local markets. In this 
context, the marketing expertise for local markets is often an important contribution of the local partners, while the 
technological sophistication is an equivalent provided by the foreign partners. Therefore, the foreign parents oriented 
towards the local markets are likely to exercise less control over the IJVs because the resources important to them are 
obtained with the help of the local partners (Calantone & Zhao, 2001). As a result, we propose:  
Hypothesis 3a: In domestic oriented IJVs, foreign parent firms prefer to exercise a narrow, loose, and social control 
over the IJVs. 
3.3.2 Export focus 
In some cases the sales of the IJVs are export oriented and the local parent partners often lack competence in exporting, 
thus it is more efficient for the foreign parent firms to dominate the IJV operation (Li, 2003). This may be because, as in 
case of managers in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe  there is technical proficiency but a lack of experience 
of market-oriented management functions such as strategic planning, and especially the marketing mix (Filatotchev et 
al., 1996; Stephan, 2006) which play a critical role in exporting to foreign markets. Thus, to offset the risk of the lack of 
local managerial competence of local managers, the foreign parent firms may become directly involved in a broad range 
of the IJV’s activities. 
In addition to exporting to international markets, the foreign parent firms who often have a competitive advantage in 
production management (see Liker et al., 1999) have to apply tight and formal control especially over product quality, 
so that their products meet the international standards and are able to compete in the international markets (Chalos & 
O’Connor, 1998; Li, 2003). Furthermore, export orientated subsidiaries often face risks related to security and 
enforcement of contractual export obligations such as timely deliveries and quality standards. Thus we expect:  
Hypothesis 3b: In export oriented IJVs, the foreign parent firms prefer to exercise a broad, tight, and formal control 
over the IJVs 
3.4 Competitive strategy 
The competitive strategy used in the present study to investigate the dimensions of foreign parent firms’ control 
dimensions over their IJVs in accordance with their competitive strategies, is based on the framework by Porter (1980). 
He divides competitive strategies into two main forms: 1) the low cost strategy, and 2) the differentiated strategy. 
3.4.1 Low cost strategy
Many times, the foreign firms operating in foreign markets often have to adapt their strategies to align with the local 
consumer’s income and therefore, often use a low cost strategy. This competitive strategy is characterized by: 1) 
vigorously pursuing cost reduction, 2) enforcing all the possible economies of scale, 3) acquiring process engineering 
skills, or skills needed in order to design and plan efficiently, 4) bring routine to the task environment, and 5) producing 
a standard, undifferentiated product (Porter, 1980). The main focus of this strategy is on the standard product with the 
routine task environment or in other words, cost control focus. The foreign parent firms motivate their delegates in the 
IJVs to measure these costs. Because the outcome is observable under the low cost strategy, the foreign parent firms 
will try to avoid costs by not engaging in further control, such as social control. Child et al. (2005) suggested that in the 
case of activities with a measurable output, control can be exercised through formal monitoring systems. Because 
control incurs both direct and indirect costs (Child, Yan & Lu, 1997), the foreign parent firms, which apply a low cost 
strategy for their units, gain a higher effectiveness by narrowing down their focus to some of formal control like output 
control (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990). In summary we suggest:
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Hypothesis 4a: The foreign parent firms prefer to exercise a narrow, formal, and loose control over low-cost strategy
oriented IJVs.
3.4.2 The differentiation strategy
Foreign parent firms which adopt this strategy for their IJVs will target producing a unique product. Thus, the IJV 
should have a unique task of producing and marketing. In this kind of competitive strategy, knowledge management
may not be a simple task for foreign parent firms with different subsidiaries. Differentiated products are often the result
of a complex interplay between all the parts of the MNCs, thus parent firms may need to act as foci for tapping the
resources of the total network (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2000). As a result, a close relationship between parent firms and
the IJVs is necessary (Johnston, 2005). Miller (1988) maintains that the task environment of the units which adopted a 
differentiation strategy is more complex than that those adopting a low cost strategy. To cope with this, the foreign
parent firms need to engage more in the IJV operation and thus to impose a broader control on them. Govindarajan and
Fisher (1990) suggested that the units which are to manufacture unique and high quality products may gain a higher
effectiveness when the parent foreign firms exercise more control over behavior which may be formatted by formal
control. In a similar manner, Child et al. (2005) argued that, when IJVs focus on complicated marketing work, the most
appropriate option is formal control which is based on behavioral assessments of how the activities are being carried out.
Based on the above we expect that:
Hypothesis 4b: Foreign parent firms prefer to exercise a broad, formal, and tight control over the differentiation
strategy oriented IJVs.
3.5 Links between the foreign parent firms’ strategies, control, and IJV performance
Child and Yan (2003) argued that parent firm control permits the effective use of whatever strategic resources that the
parent firms have in the IJVs. O’Donnell (2000) proposes that the fit between subsidiary strategy and the subsidiary
control mechanism, such as incentives for subsidiary managers, can help the subsidiary achieve performance objectives.
Johnston (2005) studies the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries, and finds that different subsidiary tasks
were associated with different levels of subsidiary autonomy. In other words, as parent firms set different tasks and
targets for their subsidiaries they may exercise different levels of control over them. Dymsza (2002) analyzed the
successes and failures of IJVs in the developing countries. He pointed out that parent firms which have a marketing
oriented strategy emphasizing the product differentiation, segmentation of markets, trademarks and brand names, and
promotion and selling will strive to control these activities in the IJVs. Lorange et al. (1986) maintain that through
exercising a proper IJV control structure, foreign parent firms can make sure that their strategies are effectively 
implemented, and their resources are efficiently utilized for enhancing the IJV performance. Thus, we expect that:
Hypothesis 5: The foreign parent firms which adapt their control structures in the IJVs according to their strategies will 
enjoy a better IJV performance than those that do not.  
4. Sample description and measurement 
The study here is a part of an on-going research project focusing on IJV behavior, strategies, partner selection, control
structure, and performance of Finnish firms. The target firms and investments were identified as follows: 1) The FDI
data base collected by the project leader starting from the late 1980s based on press releases regarding IJVs published in
several Finnish business magazines and newspapers, 2) Annual reports and websites of the 250 largest Finnish firms as 
reported by the leading business magazines, 3) based on the earlier surveys focusing on IJVs and wholly owned
subsidiaries of Finnish firms conducted by the project leader. From the resources, we identified 340 IJVs qualifying
IJVs formed by Finnish firms since 1985 and in operations at least until 2002.  The qualifying 340 IJVs involved 250
Finnish parent firms. Of those 250 firms, several firms were very difficult to contact either because they had been
restructured or gone out of business. The aim of contacting the firms was primarily to identify the best informants. In
some firms there was no longer anyone employed with sufficient knowledge required to inform. This left a total of 200
Finnish parent firms. Due to time and cost constraints a postal questionnaire and online web survey were used to gather
the data. 
The participants were those managers who directly involved in the establishment and operations of the IJVs. To
enhance the quality of the data, the respondents were contacted by phone in December 2006 to explain the key points of
the study and the questionnaires. In exchange for their cooperation with the study and to provide motivation and
accurate responses, the respondents were assured of anonymity and were promised a summary report of the findings
and also participated in a draw for three gifts. After one reminder at the end of the January 2007, at the end of February,
compared across their age, size, international experience, and IJV experience. No statistically significant difference was
54 questionnaires were returned, from which 5 questionnaires were unusable. The final sample was 49 IJVs, a res-
The sample was carefully examined for systematic response bias using t-tests. Respondents and non-respondents were
ponse rate of 24,84 % which is similar to that of earlier respective studies in Finland (see Larimo & Rumpunen, 2006).
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found. Thus, there was not response bias to be found in the final sample. After taking out the uncompleted 
questionnaires, the final sample related to 49 IJVs.  
Among these IJVs, 45% were established in 1988-1995, and 55% in 1996-2006; 53 % through acquisitions, and 47% 
through greenfield investment; 76 % involved 2 partners and 24 % involved 3 partners; 61% were established with 
indefinite duration, 22% with a duration of less than 5 years, and 17 % stated to have a duration of more than 5 years; 
41 % had a degree of Finnish ownership of between 10%-49%, 10% had equal ownership, and 49 % had Finnish 
majority ownership at establishment; 71% were located in emerging economies, and 29% in developed economies; 63% 
dealt with industrial products, 27 % with consumer products, and 10 % offered both consumer and industrial products. 
All three control dimensions were measured with a 5 point-scale. Based on the list of different mechanisms and focus 
areas provided, the respondents were asked to assess their 1) method of monitoring and control, and 2) their focus of 
monitoring and control (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.92). The measurement of strategies used by parent firms in IJVs was 
based on a 5 point-scale with 1= “not important at all” to 5= “very important” where Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.95. The 
measure of IJV performance was also based on a 5 point-scale, the respondents were asked if they were satisfied with 
IJV performance on both financial and total performance scales with 1= “very unsatisfied” to 5= “very satisfied” where 
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.94. 
5. Results 
The empirical data has been analyzed based both on descriptive statistics and on testing statistics. In order to test 
hypothesis 1 to 4, a correlation matrix including parent strategies and different control structures has been computed. 
The results are shown in table 1. 
5.1 Parent strategic motive and IJV control  
Of 49 respondents, 18 mentioned their main strategic motive in entering to IJVs to be gaining access to local firms, and 
especially their management skill set. Of these 18 respondents, almost 90% exercised narrow control, over 80% 
exercised loose control, and almost 80% exercised social control over their IJVs. In addition, table 1 shows statistically 
positive correlations between this gaining access strategy and narrow, social, and loose control structures. Thus, the 
result supports the hypothesis 1a: when foreign parent firms enter into IJVs to access local firms’ resources, they prefer 
more social, narrow, and loose control over their IJVs. There were 31 firms who mentioned their main motive of 
entering IJVs to be to gain economies of scale. Of these 31 firms, more than 80% of foreign parent firms used formal 
control, and about 70 % of parent firms used narrow and loose control with their IJVs. Table 1 also shows statistically 
positive correlations between a strategy directed towards gaining economies of scale and scope and narrow, formal, and 
loose control structures. Thus, the result supports hypothesis 1b: foreign parent firms prefer formal, narrow, and loose 
control when they enter IJVs to gain economies of scale and scope. 
5.2 Strategic importance of IJVs and IJV control 
When asked to consider the strategic importance of their IJVs, 32 respondents mentioned that IJVs are strategically very 
important for the parent firms. Of these 32 responses, almost 85% of the companies concerned exercised formal control, 
and about 75% were found to exercise broad and tight control over their IJVs. In addition, table 1 shows statistically 
positive correlations between strategic importance and broad, formal, and tight control structures. Thus the result 
supports hypothesis 2 that the more important the IJVs are to the parent firms, the more likely it is that the foreign 
parent firms exercise more formal, broad and tight control over their IJVs. 
5.3 Parent firm strategic focus and IJV control 
There were 26 respondents who mentioned that the strategic focus in their IJVs was on exporting to other markets, and 
23 respondents mentioned their focus on the domestic markets. Within the group of 26 respondents focused on export, 
17 respondent firms (65%) exercised broad control over their IJVs and 21 (80%) respondent exercised tight control over 
their IJVs, and further 22 (85%) of foreign firms exercised formal control. Table 1 shows statistically positive 
correlations between export focus strategy and a broad, formal, and tight control structure. Thus, the result supports 
hypothesis 3b that IJVs with an export focused strategy, foreign parent firms prefer to exercise broad, tight and formal 
control over their IJVs. There were 23 respondents who described their strategies as being domestically focused. 
Among these, 19 (82%) exercised formal control, 8 (35%) employed narrow control, and 10 (43%) used loose control in 
their IJVs. Table 1 does not show any statistically significant relationship between domestic focus strategy and narrow, 
social, and loose control. Thus the result does not support hypothesis 3a. 
5.4 Parent firm strategic competitiveness and IJV control  
Twenty-one respondents mentioned that they implemented a low cost strategy, and 28 respondents mentioned that they 
applied a differentiation strategy in their IJVs. Among the 21 respondents with a low cost strategy, over 80 % exercised 
formal, narrow, and loose control over their IJVs. Table 1 shows statistically positive correlations between low cost 
strategy and formal, narrow, and loose control structures. Thus, the result supports hypothesis 4a that foreign parent 
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firms prefer to exercise formal, narrow, and loose control over low cost oriented IJVs. Among the 28 respondents who 
employed a product differentiation strategy more than 80% exercised broad control and formal control, and over 75% 
respondents applied tight control to their IJVs. In addition, Table 1 shows statistically positive correlations between the 
differentiation strategy approach and broad, formal, and tight control. This result supports hypothesis 4b that foreign 
parent firms prefer to exercise broad, formal, and tight control over their differentiation strategy IJVs.  
Table 1 about here  
5.5 Parent firm’s strategies, control, and IJV performance 
There were 22 respondents who answered that their firms have adapted their control techniques according to their 
strategies. These 22 firms had a mean of total performance rating of 4.1 and financial performance rating of 3.7 (1= 
“very unsatisfied” to 5= “very satisfied”) which indicates a positive relationship between parent firm’s adaptation of 
control systems to their strategies and IJV performance. The remaining 27 firms which did not adapt their control 
systems to their strategies had a mean result of 2.6 for total performance and 2.5 for financial performance.  
In addition, to testing hypothesis 5 statistically, a chi-square test was used. The purpose of the method is to determine 
how well an observed set of data fits an expected set of hypotheses. The method was used to examine the differences 
with categorical variables and the relationships between internal factors (e.g. parent strategies) and IJV control 
structures, and IJV performance. The results of the chi-square test show a strong positive relationship between parent 
firm’s strategic choices, their control structure, and IJV performance (see table 2). Therefore, the results support the 
hypothesis 5 that supposed that the foreign parent firms which adapt their control structures in the IJVs according to 
their strategies will have a better IJV performance level than those that do not. It is worth noting that the results support 
hypothesis 5 based on both performance measures - total performance and financial performance. 
Table 2 about here 
6. Implications 
Our empirical evidence shows that different strategies used in IJVs by foreign parent firms required different control 
structures. In addition, the firms that adapted the control structure employed in their IJVs according to their strategies 
were more satisfied with their IJV performance than those who did not. The present study contributes to the existing 
IJV knowledge by offering a link between parent firm strategy and control. To expand on that, most foreign parent 
firms want a high level of control that is consistent with their bargaining power (Calantone et al., 2001). However, the 
present study suggests that, to succeed in target markets, foreign parent firms must have a comparable IJV control 
structure that fits their strategies. This finding is consistent with Lynch (1993) and Kumar and Seth (1998) who argued 
that the IJV control structure reflects the parent firm’s strategy. Moreover, the newness of this study is the extension of 
previous research. Although previous research (e.g. Kumar & Seth, 1998; Lynch, 1993) suggested the importance of a 
compatibility between strategy and control, it failed to point out which control structures are needed for which strategies. 
This study extends the previous research by specifying which kind of control structure would fit with different strategies. 
More specifically, for the purpose of gaining economies of scale and scope when committing a joint venture with local 
firms, the present study suggests that the foreign parent firms should focus their control on the most critical issues in 
IJVs, such as product quality control. Beside these critical areas, the foreign parent firms can allow the local firms to be 
in charge of other areas in the IJVs, thus they can reduce the costs associated with an excessive control structure, and at 
the same time, motivate the local parent firms to utilize their expertise. The foreign parent firms often use the IJV as a 
base for manufacturing units and then export the output to other markets. The present study points out that it is more 
efficient for the foreign parent firms to dominate the IJV operation. This is because managers in some countries, for 
example in Central and Eastern Europe, are often technically proficient, but inexperienced with market oriented 
management functions, such as strategic planning and the marketing mix which are fundamental to successfully 
exporting to developed markets. Thus, the present study suggests that broad and tight control help the foreign parent 
firms not only to ensure the IJV’s output meets the international quality standards, but also to utilize their advanced 
management know-how of export best practice.  
For the IJVs that are strategically important to the foreign parent firms, broad, formal, and tight controls are likely to be 
the effective ones. This finding confirms Johnston’s (2005) work maintaining that when the subsidiaries are big and 
play an important role, the parent firms impose progressively more hierarchical, or formal control mechanisms, on their 
subsidiaries. Regarding the competitive strategy, for the IJVs which contribute to a low cost strategy, the parent firms 
tend to use narrow, formal, and loose control methods in their IJVs. However, when the foreign firms adapt 
differentiation as the competitive strategy for their IJVs, broad, formal, and tight controls may be the most effective to 
manage the IJVs. Differentiated products are the result of a complex interplay between all the parts of the firm, so that 
the foreign parent firms need to act as a center for tapping the resources of the total network. As a result, intensive 
control is deemed necessary. Social control mechanisms can not be used in both strategies because the structure will 
take longer to build, and be extremely costly (considering social events, such as outdoor activities, parties, extensive 
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training, building personal relationships, etc.). This finding extends the previous research by Gullander (1976), who
suggested that an appropriate control structure allows parent firms to integrate the IJV’s activities with its strategies. To
expand on that suggestion, this study has specified which kinds of IJV control design structures are most suitable for 
different strategies. From another perspective, the findings contribute to existing knowledge by countering Johnston’s
argument that when the subsidiaries pursue a cost leadership strategy, the headquarters maintain tight control over
subsidiaries’ activities (Johnston, 2005: 36). 
Figure 1 about here
7. Suggestions for further research
The present study offers several opportunities for further studies. IJV structure is the result of a negotiation process
between foreign and local firms (Kogut, 1988). Because this study excluded the negotiation between foreign firms and
local firms for control of the IJVs, further study could investigate the influence of this element on IJV control. In
addition, there are other variables that can affect IJV control, such as operating environments (Fey & Beamish, 2000),
cultural similarity (Lin & Germain, 1998). These factors also need to be investigated. Since the data collected in the
present study is limited to IJVs formed by Finnish firms, further empirical study using the framework of this study
could also collect data from different countries in Asia, Europe, and America. Then, the findings would need to be
compared in order to provide more generalizable results. Moreover, as the IJVs evolve over time, further study using
the presented framework in order to investigate the fit between the foreign parent’s strategies and the control structures
utilized during the life cycle of the IJVs may be of great interest. 
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Figure 1. Relationships between foreign parent strategy, control, and IJV performance 
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Governing for success: The host country 
uncertainty and the design of foreign parent 
control in international joint ventures 
 
Huu Le Nguyen and Jorma Larimo1 
Abstract In this paper we develop a model of the international joint venture (IJV) 
control which deals with the level of uncertainty of the host country. The host 
country uncertainty is characterized by cultural, environmental, and competitive 
uncertainty. Following Geringer and Hebert (1989); Buckley, Glaister, and Husan 
(2005), we conceptualized foreign parent control across three dimensions includ-
ing mechanism, focus, and extent. Our empirical evidence is based on the survey 
of Finnish firms that established IJVs with local firms in the 1990s. The results 
show that foreign parent firms tend to exercise more formal, broad, and tight con-
trol over their IJVs when they perceived high cultural uncertainty and high com-
petitive uncertainty in the host countries. On the other hand, they prefer formal, 
narrow, and loose control over their IJVs in cases of high environmental uncer-
tainty. In addition, the firms that exercise broad, formal, and tight control in high 
uncertainty countries and narrow, social, and loose control in low uncertainty 
countries were more satisfied with their IJV performance. Finally, we conclude 
the paper by discussing the implications of our findings and directions for further 
research on IJVs.  
Keywords	
Foreign firms, host country uncertainty, international joint venture control 
1 Introduction 
In the last several decades, international joint ventures (IJVs) have become a 
major strategy for the firms entering in international markets (Dunning, 1995). 
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The international business literature shows that one of the biggest challenges that 
the parent firms face when entering IJVs is the control issue over the venture’s ac-
tivities (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Groot & Mer-
chant, 2000). This is because while participating in a voluntary cooperative rela-
tionship in the IJVs, the foreign parent firms are exposed to the risk of 
opportunism (Zhang & Li, 2001). Researchers have pointed out that the IJVs 
eventually break up at a rate of 30% to 70% of their total numbers (Geringer & 
Hebert, 1991; Yeheskel, Newburry & Zeira, 2004; Hennart et al., 1998). Insuffi-
cient control may translate into the leakage of knowledge, or proprietary compo-
nents and capabilities to the outside group (Geringer & Hebert, 1989), or the loss 
of the competitive advantage in favor of the other parent (Hamel, 1991) or some 
other competitors (Reich & Mankin, 1986). Despite the popularity and importance 
of the IJVs and the extensive research in the field, the understanding of their func-
tioning is rather limited (Das & Teng 1998). For that matter, Geringer and Hebert 
(1989) and Ramaswamy, Gomes, and Veliyath (1998) proposed that future re-
search should deepen the IJV control debate in terms of mechanisms, control ex-
tent, and control focus. Additionally, another avenue of research may be to focus 
on the foreign parent firm’s adaptation of their control in response to the IJV’s op-
erating environment (Yan & Zeng, 1999; Zhang & Li, 2001; Barden et al., 2005: 
170).  
The primary objective of the present study is to build up a framework for the 
managing of IJVs from the viewpoint of the foreign parent firms, in their endeavor 
to cope with uncertainties in the host countries. In order to accomplish this goal, 
we strive to answer to the following research question: How host country uncer-
tainty influences the foreign parent firms’ choice of control structure in the 
IJVs? The research puzzle is addressed through the following questions: 
1) How do foreign parent firms design their IJV control in order to cope 
with the host country uncertainty? 
2) What are the relationships between the foreign parent control structure 
in IJVs and the IJV performance? 
The first research question would enable us to analyze the link between the for-
eign parent control design in their IJVs and the host country uncertainty.	 It in-
quires into what control structures, in terms of mechanism, focus, and extent, is 
needed to respond to uncertainty. The host country uncertainty can be defined in 
terms of cultural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, competitive uncertainty, 
and behavioral uncertainty. The second research question investigates whether the 
foreign parent control structure influences the IJV performance. 
The issue of uncertainty in the host country is not new in the international busi-
ness literature. However, it has not been studied exhaustively. Most studies related 
to uncertainty issues in the host country focus on the choice of entry strategy by 
the foreign firms such as those by Erramilli et al. (1996), Delios and Henisz 
(2000), Brouthers et al. (2003), Kontkanen (2006), Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-
Barber (2006); on the governance structures in strategic alliances like those of 
Chen and Chen (2003); or on the headquarters’ behavior such as Lang and Lock-
hart (1990). In IJV studies, Taco and William (2004) reviewed ten major journals 
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for a period of 15 years between 1988 and 2003, and identified 388 IJV studies. 
Among these, there were a few studies researching control (15/388), while most 
IJV studies focused on the entry mode strategy (57/388), the partner learning 
(39/388), and the partner selection (28/388). After carefully reviewing the IJV lite-
rature in the major international business journals using the most significant data 
sources such as Elsevier-Science	 Direct, AIB	 Inform-Proquest	 Direct,	 EBSCO,	
Emerald,	JSTOR, and Blackwell	synergy, we reached the conclusion that no study 
has dealt with the IJV control designed to cope with the host country uncertainty 
properly. Among those studies discussing about uncertainty in joint venturing, 
Birnbirg (1998) attempted to explain the link between IJV interdependency and 
uncertainty. He suggested dealing with uncertainty solely through a formal con-
tract. Similarly, even though the environmental uncertainty was mentioned in 
Kumar and Seth’s work (1998), it was limited to the link between environmental 
uncertainty, IJV strategic interdependence, and control mechanisms. These few 
studies did not analyze the uncertainty in the host country thoroughly and have ig-
nored the multidimensional aspects of control, and our aim is to fill in this gap. In 
the present paper, an IJV is regarded as a separate entity located in a foreign coun-
try formed by one (or more) MNC (s) and one (or more) local firm (s) through ei-
ther greenfields, or partial acquisitions.	Uncertainty refers to the difficulty or ina-
bility to predict the environment (Miller, 1992), or to the unpredictability of 
changes of some factors (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003). Host country 
uncertainty in this academic enterprise refers to the following factors: cultural un-
certainty, competitive uncertainty, and environmental uncertainty. 
In the following sections, we conceptualize the IJV control along three dimen-
sions control mechanism, focus, and extent. Subsequently, we develop several hy-
potheses regarding the foreign parent control structure in their IJV and the host 
country uncertainty. Eventually, we discuss our data methodology and present the 
main results of our survey. Finally, we conclude the paper by pointing out the im-
plications for researchers and managers, and indicate some opportunities for future 
research. 
2 Conceptualization of the IJV Control 
 
In this section, we first review the key points of IJV control. Second, we elabo-
rate three dimensions of the IJV control: control mechanism, control focus, and 
control extent, which is based on the work of Geringer and Herbert (1989). 
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2.1 Definitions of Control in IJVs 
In the organizational literature, management control refers to the process by 
which an organization influences its members and its units to work in ways that 
meet the organizational objectives (Glaister & Bluckley, 1998). According to 
Child et al. (2005:15), the control is a central aspect of the management, and es-
sential in any system that holds the managers accountable for their actions and de-
cisions. Ouchi (1977: 95) suggested that “control can be conceptualized as an 
evaluation process which is based on the monitoring and evaluating of behavior or 
of outputs”. Thus, the organizational literature emphasizes how control can be 
used to manage individuals and subunits. The management control in IJV is com-
plex because there are two or more parties involved (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). In 
this paper, the control of IJVs is defined as the influence of the foreign parent 
firms on the IJV operations. Furthermore, researchers have acknowledged that the 
control systems are complex and multidimensional (see e.g. Geringer & Hebert, 
1989; Glaister, 1995; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Raswamy et al. ,1998; Das & Teng, 
1998; Buckley et al. 2005; Lu & Hebert, 2005). This study adopts the multidimen-
sional approach of control developed by Geringer and Hebert’s (1989). In the fol-
lowing, these control dimensions are elaborated. Key empirical studies made in 
1995-2007 are summarized in Table 1.    
2.2 Control Mechanisms 
In general, the control mechanisms are structural arrangements deployed to de-
termine and influence what the members of the organization do (Geringer & He-
bert, 1989; Fryxell et al., 2002). The control mechanisms consist of a variety of in-
struments including formal and social controls that are available to firms for 
exercising effective control over their members (Behrman, 1977; Friedman & Be-
guin, 1971). Formal control depends on hierarchies, standards (Perrow, 1972), 
codified rules, procedures, goals, and regulations that specify desirable patterns of 
behavior (Das & Teng, 1998). These instruments of formal control are usually 
agreed upon and imposed by both the foreign and local parent firms (Fryxell et al., 
2002). The noteworthy control mechanisms are ownership, the board of directors, 
the appointment of key personnel, the planning and approval process for capital 
budgeting and resource allocation, and the lay down procedures and routines for 
IJVs (see e.g. Makino, 1995; Lu & Hebert, 2005). In turn, social control is de-
signed to promote expectations and mutual commitments through which the JV 
managers learn to share the common attitudes and knowledge of the organization 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  Social control refers to various mechanisms such as 
informal communication, information exchange and training, personal relation, 
mentoring, and development of a common organizational culture. These mechan-
isms foster shared values and norms, without explicitly restricting the behavior of 
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the targeted people through the means of these social controls (Schaan, 1983; Das 
& Teng, 1998; Chalos & O’Connor, 1998, Fryxell et al., 2002).  
2.3 Control Focus 
Control focus can be further divided into broad control and narrow control (Ge-
ringer & Herbert, 1989). In control focus, the partners can choose to have a broad	
control focus and attempt to exercise control over the entire range of the IJV’s ac-
tivities, or they can have a narrow	control focus and confine their control activi-
ties to the performance dimensions they consider to be critical (Geringer & He-
bert, 1989; Groot & Merchant, 2000). Child et al. (2005) maintain that the parent 
firms may focus their control on activities related to technology, if they have 
strong competencies in the field; alternatively, they may concentrate on the market 
related activities of the IJV, if they are better equipped to assess them. There are 
also cases when the parent firms may focus their control on both technology and 
market related activities. The areas of control focus consist of marketing, sales and 
distribution, procurement, general management and operation, finance and ac-
counting, research and development, production and quality, and human re-
sources. Geringer and Frayne (1990) suggested that one of the crucial areas that 
determine whether the parent’s intended objectives are achieved is their focus on 
the human resource control. In this paper, the control focus is considered to be 
broad when it is based on more than two areas, and narrow when it is based on on-
ly one or two areas.  
2.4 Control extent 
The control extent refers to the degree or tightness of control which is exercised 
on the venture (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Control extent consists of tight control 
and loose control. In loose control, the parent firms tend to use only one or two 
control mechanisms and focus their control on only one or two control areas exer-
cised over the IJVs. Furthermore, in loose control, the parent firms are more flexi-
ble in their evaluation of the employees’ behavior and their performance. The fre-
quency of reports that the IJV managers have to submit to the parent firms and the 
meetings between the parent firms and the IJV managers are very few in loose 
control. In contrast, the tightly controlled organizations tend to be strict with re-
spect to their employee’s dress code, punctuality, and cost-consciousness (Hofs-
tede, Neuijen, Ohayv & Sanders, 1990); and detail oriented, precise in operation 
(O’Reilly, Chatman & Caldwell, 1991). Control is tight from a partner’s perspec-
tive if that partner has the right to make or approve the key decisions (Geringer & 
Hebert, 1989). Tight control is manifest also if the IJV staff is held strictly accoun-
table for adhering to a complete set of ascribed actions such as policies and  
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Table 1. Key empirical studies on IJV control 1995-2007 
Author 
Year 
Sample 
Size 
Data 
Collection 
Concept of 
Control 
Focus  
Area 
Glaister  
(1995) 
94 Survey Mechanism, extent 
focus 
Parent control,  
IJV autonomy 
Hébert  
(1996) 
70 Survey Extent of control,  Parent control, conflict 
Tallman & 
Mjoen (1997)  
102 Survey Activity control Equity control,  
IJV performance 
Kumar & Seth 
(1998) 
64 Survey Mechanisms of 
control 
IJV interdependence,  
uncertainty, control 
Wang et al., 
(1998) 
132 Survey Mechanisms of 
control 
Parent control, 
IJV performance 
Child & Yan 
(1999) 
67 Survey Strategy, operation Resources provision, 
appointment control 
Lyles et al. 
(2000) 
73 Survey Social, formal  
control 
Partner’s trust, know-
ledge acquisition, con-
trol 
Yan & Gray 
(2001) 
90 Survey Strategy, operations 
control 
Effects of parent control 
on IJV performance 
Fryxell et al. 
(2002) 
129 Survey Formal, social  
control 
IJV age, partner’s trust 
Johnson et al. 
(2002) 
51 Survey Decision-making Parent control, fairness, 
commitment 
Mohr & Chalos 
(2003) 
110 Survey Extent of control Partner’s trust, control 
O´Conor 
(2004) 
117 Survey Mechanisms of 
control 
Determinants of control 
Choi & Beamish 
(2004) 
71 Survey Split, shared  
control 
Parent control,  
IJV performance 
Pangarkar &Klein 
(2004) 
76 Survey Parent strategy Parent control,  
IJV performance 
Barden et al. 
(2005) 
12 Interviews Operational control Partner control, conflict 
Buckley et al. 
(2005) 
20 Survey, 
Interviews 
Mechanisms, focus, 
extent of control 
The use of different 
control in IJVs 
Lu & Hébert 
(2005) 
720 Secondary 
data 
Ownership Parent control, IJV  
performance 
Brouther & Ba-
mossy (2006) 
8 Interviews Ownership, IJV 
managers 
Parent control,  
IJV performance 
Duan & Chuan-
min (2007) 
3 Interviews Ownership, control 
mechanisms 
Parent control,  
IJV performance 
Whitelock & 
Yang (2007) 
61 Survey IJV Strategies, 
operations 
Parent control, objec-
tives, IJV performance 
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procedures. Tight control is as well related to highly frequent and precise report-
ing (Child et al., 2005). Control can be tightened through more intensive training 
of the IJV employees in production and management techniques (Van Sluys & 
Schuler, 1994).  
3. Host Country Uncertainty and Foreign Parent Control in 
IJVs 
The business environment today is increasingly challenging, the multinationals are 
facing an ever growing degree of uncertainty and risk. Previous studies indicate 
that the level of uncertainty strongly influences the design of the control dimen-
sions in the IJVs (Johnson et al., 2002). Govindarajan and Shank (1992) stated that 
because of the different levels of uncertainty faced by the constitutive units of a 
multinational, each unit would require systematically different management con-
trol systems. According to Kumar and Seth (1998), the host country uncertainty is 
defined as the complexity and volatility of environmental factors. The uncertainty 
can be high due to physical and cultural uncertainties, changes in host-government 
policies, and other specific factors (Pangarkar & Klein, 2004). In the present 
study, the host country uncertainty refers to the cultural	uncertainty (see Sanchez-
Peinado & Pla-Barber, 2006), the environmental	uncertainty (Sutcliffe & Zaheer, 
1998), the competitive	uncertainty	 (see Lang & Lockhart, 1990). To manage the 
risk involved in operating in these environments, previous researchers suggested 
that the firms’ structure and governance play a decisive role (Drew & Kendrick, 
2005). In the following we will discuss how the foreign parent firms design their 
IJV control in order to deal with the host country uncertainty. 
3.1 Cultural Uncertainty 
The cultural uncertainty is often a potential source of misunderstandings (Child 
et al., 2005) and internal uncertainty for the IJVs (Luo et al., 2001). The cultural 
uncertainty between nations has been evidenced in the differences in managerial 
practices, values, mind-sets, and norms (Ralston, Gustafson, Cheung & Terpstra, 
1993). The foreign and local parent firms differ in management styles, which may 
result into conflict and incompatible goals (Ding 1997, Hennart et al. 1998; Yan & 
Gray, 2001). This may lead to bargaining and negotiating between the foreign and 
local parent firms, which slows down the decision-making process and adds to the 
bureaucratic costs (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993; Ding, 1997). The slow down of 
the decision-making process may lead to the failure of IJVs to respond to the mar-
ket’s frequent changes. Furthermore, the foreign and local parent firms may have 
differences in routines (Hennart et al. 1998) and may clash over issues like prod-
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uct quality, exports, employee wages, or labor policy. These may result in higher 
uncertainty and higher bureaucratic costs as a result of increased bargaining and 
negotiating between partners (Ding 1997, Pangarkar & Klein, 2004). According to 
Egelhoff (1984), the greater the cultural uncertainty between the foreign and local 
parent firms, the greater the problem is in exercising organizational control over 
the IJVs. Thus, to avoid the slow down of the decision-making process and the 
high bureaucratic costs they incur, the foreign parent firms will attempt to obtain a 
broad, tight, and formal control over the IJVs. 
 On the other hand, Bai et al. (2003) evidenced that there is less control when 
the foreign parent firms and their local partners share a similar cultural back-
ground. They showed that whenever setting up a joint venture with firms from the 
mainland China, the partners from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore and Taiwan 
share a similar cultural background. They speak the same language, and may even 
have kinship relationships with the local partners. Under these circumstances, it is 
easier for them to find other ways to mitigate the expropriated problems and this 
in turn, determines them to be less reliant on control than other foreign parent 
firms. Neverthless, the loose control can also have serious shortcomings, as evi-
denced by Bai et al. (2003) when citing the spread of profanities among people of 
the same ethnicity and its negative impact on the future investment opportunities 
of the perpetrator of the expropriation. Corroborated from the above discussion we 
can state:  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the cultural uncertainty between the foreign and lo-
cal parent firms, the more likely the foreign parent firms exercise a broad, for-
mal, and tight control over the IJVs.  
3.2 Environmental Uncertainty 
The environmental uncertainty is defined as the complexity and volatility of the 
environmental factors. The environmental factors’ volatility refers to the unex-
pected changes in regulation, legislation, judicial decisions, interest rates, or 
changes in demand (Kumar & Seth, 1998). While operating in foreign countries, 
for a firm to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the environments, 
it has to develop capabilities that keep it in harmony with the environment (Wer-
nerflet, 1984). Therefore, a different context requires different control mechanisms 
(Johnston, 2005). This is due to, the frequent and unpredictable changes of the 
government policy (Child, Markoczy, & Cheung, 1994), and the possibility of col-
lusion, at the IJV level between the local parent firm and the local government, 
especially when the local parent firm is a state-owned enterprise (Pangarkar & 
Klein, 2004). 
In intricate environments, the excessive control can be problematic because the 
foreign parent firms may not be fully aware of the operational complexity of the 
local conditions. Shortell and Zajac (1988) maintained that the IJVs should adapt 
more readily to the changing external environments. When the IJVs are faced with 
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a high environmental uncertainty, the foreign parent firms may need to provide the 
IJVs with more autonomy in decision-making, and to allow them to be more flexi-
ble so that to deal with uncertainty in a timely and efficient manner. Calantone and 
Zhao (2001) suggested that for the parent firms that are unfamiliar with these 
markets, obtaining local knowledge about the specificities of the environment 
should be of major concern rather than the control issues. Foreign firms tend to al-
low local partners to keep a high level of control if they want to learn about unfa-
miliar markets (Whitelock and Yang, 2007). Peng and Health (1996) commented 
that when operating in an unfamiliar environment such as China, the foreign par-
ent firms may need to rely on the local parent firms to secure the needed re-
sources, thus willingly sharing the control with the local parents. This is because 
they are closest to the changing environments and thus they have the best know-
ledge in these particular situations (Lewis, 1990).  
Furthermore, Kumar and Seth (1998) maintained that at high levels of envi-
ronmental uncertainty, more complex control appears to be inefficient in manag-
ing the relationship between the IJV and its parent. The habitual legislation change 
and the increasing number of new competitors entering to the markets are quite 
popular in foreign markets. To stay competitive, the IJVs need to react fast to 
these changes. Sanchez-Peinado and Pla-Barber (2006) argued that when faced 
with unexpected changes in demand, the firms tend to adopt a weaker control that 
allows the IJVs to enjoy greater flexibility in responding to these changes. In addi-
tion, according to Lyles et al. (2000), it may be significantly difficult to implement 
a more formal control in a rapidly changing environment. On the other hand, Gui-
dice (2001) found that social control was not moderated by the degree of uncer-
tainty, and it appeared to be an efficient control mechanism regardless of envi-
ronmental conditions. Similarly, Drew and Kendrick (2005) argued that in this 
kind of environment, cultural mechanism could be an effective control mechan-
ism. They maintained that the firms’ structures and systems need to be adaptive in 
managing the risk involved. Thus, as the environmental uncertainty rises, the need 
for flexibility increases. As a result, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the uncertainty of the IJV’s operating environments, 
the more likely the foreign parent firms exercise a loose, narrow, and social 
control over the IJVs.   
3.3 Competitive Uncertainty 
The competitive uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of the future state of 
competition (Miller, 1992). Mjoen and Tallman (1997) maintained that a specia-
lized control design would enable the foreign parent firms to protect their IJVs. In 
the countries where the competitive uncertainty and the possibility of the new 
competitors entering to the market are high, the foreign parent firms need to close-
ly monitor the IJV operations through formal control mechanisms so that to pro-
tect their own interests and avoid suffering from low performance (Chen, 2004). 
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According to Calantone and Zhao (2001), the foreign parent firms that face a high 
pressure from their competitive uncertainty in the host countries where the IJVs 
are located are likely to increase their control level over their IJVs. On the other 
hand, in the fast growing markets where the competitive pressure is low or the 
stakes are big enough for all players, the foreign parent firms may be willing to 
give the IJVs more flexibility in dealing with other types of uncertainty (Hedlund, 
1986). Thus,  
Hypothesis 3: The higher the competitive uncertainty, the more likely the 
foreign parent firms exercise a broad, formal, and tight control over the IJVs. 
3.4 Linkage between the Host Country Uncertainty, Foreign 
Parent Control, and IJV Performance 
There is no consensus among researchers about the most appropriate measure-
ment of IJV performance. The measures often used in investigating the IJV per-
formance are either exclusively objective types, or a mix of both objective and 
subjective types. The indicators of objective measurement are profitability, 
growth, cost, survival and duration of the IJVs, instability of ownership, and the 
necessity to renegotiate the IJV contract. The subjective performance measure is 
the parent firm’s overall satisfaction with the IJV. 
Child and Yan (2003) argued that the choice of the right control structure per-
mits the effective use of strategic resources that the parent firms have in the IJVs. 
The strategic choice of a firm is directly linked to its external environments and 
has a significant implication for the overall performance (Miller and Friesen, 
1983). O´Connor and Chalos (1999), when studying the determining factors for 
success and failure of IJV, suggested that in order to succeed in China, the design 
of IJV control system has to be adapted to the business environment. The appro-
priate control structures in their IJVs can safeguard the foreign parents’ competi-
tive advantage (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Hamel, 1991) from competitors. Thus, 
the foreign parent firms will be more confident and continue supporting their IJVs, 
support which plays an important role in the IJV performance.  
To achieve the overall parent objectives in the IJVs, they have to ponder be-
tween the IJV control structure and the risks involved (Lynch, 1993), taking into 
account the extent of environmental uncertainty and the degree of trust (Birnberg, 
1998).  Lorange et al. (1986) maintained that by exercising a proper IJV control 
structure in their dealing with the host country uncertainty, the foreign parent 
firms can make sure that their strategies are effectively implemented, and that 
their resources are efficiently utilized for enhancing the IJV performance. Luo 
(1996) maintained that tailoring the company’s strategies to the investment envi-
ronment represents a necessary condition for attaining a high level of perfor-
mance. In contrast, the lack of appropriate control to monitor uncertainty can lead 
to IJV failure (O’Connor and Chalos, 1999). Thus, the foreign parent firms which 
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adapt their control structures in the IJVs to respond to the specific host country 
uncertainty will have a better IJV performance than those that do not. As a result 
of hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 3, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 4: Foreign parent firms are more satisfied with IJV performance 
when they exercise broad, formal, and tight control over the IJVs operating in 
high uncertainty host countries, and exercise social, narrow, and loose control 
in low uncertainty host countries.  
4. Sample Description and Results 
 In this section we present the methodology, the sample, and the results of the 
study. 
4.1 Methodology and Measurement 
This study adopted a survey research design to fit with the exploratory nature of 
the research. In the survey, the questions about joint venture control and perfor-
mance were collected directly from those involved in IJV operations. Furthermore, 
to be able to generalize conclusions about the joint venture control, a large number 
of IJVs is needed to be examined. This made direct interviews very costly in terms 
of time and money and impractical so that to achieve the desired sample size. The 
measure of variables is based on a 5 point-scare. Concerning control measure-
ment, a list of different control mechanisms, focused on areas of IJV activities 
were provided, the respondents were asked to evaluate their control with 1= al-
ways used to 5= never used. Host country uncertainty: is a mean of cultural uncer-
tainty, environmental, and competitive uncertainty. In each uncertainty dimension, 
the respondents were asked to evaluate the uncertainty from 1= very high uncer-
tainty to 5= very low uncertainty. IJV performance was measured by parent firm’s 
satisfaction of IJV operation with 1= very unsatisfied to 5= very satisfied. (See 
Appendix for more details). The methodologies used in this study to analyze the 
data are description statistics and the Chi-square test. The purpose of the methods 
is to determine how well an observed set of data fits an expected set of hypothes-
es. These methods are used to examine the differences with categorical variables 
and the relationships between uncertainty factors and IJV control structures, and 
IJV control structure and IJV performance. The method is particularly useful to 
find out whether an IJV control structure which is made by different elements of 
IJV control dimensions (formal, social, broad, narrow, tight, and loose) has a nor-
mal distribution or the structure has formed under the influence of uncertainty fac-
tors. Similarly, the method evidences whether or not IJV performance is influ-
enced by the IJV control structure. 
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4.2 Sample description 
The study herein is a part of an on-going research project focusing on IJV beha-
vior, strategies, partner selection, control structure, and performance of Finnish 
firms. The target firms and investments were identified as follows 1) the FDI data 
base collected by the project leader starting from late 1980s based on press releas-
es regarding IJVs published on leading business magazines and newspapers and 2) 
annual reports and websites of the 250 largest Finnish firms from the leading 
magazines; 3) based on the earlier surveys focusing on IJVs and WOS by Finnish 
firms conducted by the project leader. From the resources, we identified 340 IJVs 
qualifying for our study; they were founded by 200 Finnish parent firms since 
1988 and in operation at least until 2002. Among these 200 firms, several firms 
were very difficult to contact either because they had been restructured or gone 
out of business. While researching for informants, we found that in some firms 
there was no longer anyone with sufficient knowledge required for the study. This 
left a total of 161 Finnish parent firms. Given the time and cost constraints a postal 
questionnaire and online web survey were used to gather the data. The participants 
were those managers who were directly involved into the IJV’s establishment and 
operations.  
To enhance the quality of the data, the respondents were contacted by phone in 
December 2006 to explain the key points of the study and the questionnaires. In 
exchange for their participation in the study and to ensure accurate responses, the 
respondents were assured of their anonymity and were promised a summary report 
of the findings and participated in a draw for three gifts. After one reminder at the 
end of January 2007, at the end of February, 54 questionnaires were returned from 
which 5 questionnaires were not usable. Thus, the final sample was 49 IJVs in-
cluding 40 Finnish parent firms. The response rate was 24.84%, which is relative-
ly similar to that of earlier respective studies in Finland (see Larimo & Rumpunen, 
2006). The sample was carefully examined for any systematic response bias using 
t-tests. Respondents and non respondents were compared across their age, size, in-
ternational experience, and IJV experience. No statistically significant difference 
was found. Thus, there was not response bias to be found in the final sample. 
Among the 49 IJVs of the final sample, 45% were established in 1988-1995, 55% 
in 1996-2006; 53 % through acquisitions, 47% through greenfields, 76 % were 
with 2 partners and 24 % with 3 partners; 61% with indefinite duration, 22% with 
less than 5 years, 17 % more than 5 years; 41 % with 10%-49% Finnish owner-
ship, 10% with equal ownership, 49 % with Finnish major ownership at estab-
lishment; 71% located in emerging economies, and 29% in developed economies; 
63% with industrial products, 27 % with consumer products, 10 % with both con-
sumer and industrial products. The summary of the operationalization of the key 
variables of the study is presented in the appendix.  
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4.3 Results 
In this section, we discuss the results of empirical test of the hypotheses devel-
oped in chapter 3. 
4.3.1 Host Country Uncertainty and IJV Control Structure 
 
Most respondents regarded the same countries with the same level of uncertain-
ty like Estonia, Russia, China, etc. Concerning the perception of cultural uncer-
tainty in the host countries, most respondents regard host countries in emerging 
economies as a high cultural uncertainty (with a mean of 2.06; where 1=very high 
and 5= very low) and developed economies with low uncertainty (with a mean of 
3.21). The most commonly adopted control structure by Finnish parent firms in 
the reviewed IJVs was formal, broad, and tight control at 26/49 which accounts 
for 53%. With respect to Hypothesis 1, over 75% of Finnish parent firms exer-
cised formal, broad, and tight control in their IJVs located in high cultural uncer-
tainty countries. Less than 25% of the Finnish firms exercised social, narrow, and 
loose control in high cultural uncertainty. Based on the chi-square test, x2= 15.3 the 
result was significant at p<0.01 (df=5). Thus, the result supported H1. Regarding 
the Hypothesis 2, as a whole, the hypothesis was not supported. However, the 
more detailed analysis revealed that more than 70 % Finnish parent firms exer-
cised narrow and loose control in high environmental uncertainty. However, only 
49% of Finnish parent firms exercised social control over IJVs when they per-
ceived a high uncertainty environment. Therefore, the result only partly supports 
hypothesis 2. In hypothesis 3 over 75 % Finnish parent firms used formal, broad, 
and tight control in high competitive uncertainty countries. In contrast, when the 
host countries are characterized with low competitive uncertainty, almost 70% 
Finnish parent firms exercise more social, narrow, and loose control over their 
IJVs. Based on the chi-square test, x2 = 16.7 the result was significant at p<0.005 
(df=5) (see table 2). Thus, the results supported H3. 
4.3.2 Parent Control Structure and IJV Performance 
The performance was measured using seven different subjective measures. Res-
pondents were asked to rank on a 5 point Likert scale, first the weight given and 
secondly their degree of satisfaction to all seven measures. The two most impor-
tant measures of performance were total performance and financial performance. 
In the reviews, the mean of financial performance of IJVs was 3.4 and the total 
performance of IJV was 3.6. This shows that Finnish parent firms are somewhat 
more satisfied with the IJV total performance than IJV financial performance. In 
addition, the findings of the study show that in high uncertainty countries, Finnish 
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parent firms are more satisfied with their IJV performance (mean 3.82) when they 
exercise formal, broad, and tight control over their IJVs than other control struc-
tures (mean 2.95). 
 
Table 2. The results of the study based on the chi-square test  
Hypotheses x2 DF Results 
Uncertainty dimensions Control structure    
H1: High cultural uncertainty Broad, Formal, Tight 15.30 5 significant at 0.01 
H2: High environmental uncertainty Narrow, Social, Loose 9.73 5 not significant  
H3: High competitive uncertainty Broad, Formal, Tight 16.70 5 significant at 0.005 
Country uncertainty  Control structure Performance    
H4: High 
       Low 
Broad, Formal, Tight 
Narrow, Social, Loose 
+ 
+ 
12.43 
15.13 
5 
5 
significant at 0.05 
significant at 0.01 
 
 
Based on the chi-square test, x2= 12.43 the result was significant at p<0.01 (df=5) 
(see table 2). Similarly, in low uncertainty countries, Finnish parent firms also 
seem to be more satisfied with IJV performance (with mean of performance: 3.90) 
when using narrow, social, and loose control over their IJVs, than in the cases of 
using other control structures in IJVs (with mean of performance: 2.40). Based on 
the chi-square test, x2 = 15.13 the result was significant at p<0.01 (df=5) (see table 
2). Thus, the results supported H4. 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
The present paper offers a valuable insight into these challenges and evidences 
some traits for successful operations in foreign countries through the use of proper 
control structure by the foreign firms. The presented set of hypotheses may prove 
very useful, since the ability to adapt and change successfully has become critical 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Feldman, 2004). The aim of the paper was to answer 
the questions: 1) How do foreign parent firms design IJV control to cope with the 
host country uncertainty? and 2) What are the relationships between foreign parent 
control structure in IJVs and the IJV performance? The results show that in high 
cultural uncertainty and high competitive uncertainty, parent firms preferred 
broad, formal, and tight control over their IJVs. In contrast, in high environmental 
uncertainty, in order to react fast to the changes of the environments, most firms 
preferred narrow and loose control. The present study contributes to the IJV con-
trol theory by offering a model of linkage between host country uncertainty and 
parent control. In more detail, most foreign parent firms want a high level of con-
trol that is consistent with their bargaining power (Calantone & Zhao, 2001). 
However, the present study suggests that, in order to operate successfully in for-
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eign countries, the foreign parent firms need to have a comparable IJV control 
structure that fits the IJV operating environments.  
 
Fig. 1. IJV control model 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This finding is consistent with the work by Lynch (1993), in which the author 
maintained that the parent control has to be compatible with the risk and uncer-
tainty of external environments. Previous researchers, for example Birnbirg (1998) 
analyzed the uncertainty which may occur when involving in partnerships but 
without assessing how firms can cope with it. This paper also extends the previous 
studies by specifying which control structure could be implemented in the IJVs to 
deal successfully with different kinds of uncertainty. In particular, in high uncer-
tainty countries, parent firms will need to exercise formal, broad, and tight control 
over their IJVs to have high IJV performance. On the other hand, IJVs will per-
form better when parent firms exercise social, narrow, and loose control in a low 
uncertainty country.  
 In sum, although IJV control has been frequently addressed in the IJV litera-
ture, the inquiry into how to manage the IJVs dealing with host country uncertain-
ty remains limited. The study presents one effort to build a more comprehensive 
IJV theory by providing an IJV control model (Figure 1.). We also acknowledge 
several limitations to our study. First, the sample size of the study is rather small 
and only from Finnish IJVs. In addition, in the analysis of IJV control, we focused 
Host country uncertainty 
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only on two main IJV control structures including formal, broad, and tight control 
and social, narrow and loose control. However there are possible of other combi-
nations of IJV control structure which include three dimensions of control. For 
further studies, researchers could use the framework of the present work with a 
bigger sample size and foreign parent firms from several countries. In addition, re-
searchers could also investigate how the foreign parent firms exercise their control 
in their IJVs in order to cope with other specific factors that contribute to the un-
certainty in the host country, such as interest rate fluctuation and the supply and 
demand uncertainty. In addition, because IJVs evolve overtime, further studies are 
also needed to investigate the dynamic of the parent control over IJVs to deal with 
the host country uncertainty along the IJV’s life cycle. Finally, it would be worth 
researching whether the control of the IJVs functioning in the emerging markets is 
different than that of those IJVs located in the developed markets. 
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Appendix: Operationalizations of the present study 
Control dimensions 
 
Control mechanisms: Measured on a 5 point-scale, the respondents were asked to assess 
their method of monitoring and control of the IJVs.  
Formal control: a) Participation in venture’s board meetings; b) Appointment of key ven-
ture personnel; c) Incentive plans for top management; d) Financial reports; e) Exercising 
veto rights at the board meetings; f) Taking part in planning JVs budgets; g) JV general 
manager participates in parent worldwide; h) Parent-venture face to communication, formal 
meeting; i) Participation in JV’s decision-making; j) Control based on equity share.  
Social control: k) Feedback; l) Parent-venture informal socialization (informal phone calls, 
outdoor activities); m) Parent training of venture managers. Control mechanism is formal if 
parent firms resort to more on formal mechanisms (such as those from a. to j. with a re-
sponse value equal or greater than 3. On the other hand, control mechanism is social if par-
ent firms exercise those from point k) to m) with a value from 3 to 5. 
 
Control focus: Measured on a 5 point-scale, the respondents were asked to assess their 
monitoring and control of the IJVs on the focus areas: a) International marketing; b) Local 
marketing; c) Domestic sales; d) Human resources; e) Procurement; f) Production; 
h) Quality control; h) Prices and costs; i) Financing and accounting; j) Research and 
 development; k) Local government relations; l) General management. 
Control focus is narrow if the parent firms exercise it over some selected areas (between 1 
to 3 areas from the above list). On the other hand, control is broad if they exercise it over-
more than 3 aforementioned areas or all areas of IJV activities from a) to l). 
 
Control extent: degree of control which is exercised over the IJVs based on control 
mechanism and focus. Control extent is tight if parent firms exercise more than three con-
trol mechanisms and broad control. Control is loose if parent firms exercise less than three 
control mechanism and narrow control. 
 
Uncertainty dimensions: (Perceiving cultural, environmental, and competitive uncer-
tainty) were measured on an ordinal scale from 1=”very high” to 5= “very low”.  
 
Host country uncertainty: is a mean of cultural uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, 
and competitive uncertainty. 
 
Performance: was measured on 5 point-scale, respondents were asked if they satisfy with   
IJV performance with 1= “very unsatisfied” to 5= “very satisfied”. 
   
  
  
DO PARTNERS’ DIFFERENCES AFFECT 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE CONTROL AND 
PERFORMANCE? 
 
Nguyen H. Le, University of Vaasa  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines the influence of differences between partners on the control 
of international joint ventures (IJVs) and its subsequent performance. The term 
“partners’ differences” here refers to their perceptions of differences organiza-
tional cultures, in objectives when entering IJVs, and in partners’ business relat-
edness to their IJVs. IJV control is conceptualized across three dimensions includ-
ing mechanism, focus, and extent. The empirical evidence is based on a survey of 
Finnish firms that established IJVs with local firms from the 1990s. The results 
showed that the higher the level of the partners’ perceived differences with their 
local counterparts were, the more likely they were to exercise formal, broad, and 
tight control over their IJVs. The results also indicate that in the case of major 
differences between partners, formal, broad and tight control by foreign partners 
lead to better IJV performance. In the case of lower level differences between 
partners, social, narrow, and loose control by foreign partners lead to better IJV 
performance.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
International joint ventures (IJVs) are formed between firms with different orga-
nizational and cultural characteristics (Duan, 2007). Problems occur in IJVs due 
to the difficulties in managing them caused by the presence of two or more part-
ners (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). In particular, conflicts between partners are 
caused by the differences between partners such as the incompatible management 
styles and approaches, and cultures (Killing, 1983). Differences between partners 
often increase the risk of misunderstanding and cooperation failures (Child & 
Yan, 2003). Thus, IJVs are notoriously difficult to control (Yan & Child, 2004). 
While previous research has not provided evidence directly explaining how parent 
firms make control structure choices (Groot & Merchan, 2000); it has suggested 
some possible determinant factors (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Blodgett, 1991a; 
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Werner, 2002) such as culture (Hennart & Larimo, 1998), and their motives (Ca-
lantone & Zhao, 2001). Chang and Taylor (1999), who studied the control exer-
cised by 107 American and Japanese Multinationals (MNCs) over their subsidiar-
ies in Korea, found that national culture was one of the key influence on the 
choice of control mechanisms. Child et al. (2005: 224) maintain that foreign par-
ent firms’ cultures may well be expressed in the modes of their control in IJVs 
However, previous research on the effect of cultural preference on management 
control is decidedly mixed (Chalos & O’Connor, 1998). Several researchers 
found no significant relationship between national culture and management con-
trols (Chow, Shields, & Chan, 1991; Frucot & Shearon, 1991; Chow, Kato, & 
Shields, 1994; Merchant, Chow, & Wu, 1995). In contrast, other researchers pro-
posed that there were significant interactions between national cultural dimen-
sions and management controls (Harrison, 1993; Harrison, McKinnon, 
Panchapakesan & Leung, 1994; Lau, Low, & Eggleton, 1995; O’Connor, 1995). 
This is something of a puzzle and it has been suggested that, further research is 
needed to investigate the effects of cultural differences on IJVs (Pothukuchi et al., 
2002).  
Furthermore, partners are from different countries and therefore, often have dif-
ferent goals when they enter into IJVs. Luo and Park (2004) suggested that the 
incongruent goals of partners lead to reduced IJV performance. The existing re-
search does not show how firms can handle the differences in partner’s goals in 
joint venturing to stimulate an increase in IJV performance. Another potential 
factor that might influence IJV control and performance is the extent of business 
relatedness between partners and to the IJVs, which has received considerable 
attention in IJV research. Some studies have focused on relatedness between par-
ent firms (Saxton, 1997), while others have focused on relatedness between part-
ners and the units (Hanvanich et al., 2005). However, the results of business relat-
edness on IJV performance are thus far undetermined (Hanvanich et al., 2005). 
Moreover, previous studies have ignored the role of the relatedness on the IJV 
control. As such, there is a need to further investigate the factors that might influ-
ence IJV control and performance in the context of cultural differences, differ-
ences in motive, and business relatedness. This paper, therefore, attempts to fill 
this gap. 
This paper aims to further analyze the influence of foreign partners’ differences 
on their control of IJV and on the IJVs’ performance. The general research ques-
tion is “How do partners’ differences influence IJV control and performance?” 
Expressed in more detail, the paper’s aim is to answer the questions: 
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How do partners’ perceptions of differences in management style, joint venturing 
objectives, and business relatedness affect the control they exercise in IJVs?  
What are the relationships between partners’ differences, IJV control, and IJV 
performance? 
This paper departs from existing work in two ways. First, while most previous 
researchers have focused on only one or two dimensions of control in their IJV 
research, in this paper, the IJV control adopted is broader than usual in taking into 
consideration three dimensions of IJV control: mechanisms, focus, and extent. 
Second, much previous research has focused on differences in IJVs and how these 
differences affect IJV performance. Taking one step further, this paper points out 
how a parent company can cope with the differences through its control strate-
gies, leading to better IJV performance. In this paper, an IJV is regarded as a 
separate firm formed by two or more partners with an expected proportional share 
of dividend as compensation (Contractor & Lorange, 1988). Partner’s differences 
refer to the differences in businesses (e.g. Merchant & Schendel, 2000), objec-
tives of entering to the joint ventures (e.g. Harrigan, 1985), and the partner’s 
management style (e.g. Kogut & Singh, 1988). IJV control refers to the influence 
of foreign partners on IJV operation (Geringer &Herbert, 1983). IJV performance 
is the achievement of goals set by parent firms and is evaluated from a different 
perspective (Duan & Chuanmin, 2007). Moreover, Beamish and Delios (1997) 
concluded from their review that perceptual and objective measures of IJV per-
formance are generally correlated. In the present study, perceptual measures such 
as parent satisfaction with the IJV, total performance and financial performance 
are used to in investigate the performance of IJVs. The paper is organized as fol-
lows; first it conceptualizes the IJV control along three dimensions including con-
trol mechanism, focus, and extent. Then, it develops several hypotheses regarding 
the influence of partners’ differences on IJV control structure and IJV perform-
ance. Next, the paper discusses the methodology used, the results, and the impli-
cations of the study.   
2  CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IJV CONTROL 
Management control refers to the process by which an organization influences its 
members and its units to work in ways that meet the organizational objectives 
(Glaister, 1995). In IJV, because there are two or more parties involved, manage-
ment control is complex (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Furthermore, researchers 
have acknowledged that the control systems are multidimensional (Berrell, 2007; 
Kumar & Seth, 1998; Lu & Hebert, 2005). Unfortunately, the existing research 
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tends to focus on only one or two dimensions. In order to be able to capture the 
complex nature of the IJV and conduct IJV control research thoroughly, this study 
adopts the multidimensional approach of control developed by Geringer and He-
bert (1989).  
2.1  Control mechanisms 
Control mechanisms are structural arrangements deployed to determine and influ-
ence what the members of the organization do (Geringer &Hebert, 1989; Fryxell, 
Dooley, & Vryza, 2002). Control mechanisms consist of a variety of instruments 
including formal and social controls that are available to firms for the exercise of 
effective control over their members (Friedman & Beguin, 1971). Formal control 
depends on hierarchies, standards, codified rules, procedures, goals, and regula-
tions that specify desirable patterns of behavior (Das & Teng, 1998). These in-
struments of formal control are usually agreed upon and imposed by both foreign 
and local parent firms (Fryxell et al., 2002) and typically include control over the 
constitution of the board of directors, the appointment of key personnel, the plan-
ning and approval process for capital budgeting and resource allocation, and the 
lay down procedures and routines for IJV (Lu & Hebert, 2005; Mjoen, 1993). 
Social control is designed to promote expectations and mutual commitments 
through which IJV managers learn to share the common attitudes and knowledge 
of the organization (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Social control refers to various 
mechanisms such as informal communication, information exchange and training, 
mentoring, and personal relationships. Social control develops a common organi-
zational culture that fosters shared values and norms, without explicitly restricting 
the behavior of the targeted people through the means of those social controls 
(Chalos & O’Connor, 1998; Fryxell et al., 2002; Schaan, 1983). 
2.2  Control focus 
Control focus can be divided into broad control and narrow control (Geringer & 
Herbert, 1989). In control focus, the partners can choose to have a broad control 
focus and attempt to exercise control over the entire range of the IJV’s activities, 
or they can have a narrow control focus and confine their control activities to the 
performance dimensions they consider to be critical (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; 
Groot & Merchant, 2000). Child et al. (2005) maintain that depending on several 
factors, such as the parent firm’s competencies and the critical nature of such ac-
tivities parent firms may focus their control on activities related to technology in 
one case but on market related activities in another. There are also cases when the 
parent firms may focus their control on both technology and market related activi-
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ties (Child et al., 2005). The areas of control focus are marketing, sales and distri-
bution, procurement, general management and operation, finance and accounting, 
research and development, production and quality, and human resources.  
2.3  Control extent 
The control extent refers to the degree or tightness of control which is exercised 
on the venture (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Control extent consists of tight control 
and loose control. In loose control, the parent firms tend to use only one or two 
control mechanisms and focus their control exercised on only one or two control 
areas in the IJVs. Furthermore, the parent firms are more flexible in their evalua-
tion of employees’ behavior and their performance. The frequency of report sub-
mission by the IJV managers to the parent firms is low and there are very few 
meetings between the parent firms and the IJV managers. In contrast, the tight 
control mode tends to be strict with respect to the employee’s dress code, punctu-
ality, and cost-consciousness; and also detail oriented, and precise in operation. 
Tight control can be effected through any mechanism that provides the partner 
with a high degree of certainty that the personnel in the IJV will act as the given 
partner wishes. Tight control is manifest also if the IJV staff is held strictly ac-
countable for adhering to a complete set of prescribed actions such as policies and 
procedure. Tight control is also related to very frequent and precise reporting 
(Child et al., 2005). 
In summary, IJV control consists of three dimensions mechanisms (Formal; So-
cial), focus (Broad, Narrow), and extent (Tight, Loose). These three control di-
mensions produce eight possible control structures, namely Formal, Broad, Tight 
(FBT), Formal, Broad, Loose (FBL), Formal Narrow, Tight (FNT), Formal, Nar-
row, Loose (FNL), Social, Broad, Tight (SBT), Social, Narrow, Tight (SNT), 
Social Broad, Loose (SBL), Social, Narrow, Loose (SNL). 
3  PARTNERS’ DIFFERENCES AND IJV 
CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE 
Partners coming to joint venturing differ in their businesses, the objectives they 
have in mind when forming the IJV, and in their management styles. IJVs usually 
experience management difficulties when partners who come from different 
backgrounds work together (Wang et al., 1999). Thus, establishing control over 
the IJVs becomes crucial for IJV operations and therefore, has a direct effect on 
IJV performance. 
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3.1  Management style 
Foreign and local parent firms differ in their management styles, which may re-
sult in conflict and incompatible goals (Ding 1997, Hennart, Kim, and Zeng, 
1998; Yan & Gray, 2001). This is because the more diverse the organizational 
cultures of the partners are, the greater the differences in their organizational and 
administrative practices, employee expectations, and interpretation of and re-
sponse to strategic issues (Kogut & Singh, 1988). This may lead to bargaining 
and negotiating between foreign and local parent firms, which slows down the 
decision-making process and adds to bureaucratic costs (Balakrishnan & Koza, 
1993; Ding, 1997). In the case of organizational cultural differences, foreign and 
local partners are also different in routines (Hennart et al. 1998) and in dealing 
with conflicts over issues of product quality, exports, employee wages, or labor 
policy. These may result in higher uncertainty, the possibility of opportunism, and 
higher bureaucratic costs as a result of greater bargaining ad negotiating between 
partners (Ding 1997, Pangarkar & Klein, 2004). To eliminate the problems arising 
from long negotiation processes and delays in decision-making, foreign partners 
may need to exercise broad and tight control over the IJVs. In addition, to avoid 
misunderstanding in the IJVs, partners are required to establish clear hierarchical 
control by creating formal control over the IJVs. According to Egelhoff (1984), 
the greater the organizational cultural distance between foreign and local parent 
firms, the greater the need to exercise formal control over the IJVs. As a result, it 
can be expected that: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the management style differences between foreign and 
local partners, the more likely foreign partners are to exercise broad, formal, and 
tight control over the IJVs.  
3.2  Objectives of entering into IJVs  
Partners from different firms might have different objective when entering IJVs. 
According to Harrigan, (1985), partner firms establish IJVs to generate internal 
benefits, competitive benefits, and strategic benefits.   
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From the local government perspective, IJVs are often a means to protect local 
firms and to foster the development of the local economy and industry (Makino, 
1995). Previous researchers suggest that the objectives of parent firms determine 
their adoption of control mechanisms in IJVs (e.g. Calantone & Zhao, 2001). 
Gaining management control over an IJV is one way to ensure that one’s strategic 
objectives are actively pursued, and to actively monitor and curb possible oppor-
tunism by one’s partner (Williamson, 1975). When the differences between part-
ners are great, these often result in conflictual behavior between partners, leading 
to misunderstandings and interaction problems (Pothukuchi et al., 2002). Killing 
(1983) proposed that IJVs work most effectively when they avoid the coordina-
tion costs of shared management. Coordination costs often occur when there is a 
constant need for communication, shared decision-making and ongoing negotia-
tions (Gulati & Singh, 1998, Barden et al., 2005). These are often time consuming 
and reduce IJV performance. Thus, when foreign and local partners’ objectives 
are different, foreign partners need to impose broad and tight control over their 
IJVs. In addition, as partners’ expectations are different, precise guides to the 
procedures and operations of the IJVs are needed, leading to the exercise of for-
mal control by the foreign partners. As a result, it can be expected that   
Hypothesis 2: The greater the differences in objectives between foreign and local 
partners, the more likely foreign partners are to exercise broad, formal, and tight 
control over the IJVs.  
3.3  The partners’ business relatedness 
 
The partner’s business relatedness is a measure of how similar or connected are 
the business activities in nature of the partners relative to those performed by the 
IJVs (Merchant & Schendel, 2000). Firms may be in the same industry when they 
joint venturing, and the ventures need to learn from both partners. IJV control is 
therefore designed to support IJVs in their learning from their parents. Thus, 
when partners are involved in a similar business, less control is needed so as to 
leave room for learning to take place in the IJV. This is because similarities in the 
business activities of the parent and the IJVs lead to increased economies of scale 
and scope by increasing learning opportunities and reducing production cost. 
Therefore, partners should let the IJVs to take full advantages of the similarities, 
and learning opportunities by exercising narrow and loose control over their IJVs. 
In addition, previous researchers have pointed out that social control can promote 
increased learning in the ventures (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). On the other hand, 
the management of a joint venture becomes critical when the new business is un-
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related to a firm’s existing operations (Kogut, 1988). When working in the new 
and unfamiliar business, the partners are required to work closely with IJV man-
agement teams in order to follow the situations and to make sure that the new 
business will develop in the desired direction. Thus, formal, broad, and tight con-
trols are needed. As a result, it can be expected that: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the degree of partners’ business relatedness to each 
other and to the IJVs, the more likely foreign partners are to exercise social, nar-
row, and loose control over the IJVs 
3.4  Partner’s differences and IJV control and performance 
Child et al. (2005) maintain that control is critical for the successful management 
and performance of a strategic alliance. Lorange et al. (1986) maintain that 
through exercising a proper IJV control structure, foreign parent firms can make 
sure that their strategies are effectively implemented, and their resources are effi-
ciently utilized for the enhancement of the IJV’s performance. To achieve the 
overall objectives in the IJVs, partners have to consider both the IJV control 
structure and the risks involved (Lynch, 1998), taking into account the extent of 
the differences between partners and the degree of trust between them (Birnberg, 
1998). Differences between partners often results in ineffective communication 
and quite often lead to the dissolution of IJVs (Meschi & Ricio, 2008). Lorange et 
al. (1986) maintained that by exercising formal control in dealing with the inter-
nal uncertainty caused by differences, the foreign partners can make sure that 
their strategies are effectively implemented, and that their resources are effi-
ciently utilized for the enhancement of the IJV performance. In contrast, adopting 
narrow and loose control to cope with internal uncertainty can lead to IJV failure 
(O’Connor, 1995). Mjoen (1993) found that a tight level of control was associated 
with better performance in cases where partners have differences in their busi-
nesses and objectives. In addition, broad control has a crucial role to play in the 
success of IJVs (Barden et al., 2005; Berrell, 2007), especially, when transaction 
costs are high and partners know little about each other (Pangar & Klein, 2004). 
Thus, as a result of hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 3 we expect that: 
Hypothesis 4a: Formal, broad, and tight control exercised by foreign partners 
over their IJVs leads to better IJV performance in cases of greater differences 
between partners. 
Hypothesis 4b: Social, narrow, and loose control exercised by foreign partners 
over their IJVs leads to better IJV performance in cases of lesser differences be-
tween partners. 
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4  METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
4.1  Method  
 
This study adopted a survey research design to fit with the nature of the research. 
In the survey, the questions about joint venture control and performance were 
collected directly from those involved in IJV operations. Furthermore, to be able 
to generalize conclusions about the joint venture control, a large number of IJVs 
is needed for any examination. This would have made face to face interviews very 
costly in terms of time and money, and an impractical way to proceed to achieve 
the desired sample size. The measure of variables is based on a 5 point-scare (see 
Appendix for more details). Following Blodgett (1991b), Beamish & Inkpen 
(1995), Glaister, (1995), Nguyen & Larimo (2008), the methodology used to ana-
lyze the relationships between dependent and independent variables in IJV re-
search incorporates description statistics and the Chi-square test. The purpose of 
the methods is to determine how well an observed set of data fits an expected set 
of hypotheses. These methods are used to examine the differences with categori-
cal variables and the relationships between internal uncertainty factors and IJV 
control structures, and IJV control structure and IJV performance. The method is 
particularly useful to find out whether an IJV control structure which is made up 
of different elements of IJV control dimensions (formal, social, broad, narrow, 
tight, and loose) has a normal distribution or if the structure has formed under the 
influence of the parents’ differences and business relatedness. Similarly, the 
method evidences whether or not IJV performance is influenced by the IJV con-
trol structure. 
4.2  Sample description 
The target firms and investments were identified as follows 1) from the FDI data 
base collected by the project leader from the late 1980s based on press releases on 
IJVs published in leading business magazines and newspapers and 2) from annual 
reports and websites of the 250 largest Finnish firms; 3) based on the earlier sur-
veys focusing on IJVs and WOS by Finnish firms conducted by the project leader. 
From the resources, we identified 340 qualifying IJVs formed by Finnish firms 
since 1988 and in operation at least up until 2002. The qualifying 340 IJVs in-
volved 200 Finnish parent firms. From among those 200 firms, several firms were 
very difficult to contact either because they had been restructured or gone out of 
business. The firms were contacted to determine the correct informants. In some 
firms there was no longer anyone with sufficient knowledge required for the 
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study. This left a total of 161 Finnish parent firms. Given time and cost con-
straints a postal questionnaire and online web survey were used to gather the data. 
The participants were those managers who had been directly involved in estab-
lishment and operations of IJVs.  
To enhance the quality of the data, the respondents were contacted by phone in 
December 2006 to explain the key points of the study and the questionnaires. In 
exchange for their participation in the study and to provide motivation and stimu-
late accurate responses, the respondents were assured of anonymity, promised a 
summary report of the findings and entered into a draw for three gifts. After one 
reminder at the end of the January 2007, at another the end of February, 54 ques-
tionnaires were returned, of which 5 questionnaires were not usable. Thus, the 
final sample was 49 IJVs including 40 Finnish parent firms. The response rate 
was 24.84% which is relatively similar to that of earlier respective studies in Fin-
land (see Larimo & Rumpunen, 2006).The sample was carefully examined for 
any systematic response bias using t-tests. Respondent and non respondent firms 
were compared by their age, size, international experience, and IJV experience. 
No statistically significant difference was found. Thus, there was not response 
bias to be found in the final sample. Among the 49 IJVs of the final sample, 45% 
were established in 1988-1995, 55% in 1996-2006; 53 % through partial acquisi-
tions, 47% through greenfields, 76 % were with 2 partners and 24 % with 3 part-
ners; 61% with indefinite duration, 22% with duration of less than 5 years, 17 % 
with a duration of more than 5 years; 41 % had between 10% and 49% Finnish 
ownership, 10% had equal ownership, 49 % of had Finnish major ownership at 
establishment; 71% were located in emerging economies, and 29% in developed 
economies; 63% dealt with industrial products, 27 % with consumer products, 10 
% with both consumer and industrial products. The summary of the operationali-
zation of the key variables of the study is presented in Appendix 1.  
4.3  Results and analysis 
Regarding partners’ differences and IJV control, most respondents regarded coun-
tries like Estonia, Russia, China in a very similar way, i.e having the same level 
of differences and with those differences being high level, in terms of manage-
ment style with Finland norms (the mean is 1.5, with 1=strongly disagree and 
5=strongly agree). With regard to the perception of the objectives of entering into 
the IJVs, most respondents when asked to consider whether objectives conflict, 
regard their partners who come from emerging economies as having conflicting 
objectives (with a mean of 4.1; where 1=strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree). 
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Partners operating in developed economies are seen as having less conflictual 
objective when entering IJVs – with a mean here of 2.2.  
Table 2. The results of the study based on the chi-square test 
 
Hypotheses x
2
   DF Results 
Partner’s differences Control structure 
H1: Greater management style 
differences 
Broad, Formal, 
Tight 
13.01 5 Significant at 
0.05 
H2: Greater objective differences Broad, Formal, 
Tight 
15.07 5 Significant at 
0.01 
H3: Greater business relatedness Social, Narrow, 
Loose 
17.01 5 Significant at 
0.005 
 
Partner’s 
differences 
Control struc-
ture 
Performance    
H4: High Broad, Formal, 
Tight 
+ 15.32 5 Significant at 
0.01 
       Low  Social, Narrow, 
Loose 
+ 12.91 5 Significant at 
0.05 
 
The most common control structure adopted by Finnish partners in the reviewed 
IJVs was formal, broad, and tight control as utilized by 32 of the 49 which ac-
counts for 65.30%. With regard to Hypothesis 1, over 70% of Finnish partners 
exercised formal, broad, and tight control when they perceived high organiza-
tional cultural differences with local partners. Less than 15 % of Finnish partners 
exercised social, narrow, and loose control, and the rest, about 15 % of the Fin-
nish partners exercised other control structures such as social, broad, and tight; 
formal, narrow, and loose control, over their IJVs. Based on the chi-square test, 
where x
2
=13.01, the result is significant at p<0.05 (df=5). Thus, the result sup-
ports H1. Turning to hypothesis 2 over 75 % of Finnish partners used formal, 
broad, and tight control when they perceived major objective differences with the 
local partners. Based on the chi-square test, where x
2
 = 15.07, the result is signifi-
cant at p<0.01 (df=5) (see table 2). Thus, the results support H2. Regarding Hy-
pothesis 3, over 90% of Finnish partners exercised social, narrow, and loose con-
trol when they perceived high business relatedness with their local partners and 
with the IJVs. About 5 % of Finnish partners exercised formal, narrow, and loose 
control, and the remaining roughly 5 % Finnish partners exercised social, broad, 
and tight control over their IJVs. Based on the chi-square test, x
2
=17.01 the result 
significant at p<0.005 (df=5). Thus, the result supported H3 
Turning to partners’ differences and the control and performance of IJVs, the per-
formance was measured using seven different subjective measures. Respondents 
were asked to rank on a 5 point Likert scale, first the weight given and secondly 
their degree of satisfaction with all seven measures. The two most important 
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measures of performance were total performance and financial performance. In 
the reviews, the mean of the assessment of financial performance of the IJVs was 
3.4 and the mean relating to overall performance was 3.6. (1=very dissatisfied to 
5=very satisfied). This shows that Finnish parent firms are somewhat more satis-
fied with their IJV’ overall performance than they are with the financial perform-
ance. In addition, the findings of the study show that when they perceived high 
differences with their local partners, Finnish partners are more satisfied with their 
IJV performance (mean 4.09) when they exercise formal, broad, and tight control 
over their IJVs than other control structures (mean 2.25). 
Based on the chi-square test, where x
2
= 15.32 the result is significant at p<0.01 
(df=5) (see table 2). Similarly, when Finnish partners perceived only minor dif-
ferences with their local partner, they also seem to be more satisfied with IJV 
performance (with a mean for performance of 3.56) when exercising narrow, so-
cial, and loose control over their IJVs, than in the cases of using other control 
structures in IJVs (with a mean for performance of 2.47). Based on the chi-square 
test, where x
2
 = 12.91 the result is significant at p<0.05 (df=5) (see table 2). Thus, 
the results support H4. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study investigated whether or not partners’ differences influence IJV control 
and performance. Partners’ differences are categorized into differences in busi-
ness relatedness, objective held when entering IJVs, and management style. IJV 
control dimensions are based on the work of Geringer and Hebert (1989) includ-
ing control mechanism, control focus, and control extent. The empirical evidence 
is based on a survey of Finnish firms that established IJVs with local firms from 
the 1990s.  
The results show that partners’ differences have strongly influenced IJV control 
and thus, having influences on IJV performance. The results reveal that partners 
perceiving high level of difference from each other require formal, broad, and 
tight control exercised over their IJVs. The results, in addition, indicate that in the 
case of high level of differences between partners, formal, broad and tight control 
by foreign partners lead to better IJV performance. In contrast, in the case of low 
level differences between partners, social, narrow, and loose control by foreign 
partners leads to better IJV performance.  
The major contribution of this study is to the IJV control theory. The study has 
provided empirically tested models acting as an additional knowledge about the 
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way partners cope with internal uncertainty caused by partner’s differences in 
management style, in objectives when forming IJVs, and in their business relat-
edness to their IJVs. Another important contribution of this study is to extend the 
existing research and nurture a better understanding of international joint venture 
performance. The study offers managers ways to foster IJV performance by hav-
ing proper IJV control structures that can limit the negative effect raised by the 
differences.  
The study does have some limitations due to its small sample size and due to the 
focus of the foreign partners being from only one country - Finland. In addition, 
because IJVs change over time and the partners’ degrees of difference may also 
reduce over time, it would be interesting to know the control and performance of 
IJVs will change against the respective measures. Researchers could use the 
framework of the present study with a bigger sample size and foreign parent firms 
from several countries. Finally, it would be worth researching if control of IJVs 
functioning in the emerging markets differs from that of those located in devel-
oped markets. 
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APPENDIX 1: OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Partner’s differences 
 
Management  style 
 
Partner’s perceiving of organizational similarity                                   Measured on a 5 point-scale, 1= strongly 
Partners were asked to assess if they have similar                                disagree to 5 strongly agree 
management styles 
 
Objectives set for the joint ventures 
 
Partners were asked to evaluate if the objectives set for                      Measured on a 5 point-scale with 1=strong 
IJVs are different between partners.                                                         disagree, 5= strongly agree 
 
Partners’ business relatedness 
 
Partners were asked to evaluate how similar is their                              Measured on a 5 point-scale with 1=  
business with the other partners and the IJVs                                         completely differences, 5= exactly the same 
 
Control dimensions 
 
Control mechanisms                                                                                 Measured on a 5 point-scale, the respondents 
were asked to assess   their method of 
 Formal control    monitoring and 
a. Appointment of key venture personnel control of the IJVs. Control mechanism is formal  
b. Participation in the venture board meetings (F) if the parents exercise control more on formal  
c. Incentive plans for top management  mechanisms (from a. to j. with responses value  
d. Financial reports   from 4 to 5). On the other hand control  
e. Exercising veto rights at the board meetings mechanism is social (S) if parents exercise control 
f. Taking part in planning JVs budgets mechanisms more on k. to m. (with response value  
g. JV general manager participates in parent  from 4 to 5). 
worldwide meetings 
h. Parent-venture face to communication, formal  
meeting 
i. Participation in JV’s decision making  
j. Control based on equity share 
 
 Social control 
k. Feedback 
l. Parent-venture informal socialization  
(informal phone call, outdoor activities) 
                  m.     Parent training of venture managers 
Control focus    Measured on a 5 point-scale, the respondents were  
a. International marketing  asked to assess the focus areas of their monitoring  
b. Local marketing   and control of the IJVs. Control focus is broad (B) 
c. Domestic sales   if parents exercise control on more than three  
d. Human resources   areas from a. to l. (with response value from 4 to  
e. Procurement   5). On the other hand, control focus is narrow  
f. Production   (N) if the parents exercise control from 1 to two   
g. Quality control   selective areas (with response value from 4 to  
h. Prices and costs   5). 
i. Financing and accounting 
j. Research and development 
k. Legal or local government relations 
l. General management 
 
Control extent: degree or tightness of control which is exercised  Control is tight (T) if parent firms exercise more 
on the venture based on control mechanisms and control focus than three control mechanisms and broad control 
           over the IJVs. Control is loose when parent firms 
                              exercise less than 3 control mechanisms and                                         
    narrow control. 
 
Performance    
Financial performance   Measure on a 5 point-scale, respondent were asked 
Total performance   if they satisfied with IJV performance on both 
    financial and total performance with 1= “very 
                                                                                                unsatisfied” to 5= “very satisfied”  
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Abstract 
This article examines the relationship between foreign parent control and International Joint Venture (IJV) performance 
over the lifecycle of the IJV. Following Geringer and Hebert (1989); Glaister, Husan, and Buckley (2005), Nguyen and 
Larimo (2008), the paper conceptualizes foreign parent control across three dimensions including mechanism, focus, 
and extent. The empirical evidence is based on an analysis of 49 Finnish IJVs established in the 1990s. The result shows 
that foreign parent firms who adopted a control dynamic approach will see better IJV performance. Broad, tight, and 
formal control exercised by foreign parent firms over their IJVs leads to better performance of those IJVs in the 
formation stage. When the performance of an IJV is viewed negatively, foreign parent firms who exercise more control 
over IJVs will see better IJV performance in the post-formation stage. In contrast, when IJV performance is positive in 
the formation stage, foreign parent firms are likely to exercise less control over the IJV in the post-formation stage. 
Keywords: Control, Dynamics, Performance, Parent, International Joint Venture 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In recent years, International Joint Ventures (IJVs) have become a critical part of corporate strategy and firm growth in 
global markets (Luo & Park, 2004). However, IJVs often experience managerial difficulties in achieving of the intended 
goals (Park & Ungson, 2001), and thus often have a greater than 50 % failure rate (Parkhe, 1993). Researchers suggest 
that control problems are one of the primary causes of IJV failures (i.e. Groot & Merchant, 2000). This is said to be due 
to the fact that in IJVs foreign parent firms are exposed to the risk of opportunism (Zhang & Li, 2001). Furthermore, the 
operating environment in a foreign market often involves high degrees of uncertainty and risk. Through exercising 
control, foreign parent firms make sure that their strategies are effectively implemented and their resources are 
efficiently utilized (Lorange, Morton, & Ghosal, 1986). Insufficient control may result in a leakage of knowledge, 
proprietary components and capability to outside group (Geringer & Hebert, 1989) or a loss of competitive advantage to 
other parent firms (Hamel, 1991) or to the competitors (Reich & Mankin, 1986).  
1.2 Research gaps and research questions 
control (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). IJV research was continued by the works of Killing (1983), Schaan (1983) and since 
then has become an important subject in IJV literature (Calantone & Zhao, 2001; Lee & Beamish 1995; Parkhe, 1993; 
Yan & Gray 2001a). A substantial number of studies has addressed the importance of control to IJV performance (e.g., 
Beamish, 1988; Sohn, 1994). However, the results on the impact of parent firm control on IJV performance have been 
The IJV control was introduced in early research by West (1959),Tomlinson (1970), Franko (1971), Behrman (1977), 
Rafii (1978). This early research on control elaborated the context of IJVs with respect to the relationship between the 
international strategy of foreign firm, the strategy of local partners, and IJV control. In these tream works, the important  
focus was paid to the necessity of control of IJVs, rather than to the actual activities required to control and what to 
contradictory and controversial (Calantone & Zhao, 2001; Chalos & O’Connor, 1998; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Groot 
& Merchant, 2000; Lecraw, 1984; Yan & Gray, 2001b). Earlier studies on foreign parent dominant control and 
its relationship to performance show mixed results: that is, they are either 1) positive (Ding 1997; Killing 1983; Lee  
& Beamish 1995; Luo, Shenkar & Nyaw, 2001); 2) show no relationship (Calantone & Zhao 2001; Kogut 1988); 3) 
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show a negative relationship (Boateng & Glaister, 2002; Child, Faulkner & Tallman, 2005; Isobe et al., 2000; Osland, 
than that found in the shared and dominant control models. In addition, it has been noticed that the control and 
performance relationship may vary in IJVs. 
Faced with this research puzzle, researchers suggest that future research should seek to deepen IJV control research 
along its three dimensions including mechanisms, extent, and focus and its relationship to IJV performance (Chalos & 
O’Connor, 2004; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Raswamy, Gomes, & Veliyath, 1998; Woodley, 2006). Furthermore, 
Shortell and Zajac (1988), Brouthers and Bamossy (2006), Nguyen and Larimo (2008), Nguyen and Larimo (2009) 
suggest the need to study IJV development processes such as control and performance outcomes. In addition, Kogut 
(2002) maintains that “no matter what the initial agreement on control and ownership may have been at the start of a 
venture, environmental change over time may shift the relative bargaining power among partners”. This may lead to 
reconfiguration of the control design of IJVs as these environmental factors are crucial for an IJV’s stability (Harrigan, 
1985). Moreover, Yan and Zeng (1999) and Zhang and Li (2001) argued that the evolution of the control design is 
dependent on extraneous variables such as change in government policies, competitive environment. They explained 
that shifts in a partner’s bargaining power may result from inter-partner learning, changes in resource contributions, 
industry structure, and the host government’s regulations on foreign investments. These all lead to the continuously 
changing structure of organizations (Nielsen, 2007). As a result, IJV control design may not be stable over time and 
thus it is necessary to investigate how and why a parent firm’s control structures implemented in their IJVs change 
during the lifecycle of the IJV.  
The purpose of the present study is, therefore, addressed through the research question: (1) What are the relationships 
between foreign parent control and IJV performance during the formation stage of IJV lifecycle? (2) Why and 
how do these relationships change during the post-formation stage of the IJV life-cycle?  
International Joint Ventures. Contractor and Lorange (1988) use the term “joint venture” for the creation of a separate 
corporation by two or more partners with expected proportional share of dividend as compensation. Hennart (1988) 
defines an equity joint venture as an independent legal entity that is formed when two or more sponsors bring specified 
assets to that entity and they are paid for some or all of their contributions from the profits earned by the entity. In the 
present study, an IJV is regarded as a separate entity located in a foreign market formed by one (or more) multinational 
firm (s) and one (or more) local firm (s) whether through greenfield or partial acquisitions in the target markets 
IJV lifecycle has not been clearly defined and agreed in IJV literature. When focusing on the co-operative angle or 
inter-partner relations, researchers have often divided IJV life stages into three stages, as does Buechel (2000) with a 
formation stage, an adjustment stage, and an evaluation stage; Heide (1994) with a relationship initiation stage, a 
relationship maintenance stage, a relationship termination stage; Wood and Gray (1991) with a precondition stage, a 
process stage, and an outcome stage; and Ott (2003) with the three stages being a bargaining stage, a common agency 
stage, and a repeated games stage. While Kogut (2002) suggested three stages of the IJV lifecycle: creation, 
institutionalization, and termination, his research focused on only two stages: creation and termination. In contrast, 
when focusing on IJV success, researchers often distinguish only two IJV lifecycle stages, for example, formation and 
termination (Reuer, 2000), or pre-incorporation stage and post incorporation stage (Yeheskel, Newburry, & Zeira, 2004), 
or a formation stage and stable development, or joint venture formation followed by breakdown (Chowdhury & 
Chowdhury, 2001). In summary, there are different ways to structure IJV lifecycle stages, depending on the focus of the 
research. In the present study, the focus is on the control of IJVs and its relationship to IJV performance, therefore, the 
lifecycle stages of IJVs here include a formation stage and a post-formation stage. An IJV formed three to four years 
previously will often be ready to enter its post-formation stage and that could also be termed an evaluation or 
reformulation stage (Shortell & Zajac, 1988).
The definition and measurement of organizational performance is always a controversial topic for academic researchers 
as well as practitioners in many different areas. While there have been many attempts to define and measure the 
performance of organizations, due to a lack of consensus on this concept, the extant empirical research has not produced 
a single theory of performance measurement that can be applied across organizations (Tatoglu & Glaister, 1998). 
Furthermore, the hybrid nature of IJVs, the possibility of incongruence between partners, and the influence of different 
cultures in IJVs, all result in the valuation of performance becoming very complex and contribute to there being no 
consensus on the determinants of IJV performance (Child & Yan, 2003: 283-284; Mohr, 2006; Zeng, 1998). 
Performance is the ultimate test of a firm’s strategy (Schendel & Hofer, 1979), a multidimensional construct (Vryza, 
1997), and may be evaluated from a different perspective by each IJV partners (Duan & Chuanmin, 2007). Therefore, 
different perspectives have been adopted in prior research to assess a venture’s performance in previous research 
including a) a single parent firm (such as foreign parent ot local parent) perspective; or b) a dual parent firm perspective; 
(2004) find that split control between foreign parent firms and local parent firms has an IJV performance level better 
1994). In some other studies the results show a shared control between foreign and local parent firms as being 
positively related to IJV performance (Beamish, 1988, 1993). In the recent study on IJV control, Choi and Beamish, 
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and/or c) an IJV management perspectives. Geringer and Hebert (1991) find a significant correlation between a parent’s 
assessment and that of the IJV manager. Further, Peng and Luo (2000) point out a high degree of correlation between 
self-reported data and archival data in China. Moreover, Beamish and Delios (1997) concluded from their review that 
perceptual and objective measures of IJV performance are generally correlated. Thus, in the present study, perceptual 
measures such as parent firm satisfaction with IJV total performance and financial performance are used to established 
performance of IJVs. The article is organized as follows: First, it conceptualizes IJV control. Then it analyzes the 
relationships between foreign parent control and IJV performance during an IJV´s lifecycle. After that, the paper 
discusses the methodology, the sample, and the results of the study. Finally the study concludes with a discussion of the 
implications and potential directions of further study. 
2. The Conceptualization of IJV Control 
In the organizational literature, management control refers to the process by which an organization influences its 
members and its units to work in ways that meet the organizational objectives (Glaister & Bluckley, 1998). According 
to Child et al. (2005:15), control is a central aspect of management, and essential in any system that holds the managers 
accountable for their actions and decisions. Ouchi (1977: 95) suggested that “control can be conceptualized as an 
evaluation process which is based on the monitoring and evaluating of behavior or of outputs”. Thus, the organizational 
literature emphasizes how control can be used to manage individuals and subunits. In IJVs, because there are two or 
more parties involved, their management control is complex (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). In this paper, the control of 
IJVs is defined as the influence of the foreign parent firm on the IJV operations. Researchers have also acknowledged 
that control systems are complex and multidimensional (see e.g Berrell, 2007; Das & Teng, 1998; Geringer & Hebert, 
1989; Glaister, 1995 Glaister, Husan, & Buckley, 2005; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Lu & Hebert, 2005; Raswamy et al., 
1998). Unfortunately, the existing research tends to focus on only one or two dimensions of control. In order to be able 
to capture the dynamic nature of the IJV and conduct IJV control research thoroughly, this study adopts the 
multidimensional approach to control developed by Geringer and Hebert’s (1989). These control dimensions are 
elaborated upon below. 
2.1 Control mechanisms 
Control mechanisms are structural arrangements deployed to determine and influence what the members of the 
organization do (Fryxell et al., 2002; Geringer &Hebert, 1989). Control mechanisms consist of a variety of instruments 
including formal and social controls that are available to firms to exercise effective control over their members 
(Behrman, 1977; Friedman & Beguin, 1971). Formal control depends on hierarchies, standards, codified rules, 
procedures, goals, and regulations that specify desirable patterns of behavior (Das & Teng, 1998). These regulations are 
explicit in their prescription of behavior and in their means of enforceability (Das & Teng, 1998), aimed directly at 
protecting the assets of the parent firms (Fryxell et al., 2002). The formal control mechanisms help to decrease the 
potential for opportunism, by controlling the assets through hierarchical means (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). Formal 
control includes majority equity holding, determining the composition of the board of directors, rights to appoint key 
personnel, control of the planning and approval process for capital budgeting and resource allocation and the setting of 
routines for IJVs (see e.g. Makino, 1995; Mjoen, 1993; Lu & Hebert, 2005).  
Social control is designed to promote expectations and mutual commitments through which the JV managers learn to 
share the common attitudes and knowledge of the organization (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Social control refers to 
various mechanisms such as informal communication, information exchange and training, mentoring, development of a 
common organizational culture, and establishment of personal relationship with IJV managers. These mechanisms 
foster shared values and norms, without explicitly restricting the behavior of the selected people through the social 
controls (Chalos & O’Connor, 1998, Das & Teng, 1998; Fryxell et al., 2002; Schaan, 1983). Compared to formal 
control mechanisms, social control mechanisms have the potential to reduce monitoring and contracting costs, and to 
support the flexibility and adaptability of the enterprise (Dyer, 1997).
2.2 Control focus 
Control focus can be further divided into broad control and narrow control (Geringer & Herbert, 1989). In control focus, 
the parent firms can choose to have a broad control focus and attempt to exercise control over the entire range of the 
IJV’s activities, or they can have a narrow control focus and confine their control activities to the performance 
dimensions they consider to be critical (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Groot & Merchant, 2000). Child et al. (2005) 
maintain that depending on several factors, including the parent firm’s competencies and its evaluation of how critical 
activities are, parent firms may focus their control over activities related to technology in one instance but then focus on 
market related activities in another instance. The areas of control focus consist of marketing, sales and distribution, 
procurement, general management and operation, finance and accounting, R & D and development, production and 
quality, and human resources. Geringer and Frayne (1990) suggest that one of the crucial areas that determine whether 
the parent firm’s intended objectives are achieved is their focus on the control of human resource control. In this paper, 
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the control focus is considered to be broad when parent firms exercise control over two or more areas, and narrow when 
they exercise control over only one or two areas.  
2.3 Control extent  
The control extent refers to the degree or tightness of control which is exercised over the venture (Geringer & Hebert, 
1989). Control extent consists of tight control and loose control. With loose control, the parent firms tend to use only 
one or two control mechanisms and focus their control on only one or two control areas exercised over the IJVs. 
Furthermore, with loose control, the parent firms are more flexible in their evaluation of the employees’ behavior and 
their performance. IJV managers have to submit reports less frequently and there are fewer meetings between the parent 
firms and the IJV manager in loose control types. Tight control can be effected through any mechanism that provides 
the partner with a high degree of certainty that the personnel in the IJV will act as the given partner wishes. Control is 
tight from a partner’s perspective if that partner has the right to make or approve the key decisions (Geringer & Hebert, 
1989). Tight control is also manifested if the IJV staff is held strictly accountable for adhering to a complete set of 
actions such as policies and procedures. Tight control is also related to highly frequent and precise reporting (Child et 
al., 2005). Control can be tightened through more intensive training of the IJV employees in production and 
management techniques (Van Sluys & Schuler, 1994). However, tight control may also have adverse side effects. As 
Child et al. (2005) have argued, if control is exercised in a too domineering manner and/or too frequently, it is likely to 
lead to significant ill will and to the eventual breakdown of the IJV. 
3. Relational Dynamics between Control and Performance in an IJV’s Lifecycle 
Performance is an important issue in strategic management (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). Nielsen (2007) 
suggests that performance should be discussed in the context of the different stages of the development of an IJV. 
Previous research on the relationship between control and performance has been dominated by a static approach (Zhang 
& Li, 2001). However, in order to understand the complex nature of the relationship, it is believed that the dynamic 
perspective may help to investigate how control dimensions affect performance and how performance, in turn, affects 
the IJV control decisions of parent firms. In addition, previous researchers propose that “the control system at a 
relatively young IJV should be viewed as embryonic and should evolve over the life of the venture” (Chalos & 
O’Connor, 1998: 64). The paper continues by analyzing how foreign parent control structures in IJVs influence 
performance during the IJV formation stage. Then, the paper studies why and how foreign parent control systems in 
IJVs change under the influence of IJV performance in the post-formation stage. 
3.1 Foreign parent control choice in the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle and their effect on IJV performance  
Luo, Shenkar, and Nyaw (2001) find that broad control exercised by a foreign parent is an important contributor to its 
satisfaction with its IJV performance. Hoon-Halbauer (1994) maintains that the on-going management process of an 
IJV works better when foreign staffs possess dominant management control and holding the major decision making 
power. Brouthers and Bamossy (2006), studying the post-formation process of IJVs established by western and eastern 
European firms, find that high performance in IJVs is associated with broad control at an early stage of IJV formation. 
Moreover, Child, Markoczy and Cheung (1994) finds that IJVs in emerging markets like China, local managers are 
reluctant to make decisions and are afraid of accepting personal responsibility. It, therefore, appears in joint ventures at 
least local managers may need time to learn to take actions and accept responsibility in managing the IJVs. As a result, 
it is to be expected that broad control by foreign parent firms leads to better IJV performance during the formation 
stage. 
Child et al. (2005) maintain that control is critical for the successful management and performance of any strategic 
alliance. Mjoen (1993) find that a tight degree of control was associated with better performance. Studying of IJVs in 
China, Chen (2004) maintains that tight control by local parent firms over IJVs has a negative impact on performance. 
This is because local parent firms usually do not advantageous expertise of management IJVs. In IJVs, local parent 
firms primarily contribute land, facilities, labor so they may not have a capability to control the technology and 
know-how contributed by foreign parent firms. In such situation, the result of tight control by local parent firms is a 
delay in the decision making process and to hinder implementation of best practices contributed by foreign parent firms, 
leading to a decrease in the competitive advantage of the IJVs. Therefore, a foreign parent firms should not let a local 
firm tighten control of an IJV but instead should exercise control itself (Chen, 2004). As a result, tight control by 
foreign parent firms leads to better IJV performance in formation stage.
Furthermore, Fryxell, Dooley, and Vryza (2002) find that formal control and IJV performance were positively related in 
younger IJVs but that this relationship became negative in more mature IJVs. As a result, formal control mechanisms 
are aimed at monitoring the behavior and performance of IJVs, which is critical for stability and efficiency during their 
early development stage (Larson, 1992). As a result, formal control by foreign parent firms leads to better IJV 
performance during the formation stage. In summary, we propose that: 
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Hypothesis 1: Broad, tight, and formal control exercised by foreign parent firms over their IJVs leads to better 
performance in the formation stage. 
3.2 IJV performance during the formation stage and the changes in foreign parent control in the post- formation stage 
Lorange (1997) maintains that because IJVs evolves over time, the balance of a parent firm’s control should be shifted 
accordingly. In the same vein, Brouthers and Bamossy (2006) argue that changes in IJV structure and control 
relationships may result in lower transaction costs and improved IJV performance. In managing IJVs, Lee, Chen, and 
Kao (1998) suggest that foreign parent firms need to adopt a flexible mindset. Groot and Merchant (2000) suggested 
that IJV performance is directly related to parents firms’ attitudes toward control. Several studies have focused on how 
IJV performance affects IJV reconfiguration. Vaidya (2000) argues that control related failures are likely to occur if 
control practices are not re-evaluated and modified in response to changing circumstances. Simonin (1997) argues that a 
parent firm’s competence at successfully designing subsequent control structures is ultimately reflected in future IJV 
performance. Killing (1983) observes that partners might loose or strengthen control over the IJV in response to the 
IJV’s on going performance. According to Brouthers and Bamossy (2006: 8), control changes may lead to improved 
cooperation and performance.  
In post-formation stage, when performance results carrying over from the formation stage are positive the use of formal 
control mechanisms to mitigate opportunism in the later stage may be short-lived (Fryxell et al., 2002).This is due to the 
fact that formal control mechanisms are based on formal contracts between parent firms, and therefore, valid for a 
certain period of time (Dyer, 1997). When a parent firm’s needs and strategies for IJVs change, they often call for 
repeated contracts renegotiation, leading to very high transaction costs. In addition, in the post-formation stage of IJVs, 
when the relationship between foreign parent and local parent firms matures, formal control mechanisms can cause 
conflicts and promote distrust between parent firms (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Consequently, in the post-formation 
stage of the IJV lifecycle, social control mechanisms (based on trust and commitment) are more economical, that is 
once the initial cost of establishing social controls averages out to become less than the cost of periodic contracting 
(Fryxell et al. 2002). Furthermore, Fryxell et al. (2002) find that social control and IJV performance were positively 
related only in the presence of effect-based trust between the parents, which is built during the development of IJVs. On 
the other hand, if parent firms rely totally on social control in the early in IJV lifecycle stage they may expose the 
potential for opportunism in the formation stage. Thus, trust often appears between parent firms in the post-formation 
stage rather than during the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle. In the post-formation stage, there is a need to find a 
balance between control and maintaining harmony between foreign parent and local parent firms. Kauser (2007) 
suggests that where there is a pre-existing trust, control should be monitored by social mechanisms. In the same vein 
Chen, (2004) maintains that in the later stage social control helps to increase a parent firm’s confidence in its IJVs. This 
confidence can lead to high expectations of mutual learning and high degree of commitment by parent firms to the IJV 
and so promotes knowledge sharing and creates a more competitive bundle of resources (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). In 
short, when IJV performance in the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle is positive, foreign parent firms tend to exercise 
social control over their IJVs in the post-formation stage. 
Furthermore, in post-formation stage, local managers also learn how to manage and direct IJVs towards their targeted 
goals. Robins et al. (2002) suggest that “mature” ventures often use local personnel supplied by local partners at many 
levels, thus giving local parent firms broader control over IJVs. Further, previous research has suggested that IJVs 
require greater autonomy in order to adapt to the social, political, financial, legal and cultural expectations of the IJV 
host environment (Yeheskel, Newburry, Zeira, 2004). Moreover, Yeheskel et al. (2004) proposed that foreign parent 
firms that allow IJV managers to formulate and implement policies in functional areas that are sensitive to the host 
country would lead to better IJV performance. Superior performance of an IJV in post-formation stage is also achieved 
if foreign firms focus their control on their resource contribution not on the whole range of IJV activities (Yan & Child, 
2004). Moreover, during the post-formation stage of IJV as the level of trust increase between foreign and local firms, 
the need for control diminishes (Nielsen, 2007). Therefore, parent firms seek to focus their control over particular 
activities, rather than control all activities (Kauser, 2007). Merchant and Groot (2000) suggest that when recent IJV 
performance rates are relatively high, parents firms will utilize more looser control over the IJV and narrower control 
foci. As a result, when IJV performance in the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle is positive, foreign parent firms tend 
to exercise narrow control over their IJVs in the post-formation stage. 
In addition, when an IJV has superior performance, the partners tend to loosen control since the IJV’s management 
team has proved its expertise and that helps to maintain harmonious relations with the local parent firms (Child et al. 
2005). Similarly, Chen (2004) proposed that over time, tight control activities exercised by foreign parent firms might 
decrease due to the influence of the IJV management getting stronger at the post-formation stage than it was in the 
formation stage. This is because it permits the expectations of labor unions, clients, suppliers, and other local 
stakeholders to be properly considered. This would positively affect worker commitment and productivity and increase 
the fit between the IJV and its host environment. As a result, this will increase the effectiveness of IJVs and leads to 
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better IJV performance. Gaining more autonomy in the post-formation stage is also important for an IJV’s survival. In 
foreign markets, IJVs often need to be able to react quickly to fast-changing markets by reducing long decision-making 
processes and bureaucracy. Supporting the argument for more autonomy for IJV management, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) 
contend that operating decisions are best made by those who are focused purely on the JV. Yeheskel et al. (2004) point 
out that foreign parent firms are willing to permit more autonomy when their IJVs operate under more certain and stable 
circumstances. In addition, Nielsen (2007) argues that the venture mature over time and partners are more familiar with 
each others’ idiosyncrasies, thus the uncertainty within transactions decreases. Consequently, intensive control is not 
necessary. In addition, Dianne (1997) suggests that as the IJV has progressed well, foreign parent firms should have 
clarified the criteria and time frames for the gradual transfer of control and power to their local partners. As a result, 
when IJV performance during the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle is positive, foreign parent firms tend to exercise 
loose control over their IJVs in post-formation stage.  
On the other hand, undesirable IJV performance prompts structural instability in control system (Yan, 1999). Poor IJV 
performance is often caused by at least one of the partner firms failing to achieve its objectives, thus creating stimuli for 
changing the ineffective existing control system. Yan and Gray (2001b) suggested that a factor that could produce 
change in an IJV is a shift in IJV performance. When investigating the evolution of IJVs, Child (2002) concluded that 
over time, foreign parent firms are likely to increase their equity share for the following reasons: a) the need to buy out 
unreliable partners; b) the unwillingness or inability of local partners to finance IJV expansion. In their study, Brouthers 
and Bamossy (2006) also found that tighter controls were normally instituted after poor results and/or misdeeds. As a 
result, when IJV performance in the formation stage of IJV lifecycle is negative, foreign parent firms tend to exercise 
more control by exercising broad, formal, and tight control over their IJVs in post-formation stage. In summary, we 
propose that: 
Hypothesis 2: When IJV performance has been negative in the formation stage, foreign parent firms tend to exercise 
formal, broad, and tight control over their IJVs in the post-formation stage of the IJV lifecycle. In contrast, when IJV 
performance has been positive in the formation stage, foreign parent firms tend to exercise social, narrow, and loose 
control over their IJVs in the post-formation stage of the IJV lifecycle. 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Methodology 
To test the hypotheses, the study uses a survey research method to collect data for the empirical evidence. In the survey, 
the questions about joint venture control and performance were collected directly from those involved in IJV operations. 
The measurement of variables is based on a 5 point-scale. The methods used in this study to analyze the data are 
description statistics and the Chi-square test. The purpose of the methods is to determine how well an observed set of 
data fits an expected set of hypotheses. The method is particularly useful to find out whether an IJV control structure 
which is made up of different elements of the IJV control dimension (formal, social, broad, narrow, tight, and loose) has 
a normal distribution or whether the structure has been formed under the influence of performance factors. 
4.2 Data collection and measurement 
The study here is a part of an on-going research project focusing on IJV behavior, strategies, partner selection, control 
structure, and performance of Finnish firms. The target firms and investments were identified as follows: 1) The FDI 
data base collected by the project leader starting from the late 1980s based on press releases regarding IJVs published in 
several Finnish business magazines and newspapers, 2) Annual reports and websites of the 250 largest Finnish firms as 
reported by the leading business magazines, 3) based on the earlier surveys focusing on IJVs and wholly owned 
subsidiaries of Finnish firms conducted by the project leader. From the resources, we identified 340 qualifying IJVs 
formed by Finnish firms since 1985 and in operations until at least 2002. The 340 qualifying IJVs involved 250 Finnish 
parent firms. Of those 250 firms, several firms were very difficult to contact either because they had been restructured 
or because they had gone out of business. The aim of contacting the firms was primarily to identify the best informants. 
In some firms there was no longer anyone employed who had sufficient knowledge to further study. This left a total of 
200 Finnish parent firms. Due to time and cost constraints a postal questionnaire and online web survey were used to 
gather the data.  
The participants were those managers who directly involved in the establishment and operation of the IJVs. To enhance 
the quality of the data, the respondents were contacted by phone in December 2006 to explain the key points of the 
study and the questionnaires. In exchange for their cooperation with the study and to provide motivation and accurate 
responses, the respondents were assured of anonymity and were promised a summary report of the findings, and were 
also entered into a draw for three gifts. Following one reminder at the end of the January 2007, 54 questionnaires were 
returned at the end of February 2007, from which 5 questionaires were not usuable. Thus, the final sample was
49 IJVs including 40 Finnish firms. The response rate was acceptable 24.84% (Larimo & Rumpunen, 2006). The  
sample was examined for systematic response bias using t-tests. Respondents and non-respondents were compared by 
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their age, size, international experience, and IJV experience. No statistically significant difference was found. Thus, 
there was no response bias to be found in the final sample. After taking out the uncompleted questionnaires, the final 
sample related to 49 IJVs.  
Among these IJVs, 45% were established 1988-1995, and 55% 1996-2006; 53 % through acquisitions, and 47% through 
greenfield investment; 76 % involved 2 partners and 24 % involved 3 partners; 61% were established with an indefinite 
term, 22% with a duration of less than 5 years, and 17 % stated to have an intended duration of more than 5 years; 41 % 
had a degree of Finnish ownership of between 10%-49%, 10% had equal ownership, and 49 % had Finnish majority 
ownership upon establishment; 71% were located in emerging economies, and 29% in developed economies; 63% dealt 
with industrial products, 27 % with consumer products, and 10 % offered both consumer and industrial products. 
All three control dimensions were measured with a 5 point-scale. Based on the list of different mechanisms and focus 
areas provided, the respondents were asked to assess 1) their method of monitoring and control, and 2) their focus of 
monitoring and control at the formation and post-formation stages (Cronbach’s Alpha=0.89, and 0.92, respectively). 
The measure of IJV performance was also based on a 5 point-scale, the respondents were asked if they were satisfied 
with IJV performance on both financial and total performance scales with 1= “very dissatisfied” to 5= “very satisfied” 
at both formation stage and post-formation stage where Cronbach’s Alpha values were = 0.91 and 0.94, respectively. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Parent firms’ control choice and IJV performance in the formation stage of the IJV life-cycle 
Performance was measured using seven different subjective measures. Respondents were asked on a 5-point Likert 
scale, first to weight a suggested set of measures, and then to express their degree of satisfaction with each of the seven 
measures. The two most important measures of performance were total performance and financial performance. Among 
49 respondents, 32 Finnish parent firms (65%) exercised formal, broad, and tight control over their IJVs during the 
formation stage. The respective mean of the IJVs total performance was 4.6 (with 1= very dissatisfied to 5= very 
satisfied) and financial performance was 4.3. The remaining 17 Finnish parent firms (35%) exercised other control 
structure such as social, narrow, and loose control. Those parent firms demonstrate a respective total performance mean 
of 2.5, and one for financial performance of 2.4. Therefore, formal, broad, and tight control exercised by foreign parent 
firms in the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle leads to better IJV performance. Also, based on the chi-square test, ?2=
16.5 the result was significant at P<0.005 (df=5) (see table 1). Thus, the results supported hypothesis 1 for both 
description statistic and chi-square test. 
4.3.2 IJV performance in the formation stage and parent control in the post-formation stage of the IJV life-cycle 
According to the respondents, 75% of foreign parent firms (37 firms) were satisfied with the IJV’s total performance 
(mean 4.3) and financial performance (4.1) resulting from IJV operations in the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle. Of 
these 37 foreign parent firms, 95 % foreign parent firms exercised social, narrow, and loose control over their IJVs in 
the post-formation stage of IJV lifecycle. On the other hand, the 25% of foreign parent firms (12 firms), who were not 
satisfied with their IJV performance in the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle, all exercised formal, broad, and tight 
control over their IJVs in the post-formation stage of the IJV lifecycle. In addition, according to a chi-square test ?2=
15.27, the result was significant at P<0.01 (df=5) (see table 1.). Thus, the results supported hypothesis 2 for both 
description statistics and chi-square test. So that if IJV performance in the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle has been 
positive, foreign parent firms tended to exercise social, narrow, and loose control over their IJVs in the post-formation 
stage of IJV lifecycle. In contrast, if IJV performance has been negative in the formation stage of an IJV’s lifecycle, 
foreign parent firms tend to exercise formal, broad, tight control over their IJVs in the post-formation stage of IJV 
lifecycle.  
All in all, the relationship between the design of the control structure and performance is not just one-way, but rather is 
reciprocal and dynamic. With an initial control system designed by a foreign parent firms, there will be two situations 
affecting IJV performance. In the first case, when the performance is negative, foreign parent firms will respond to this 
situation by exercising more control over IJVs to restore order and make sure that the IJVs achieve planned targets. 
However, control also carries costs, especially with broad control and tight control. In addition, foreign parent firms 
may also signal their distrust of local parent firms, by insisting on a lot of procedures and excessive paperwork that may 
flow from formal control and tight control. Therefore, when IJV performance is positive, foreign parent firms may 
prefer to exercise less control over IJVs to create trust with local parent firms and to reduce associated costs (see Figure 
1.).  
5. Contribution and Conclusions 
With regard to control in IJVs, research has traditionally been modeled solely by the relative degree of ownership 
(Mjoen & Tallman, 1997). However, ownership may not be the optimal means of control in every situation and may be 
but a minor issue in governance. Guide (2001) states that a firm does not need majority equity ownership to exercise 
managerial control. Sohn (1994: 299) points out that social knowledge may help MNCs reduce dependency on 
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ownership as means of control over their subsidiaries. In addition, when control of IJVs was discussed separately from 
the ownership structure, most previous research focused on only one dimension of control, mainly control mechanisms 
(e.g. Mjoen, 1993; Vryza 1997; Xiansheng, 1998; Yan & Gray 2001a). However, to be able to recognize the control 
issues within IJV clearly, Geringer and Hebert (1989) and Lu and Hebert (2005) and Raswamy, Gomes, and Veliyath 
(1998) proposed that future research should examine the multidimensionality of IJV control including control focus, 
control mechanisms, and control extent, and also the relationship of each one to IJV performance.  
The first contribution of the present study to IJV theory is to fill this gap by providing a better understanding of the 
multidimensionality of parent firm control and each element’s influence on IJV performance. In addition, the present 
study is the first to examine the change of IJV control during the IJV lifecycle since Zhang and Li (2001: 342) 
concluded “how control design of IJVs evolves over time remains unclear”. This is important because it examines 
organizational process. The research of process makes an important contribution because it explains how managers can 
influence firm performance through organizational control (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992). In the relationship between 
IJV control and performance the present study points out that the conflicting results from previous studies are, perhaps, 
because they have assumed a monotonic relationship between control and performance (Fryxell et al., 2002). As it takes 
one step further away from this approach, the present study proposes that the relationship between IJV control and 
performance depends both on which lifecycle stage IJVs are at, and on the results of IJV performance during the 
previous stage. In particular, the present study proposes that when foreign parent firms choose to exercise broad, formal, 
and tight control at the formation stage of the IJV lifecycle, IJV performance is likely to be positive. In contrast, if 
foreign parent firms choose to exercise narrow, social, and loose control over IJVs at the formation stage, IJV 
performance is likely to be negative. 
In addition, foreign parent firms will redesign their control exercised over IJVs over time according to IJV performance. 
In the post-formation stage, when IJV performance is negative, foreign parent firms need to exercise more control over 
IJVs in an attempt to improve performance. When IJV performance is positive foreign parent firms may reduce their 
degree of control over IJVs in order to reduce the costs associated with control, and to promote a higher degree of trust, 
the potential for which had probably already been observed during the initial stage, and evidenced through strong 
performance. This finding is consistent with Zhang and Li (2001) who report that during IJV development process, IJV 
performance becomes a motivating force stimulating the evolution of IJV control design. The present study extends this 
by specifying which particular control structure is needed during the period of such changes. In short, it can be 
concluded that there is no optimal choice of IJV controls that are stable over time. Control of IJVs needs to be 
re-adjusted over time in accordance with IJV performance. As a result, this study may help to explain previous 
conflicting results, such as why in some cases dominant control forms yield better performance while in others they do 
not but instead minor control or shared prove effective control forms. This finding contradicts Glaister and Buckley’s 
(1998) which maintains that the nature of management control does not vary with the development of IJVs.  
This study does have several limitations. First, the sample size of the study is rather small and the analysis based only 
on data from foreign parent firms. For further studies, researchers could use the framework of this study with a bigger 
sample size and incorporate the viewpoints of both local and foreign parent firms to study the dynamics of parent firm 
control. In addition, the study defines an IJV lifecycle as consisting of two stages; further study could test the 
framework of this study using three or more stages. Finally, although performance is the main motive driving IJV 
control change, other factors should be taken into account. Future studies may wish to investigate control dynamics 
during the IJV lifecycle in accordance with the changes in operating environments of IJVs, the changes to parent 
strategies in IJVs, and the relationship development between local firms and foreign firms.  
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[Abstract] The paper aims to investigate the influence of parent firms’ contributions and prior
international joint venture (IJV) experiences on IJV control and performance. IJV control is
conceptualized across three dimensions, including control mechanism, control focus, and control
extent. The empirical evidence is based on the survey of Finnish firms that have established IJVs with
local firms in the 1990s. The results showed that in different groups of contributions, parent firms
prefer different control structures. These structures, in turn, have differently influenced IJV
performance. The results also reveal that parent firms deployed different control structures in their
IJVs according to their prior IJV experience. The more experience parent firms have, the less control
they exercise over their IJVs. Besides, foreign firms, which have more experienced in IJVs, have
better IJV performance. In addition, the prior IJV experience of foreign parent firms has different
influences on total performance and financial performance.
Introduction
(Groot & Merchant, 2000). Despite the popularity and importance of IJVs and extensive
research in the field, it is suggested that we have a limited understanding of how to manage
them (Das & Teng, 2001). In particular, most previous studies provide little knowledge about
how to control IJVs and their relationship to IJV performance (Geringer & Hebert, 1989).
Futhermore, Geringer and Hebert (1989) and Ramaswamy, Gomes, and Veliyath (1998)
proposed that future research should deepen IJV control in terms of mechanisms, extent, and
focus. 
While previous research has not provided evidence directly explaining how parent firms
make control structure choices (Groot & Merchan, 2000), it has suggested some possible
determinant factors, such as parent firms’ experiences (Peng & Health, 1996; Guide, 2001)
and their contributions (Blodgett, 1991; Yan & Gray, 1994; Isobe, Makino, Montgomery,
2000). Pangarkar and Klein (2004), and Berrell (2007) suggested that further studies are
needed to examine factors that influence IJV control and performance.  This paper aims to
further analyze the influence of foreign parent firms on their IJV control and performance. In
more detail, the paper aims to answer the research question: How do foreign parent firms’
contributions and IJV experiences influence IJV control and performance?
Conceptualization of Control in IJVs
The international Joint Venture (IJV) is defined as a separate corporation established by two
or more partners with an expected proportional share of dividend as compensation (Contractor
& Lorange, 1988). Management control refers to the process by which an organization
influences its members and its units to work in ways that meet the organizational objectives
(Glaister, 1995). In IJV, because there are two or more parties involved, the management
Researchers have shown that a majority of international joint ventures (IJVs) fall    short   of 
their goal (Luo et al., 2001) since they are difficult to manage    (Schuler & Tarique, 2005).
[Keywords] International Joint Ventures; foreign parent; contributions; control; performance
Researchers have suggested  control problems are one of the primary causes of IJV failures
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control is complex (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Furthermore, researchers have acknowledged
that the control systems are multidimensional (Kumar & Seth, 1998; Lu & Hebert, 2005;
Berrell, 2007). Unfortunately, the existing research tends to focus on only one or two
dimensions. In order to be able to capture the complex nature of the IJV and conduct IJV
control research thoroughly, this study adopts the multidimensional approach of control
developed by Geringer and Hebert (1989). 
Control Mechanisms
the members of the organization do (Geringer &Hebert, 1989; Fryxell, Dooley, & Vryza,
2002). Control mechanisms consist of a variety of instruments, including formal and social
controls that are available to firms for exercising effective control over their members
(Friedman & Beguin, 1971). Formal control depends on hierarchies, standards, codified rules,
procedures, goals, and regulations that specify desirable patterns of behavior (Das & Teng,
1998). These instruments of formal control are usually agreed upon and imposed by both
foreign and local parent firms (Fryxell et al., 2002), such as a board of directors, appointment
of key personnel, planning and approval process for capital budgeting and resource allocation,
and the lay-down procedures and routines for IJV ( Mjoen, 1993; Lu & Hebert, 2005). 
Social control is designed to promote expectations and mutual commitments through
which IJV managers learn to share the common attitudes and knowledge of the organization
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Social control refers to various mechanisms, such as informal
communication, information exchange and training, mentoring, and personal relationships.
Social control develops of a common organizational culture that fosters shared values and
norms, without explicitly restricting the behavior of the targeted people through the means of
those social controls (Schaan, 1983; Chalos & O’Connor, 1998, Fryxell et al., 2002).
Control Focus
Control focus can be divided into broad control and narrow control (Geringer & Herbert,
1989). In control focus, the partners can choose to have a broad control focus and attempt to
exercise control over the entire range of the IJV’s activities, or they can have a narrow control
focus and confine their control activities to the performance dimensions they consider to be
critical (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Groot & Merchant, 2000). Child et al. (2005) maintained
that, depending on several factors, such as the parent firm’s competencies and the criticality of
such activities, parent firms may focus their control over activities related to technology in
one case but on market-related activities in another case. There are also cases when the parent
firms may focus their control on both technology and market-related activities (Child et al.,
2005). The areas of control focus consist of marketing, sales, and distribution, procurement,
general management and operation, finance and accounting, R & D and development,
production and quality, and human resources.
 
Control Extent
The control extent refers to the degree or tightness of control which is exercised on the
venture (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). Control extent consists of tight control and loose control.
In loose control, the parent firms tend to use only one or two control mechanisms and focus
their control on only one or two control areas exercised over the IJVs. Furthermore, the parent
firms are more flexible in their evaluation of employees’ behavior and their performance. The
frequencies of reports that the IJV managers have to submit to the parent firms and the
Control mechanisms are structural arrangements deployed to determine and influence what
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meetings between the parent firms and the IJV managers are very few. In contrast, the tight 
control tends to be strict with respect to the employee’s dress code, punctuality, and cost-
consciousness, being detail oriented and precise in operation. Tight control can be effected 
through any mechanism that provides the partner with a high degree of certainty that the 
personnel in the IJV will act as the given partner wishes. Tight control is manifest, also, if the 
IJV staff is held strictly accountable for adhering to a complete set of described actions, such 
as policies and procedures. Tight is, as well, related to highly frequent and precise reporting 
(Child et al., 2005). 
In sum, IJV control consists of three dimensions mechanisms (formal: F; social: S), focus 
(Broad: B, Narrow: N), and extent (Tight: T, Loose: L). These three control dimensions 
produce eight possible control structures, such as Formal, Broad, Tight (FBT), Formal, Broad, 
Loose (FBL), Formal Narrow, Tight (FNT), Formal, Narrow, Loose (FNL), Social, Borad, 
Tight (SBT), Social, Narrow, Tight (SNT), Social Broad, Loose (SBL), Social, Narrow, 
Loose (SNL). 
Parent Contributions and IJV Control and Performance 
Parent firms contribute to IJVs through their resources. Firm resources include all assets, 
capabilities, information, and knowledge. Grant (1991) classified that resources of firms 
include tangible, intangible, and personnel-based sources. The most common areas of 
contribution in IJVs are technology, financial resources, trained personnel, and trade marks. 
Technology 
Technological know-how is generally the most scarce resource (Luo et al., 2001). In addition, 
foreign parent firms are often responsible for supplying technology and know-how to IJVs 
(Lee et al., 1998). Local parent firms may appropriate the proprietary information, such as 
recent patents, from foreign parent firms for their own purposes outside of the IJV 
relationship (Chalos & O’Connor, 1998). Moreover, foreign parent firms are not able to count 
totally on legal protection, since it is has many limitations (Al-Obaidi, 1999), especially when 
it involves tacit knowledge and skills that are not protected by property laws (Chen, 2004). 
Therefore, foreign parent firms will protect their technology using certain control focus and 
mechanisms (Al-Obaidi, 1999, p. 269). Yan and Gray (1994) found that technological 
resources, such as production knowledge that parent firms bring to IJVs, influence IJV control 
design. Transaction cost theory suggests that for a high level of transfer of tacit knowledge to 
IJVs, foreign parent firms will exercise more control, as they are able to demand more control 
concessions from local foreign parent firms (Lee et al., 1998).  
According to Blodgett (1991), tight control over an IJV is necessary for foreign parent 
firms to transfer critical resources, such as proprietary technologies. This is to curb 
opportunism and avoid unauthorized technology leakage (Killing1983; Yan & Gray, 2001). 
Therefore, a parent who makes extensive contributions of manufacturing resources and know-
how will expect a high level of control of operations. Killing (1983) and Hennart (1988) 
suggested that formal control is more efficient method to reduce the risk of the misuse of 
technology. Besides, Chen (2004) maintained that in advanced technology IJVs in which 
technology is provided by foreign parent firms, letting local parent control IJV activities may 
lead to proprietary information lost to local parents. Therefore, the more technology foreign 
parent firms contribute to IJVs, the greater the management control they need to achieve (Yan 
& Gray, 2001).  
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In other words,
Hypothesis 1: When foreign parent firms are contributors of technology for IJVs, they are 
likely to exercise broad, formal, and tight control over them. 
Financial Resources 
Financial capital investment in facilities by foreign parent firms will enhance the capability 
and quality of IJV products. The new facilities play crucial roles in IJV performance. Besides, 
with financial capital from parent firms, IJV can afford to recruit and train the best people for 
IJVs, thus, increasing IJV performance. Having a higher financial contribution position means 
more power on the board of directors and, thus, enhances more control over the IJVs than the 
lesser financially contributing partners (Mjoen, 1993). Xiansheng’s (1998) study on IJVs in 
the emerging market of China found that there is a positive relationship between the foreign 
parent’s financial resources contribution and management control in the IJVs. More 
particularly, when partner firms are the major financial contributors to IJVs, they often 
demanded control over a wide range of areas and often exercised extensive control over their 
IJVs (Xiansheng, 1998).  
When foreign firms are the main contributors of financial resources to IJVs, Hoon-
Halbauer (1994) maintained that IJVs work better when foreign staffs possess dominant 
management control and hold major decision-making power. Brouthers and Bamossy (2006), 
studying the post-formation process of IJVs established by western and eastern European 
firms, find that high performance of IJVs is associated with broad control exercised by foreign 
parent firms in the early stages of IJV formation. Moreover, Child, Markoczy and Cheung 
(1994) found that IJVs in emerging markets like China, as minor contributors for IJV 
resources, local firms are reluctant to make decisions and are afraid of getting personal 
responsibilities. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: When foreign parent firms are contributors of financial resources to 
IJVs, they tend to exercise formal, broad, and tight control over their IJVs. 
Management Know-How 
Other areas of contribution to IJVs are management know-how, a valuable trade mark, and 
trained personnel. Management know-how alone, such as marketing skills, is often consistent 
with minor ownership (Blodgett, 1991). According to resource dependence theory, the 
effective use of a foreign parent firm’s management know-how often requires exercising 
critical control in the areas contributed in IJVs (Yan & Child, 2004). Thus, foreign parent 
firms expect consistency between their relative contributions of knowledge and their relative 
level of control (Barden et al., 2005). Because their contribution is minor, their control is 
associated with narrow and loose control. Chung, Gibbons, and Schoch, (2000), studied 
management control of MNCs in Australia and found that as knowledge flow increases, 
reliance of financial control decreases and reliance on social control increases. As a result, 
Hypothesis 3: When foreign parent firms are contributors of management know-how 
for IJVs, they tend to exercise social, narrow, and loose control over the IJVs 
Trade Mark  
A valuable trade mark and brand are often crucial for firms’ survival and success. Thus, when 
IJVs use the foreign parent firm’s valuable trade mark, especially in emerging markets, tight 
control of the IJVs is a vital issue. Furthermore, the influence gained by the foreign parent 
firm may be derived mainly from their trademark contributed to IJVs (Luo et al., 2001). 
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Providing their trade mark to IJVs, foreign parent firms often need to effectively locate the 
interface points, staff and train appropriately, develop social control systems, and monitor the 
exchange of information to maintain a high quality standard of product and service of the IJVs 
(Baughn et al., 1997). Schaan (1983) proposed that staffing top management position of the 
IJV with members from foreign parent firms which will provide a common vision for IJVs as 
the same as in foreign parent firms. Child (2004) found that the ability of one party to control 
resources vital for the success of an organization gives it power to control some the particular 
areas in the organizations. For manufacturing and joint ventures, the most important areas 
often are quality control and delivery service, and they are often the interests of foreign parent 
control. As a result, 
Hypothesis 4: When foreign parent firms provide trademark to the IJVs, they tend to 
exercise social, narrow, and tight control over the IJVs. 
Trained Personnel 
Trained personnel have been cited as one of the important factors for IJV operations, 
especially in developing countries (Xiansheng, 1998). In IJVs for which foreign parent firms 
are often responsible for highly trained personnel, and local partners are responsible for other 
resources for IJV operations, such as local specific knowledge, sharing control with local 
parent firms is an important vehicle for procuring those firm-specific advantages embedded 
with local parent firms (Choi, 2001). Thus, when foreign parent firms contribute only trained 
personnel to IJVs, they do not need to carry out extensive control over the IJVs.  
This is because trained personnel are the ones who spread the foreign parent firm’s 
concepts and ensure the IJV runs smoothly, as well as assuring IJV product quality (Baughn 
et al., 1997). However, in order for trained personnel to utilize their skills and abilities, they 
have to be placed in the right position in the firms and be managed by talented superiors. 
Through trained personnel in IJVs, foreign parent firms establish their social control over the 
IJVs, since these key personnel are in charge of educating and training other staffs of the 
ventures. As a result, foreign parent firms will need only to be in charge of some important 
areas, such as human resources or other specific areas in which these trained personnel work. 
Thus 
Hypothesis 5: When foreign parent firms are contributors of highly trained personnel 
to the IJVs, they tend to exercise social, narrow, and loose control over their IJVs.
Parent Control and IJV Performance 
Parental control plays a crucial role in the success of IJVs (Simoin, 1997; Child et al., 2005; 
Berrell, 2007), especially, when transaction costs are high and partners know little about each 
other (Pangar & Klein, 2004). Mjoen (1993) found that the right level of control was 
associated with better performance. Child and Yan (2003) argued that parent control permits 
the effective use of whatever strategic resources that the parent firms have on the IJVs. 
O’Donnell (2000) proposed that the fit between parent resource strategy and the subsidiary 
control mechanism can help the subsidiary achieve objective performance. Johnston (2005) 
studied the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries and found that different 
subsidiary tasks were associated with different levels of subsidiary autonomy. In other words, 
when parent firms have different contributing strategies to their subsidiaries, they have 
different levels of control over them. Dymsza (2002) analyzed the successes and failures of 
IJVs in the developing countries. He pointed out that parent firms, which make the most 
contribution to marketing strategy, such as product differentiation, segmentation of markets, 
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promotion, and selling, will strive to control these activities in the IJVs. Lorange et al. (1986) 
maintained that through exercising a proper IJV control structure, foreign parent firms can 
make sure that their strategies are effectively implemented and their resources are efficiently 
utilized for enhancing the IJV performance. Thus, we expect that
Hypothesis 6: Foreign parent firms that exercise control structures accordance to their 
contributions as suggested in hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2, hypothesis 3, hypothesis 4, 
and hypothesis 5 will have better IJV performance 
Parent Experience and IJV Control and Performance 
A parent firm’s prior experience in managing IJVs plays a significant role in IJV control 
(Guidice, 2001). Guidice (2001) suggested that when foreign parent firms engage in new 
IJVs, they search for their organizational memories of past relationships with similar 
characteristics and use that information in designing the current IJV control structure. 
Operating in foreign markets, experience in a particular host country may be very valuable 
because this allows foreign parent firms to cope better with uncertainties. Furthermore, when 
foreign parent firms are familiar with the local environments and cultures, they can exert 
considerable control over the IJVs and still obtain local knowledge (Calantone & Zhao, 2001).  
In addition, when IJV partners are new to each other, the foreign parent firms may be 
unsure of the local partner’s capability. The risks of opportunism may be significant in terms 
of leakage of proprietary technology. Therefore, when foreign parent firms have no prior IJV 
experience, they tend to exercise greater control over the IJV’s decision making in order to 
safeguard their interests and enhance the IJV’s performance (Pangarkar & Klein, 2004). In 
addition, Berrell (2007) maintains that inexperienced parent firms are not ready to exercise 
social mechanisms of control. According to Cullen et al. (2001), parent firms that lack IJV 
experience need to use excessive control. As a result, they may use all control mechanisms 
and focus on all the areas of IJV activities. As a result,  
Hypothesis 7: The less IJV experience the foreign parent firms have, the more likely 
they exercise broad, formal, and tight control over the IJVs, the better IJV 
performance.  
In contrast, as a foreign parent firm gains more experience with a local parent firm through an 
IJV, its philosophy towards IJV management moves toward less control (Johnson et al., 
2001). A partner’s opportunistic behavior is an important source of risk in IJVs. Earlier 
relationships with the same partners tend to reduce the possibility of opportunism because 
such behavior may jeopardize present and future relationships (Parkhe, 1993). Excessive 
control in the latter stages of an IJV development is counterproductive to IJV success. 
Besides, excessive control may be helpful to minimize risk (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986), 
while it does not maximize returns. Due to the increasing conflict between foreign and local 
parent firms (Lorange et al., 1986), a repeated relationship is often evidence of some degree 
of satisfaction with a partner. Foreign parent firms’ prior experiences in managing IJVs result 
in the need for less control (Yan & Gray, 2001).  
In the same vein, Cullen et al. (2001) found that IJV experiences help to reduce Anglo and 
Japanese parents’ need for extensive control over their IJVs. Moreover, Makino and Delios 
(1996) found that experience in foreign markets enhanced parent firms’ IJV capabilities and 
resulted in higher performance. In addition, when parent firms have good knowledge of how 
to control IJVs, they would be able to achieve IJV goals without exercising heavy control that 
increases transaction costs and hinders trust building. As a result,
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Hypothesis 8: The more IJV experience the foreign parent firms have, the more likely
they exercise narrow, social, and loose control over their IJVs, the better IJV
performance.
Methodology and Results
This study adopted a survey research design to fit the exploratory nature of the research. In
the survey, the questions about joint venture control and performance were collected directly
from those involved in IJV operations. This made direct interviews very costly in terms of
time and money and impractical to achieve the desired sample size. The measure of variables
is based on a 5-point scale. The methodologies used in analysis relationship between variables
in IJVs are description statistics (e.g. Hennart, Roehl, & Zietlow, 1999; Glaister & Yu, 1994)
and the Chi-square test (e.g. Beamish & Inkpen, 1995; Bloggett, 1991; Glaister, 1995;
Nguyen & Larimo, 2008). 
The purpose of the methods is to determine how well an observed set of data fits an
expected set of hypotheses. These methods are used to examine the differences with
categorical variables and the relationships between influenced factors and IJV control
structures and IJV performance. The method is particularly useful to find out whether an IJV
control structure (mechanism, focus, and extent) has a normal distribution or the structure has
formed under the influence of parent’s contributions and experiences. 
The target firms and investments were identified as follows: 1) the FDI data base collected
by the project leader starting from late 1980s based on press releases regarding IJVs published
in leading business magazines and newspapers and 2) annual reports and websites of the 250
largest Finnish firms; 3) based on the earlier surveys focusing on IJVs by Finnish firms. From
the resources, we identified 340 IJVs qualifying as IJVs formed by Finnish firms since 1988
and in operations at least until 2002. The qualifying 340 IJVs involved 200 Finnish parent
firms. Among these 200 firms, several firms were very difficult to contact, either because they
had been restructured or gone out of business. The firms were contacted to find out the right
informants. In some firms, there was no longer anyone with sufficient knowledge required for
the study. This left a total of 161 Finnish parent firms. Given time and cost constraints, a
postal questionnaire and online web survey were used to gather the data. 
The participants were managers who were directly involved in IJV’s establishment and
operations. To enhance the quality of the data, the respondents were contacted by phone in
December 2006 to explain the key points of the study and the questionnaires. In exchange for
their participation in the study and to provide motivation and accurate responses, the
respondents were assured of anonymity and were promised a summary report of the findings
and participation in a drawing for gifts. After reminders at the end of the January and
The sample was carefully examined any systematic response bias using T-tests.
Respondents and non-respondents were compared across their age, size, international
experience, and IJV experience. No statistical significant difference was found. Thus, there
was not a response bias to be found in the final sample. Among these IJVs, 45% were
established in 1988-1995, and 55% in 1996-2006; 53 % through acquisitions, and 47%
through greenfield investment; 76 % involved 2 partners and 24 % involved 3 partners; 61%
were established with an indefinite duration, 22% with a duration of less than 5 years, and 17
% stated having a duration of more than 5 years; 41 % had a degree of Finnish ownership of
usable. Thus, the final sample was 49 IJVs, including 40 Finnish parent firms. The response
February of 2007, 54 questionnaires were returned from which 5 questionnaires were not
rate was approximately 24,84. 
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between 10%-49%; 10% had equal ownership; and 49 % had a Finnish majority ownership at
establishment; 71% were located in emerging economies, and 29% in developed economies;
63% dealt with industrial products, 27 % with consumer products, and 10 % offered both
consumer and industrial products.
All three control dimensions were measured with a 5-point scale. Based on the list of
different mechanisms and focus areas provided, the respondents were asked to assess their 1)
method of monitoring and control, and 2) their focus of monitoring and control (Cronbach’s
Alpha=0.92). The measurement of parent contribution was based on a 5-point scale with 1=
“not important at all” to 5= “very important” where Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.88. The measure of
IJV performance was also based on a 5-point scale; the respondents were asked if they were
satisfied with IJV performance on both financial and total performance scales with 1= “very
unsatisfied” to 5= “very satisfied” where Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.94. The results of the survey
are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. The Results of Survey
From Table 1, we can see that there were 6 different control structures exercised by foreign
parent firms, including FBT, SBT, FNT, SNL, FNL, SNL. Besides, most foreign parent firms
In addition, most foreign parent firms have from one to four years experiences in IJVs (16/49),
From Table 2, we can see that the results support H1, H2, H3, H4, H5. When foreign
parent firms contributed financial and technological resources to IJVs, they preferred FBT
Dependent Variables
Control Performance
Independent
Variables FBT SNL SBT FNL FNT SNT
Financial
P. (mean)
Total Perf.
(mean)
Contributions        
Finance 25 1 8 2 0 0 3,8 4
Technology 31 0 6 3 0 0 4,2 4,2
Management K H 2 15 1 13 0 0 3,5 3,2
Trademark 2 0 1 0 3 13 2 2,6
Trained
personnel. 1 11 3 4 0 0 3,8 3,9
Experiences        
No experience 9 1 2 1 0 0 1,2 1,9
1-4 years  12 3 1 0 0 0 3,1 3,9
5-10 years EXP 2 11 0 1 0 0 4,7 4,1
More than 10
years 0 5 0 1 0 0 4,8 4,3
contribute technological (40/49) and financial (36/49), management (31/49) resources to IJVs.
control structure over their IJVs at, respectively, the rates of 69% (25/36) and 77.5% (31/40)
followed by the group of parents that have from 5-10 years of experiences (14/49). 
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Table 2. Results of Relationship between parent Contribution and Control Structure in IJVs
Contribution Finance (H1) Technology 
(H2)
Management
(H3)
Trade Mark
(H4)
Personnel (H5)
Control  FBT FBT SNL SNT SNL
Performance  4,5 4,7 3,5 3,1 4,4
Df 5 5 5 5 5
x2 79,7 124 47,8 38,3 29
In addition, when parent firms are the main contributors of management know-how,
SNL (58%). In respect to the relation between foreign parent contributions, IJV control and
performance, the result of the empirical from Table 2 and Table 3 showed support for H6.
When foreign parent firms are the main contributor of financial and technological resources to
IJVs, FBT control exercised by foreign parent firms lead to IJV performance 4.5 and 4.7,
respectively. These performances (4.5 and 4.7) are higher that those of other groups with other
control structures with a mean of 2.8 and 3.2. (with 1= total unsatisfied; 5= total satisfied) see
table 2 and table 3.) 
In addition, the results of the Chi-square test also confirmed the significant results with df
= 5 at p<0.000 supported for H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 about the relationship between parent
contribution, control, and the IJV’s performance. Regarding H6, the results show that all
foreign parent firms that adjust their control structures according to the level of their
contribution have means of IJV performance above 3,1 and up to 4,7 (see Table 2). On the
other hand, foreign firms that did not adapt their control structures according to the level of
their contributions have means of IJV performance 1.8. Besides, based on the Chi-square test,
x2 = 17.7, the result of H6 was significant at p<0.005 (df=5). Thus, the results supported H6.
The Influence of IJV Experience of Parent Firms on IJV Control and Performance
The results of the empirical data from Table 3 confirm H7 and H8 that when foreign parent
respectively) control over their IJVs. On the other hand, when they have 5 years to 10 years or
Concerning the relationship between foreign parent’s IJV experience, IJV control and
performance, the result from the Table 2 and Table 3 supported hypotheses 7 and 8. In
particular, when foreign parent firms have no experience, they exercised FBT control over
when foreign parent firms have 1 to 4 years of IJV experience, with FBT control, IJV total
control 3, 9.  
Result(n=49) Sig. at p<0.000 Sig. at p<0.000 Sig. at p<0.001 Sig. at p<0.001 Sig. at p<0.001
performance is 4,4, which is higher than the mean of IJV total performance of all structures of
IJV control (in no experience category) with means of total IJV performance 1,9. Similarly,
trademark, and trained personnel to IJVs, they were preferred to SNL (48%), SNT (68%),
firms have no or less than 4 years IJV experience, they preferred FBT (69% and 75%
more than 10 years experience, they preferred SNL control (79% and 83% respectively)
the IJVs leading to mean of IJV total performance 2,7, which is higher than all structures of
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Table 3. Relationship between Foreign Parent’s IJV Experience, IJV Control and Performance 
Experience (H7, H8) No prior IJV experience 1-4 years 5-10 years More than 10 years
Control  FBT FBT SNL SNL
Total Performance
(mean)
2, 7 4, 4 4, 6 4, 7
Df 5 5 5 5
x2 28 57 47 30
When foreign parent firms have 5-10 years experience and more than 10 years IJV experience
with SNL control structure, IJVs total performance were 4,6 and 4,7 ,which are higher than
In addition, parent firms that have no experience were more satisfied with total
performance (mean: 1,2). Similarly, parent firms that have experience in IJVs from 1-4 years
were more satisfied with total performance of IJVs (mean: 3,9) than with financial
performance (mean: 3,1). In contrast, parent firms that have experience in IJVs from 5 to 10
years were more satisfied with their IJVs financial performance (mean: 4,7) than that with
total performance (4.1). Parent firms that have more than 10 years IJV experience were also
more satisfied with the financial performance of their IJVs (mean: 4,8) than that of total
performance (4,3). In sum, less-experienced parent firms are more satisfied with total
performance than with financial performance. More-experienced parent firms are more
satisfied with financial performance than with total performance. 
Conclusion
The study showed that in different groups of contributions, parents prefer different structures
of control, and these have different influences on IJV performance. Foreign parent firms are
likely to exercise broad, formal, tight control over IJVs when they are the key suppliers of
technology and financial resources and lack IJV experience. In contrast, foreign parent firms
markets. The findings confirm that most foreign parent firms want a high level of control that
is consistent with their bargaining power, which results from their contribution to IJVs
(Calantone & Zhao, 2001). In respect to the influence of IJV experience on control, the
findings confirm the results from Gray and Yan (2001) that more IJV experience should result
in less control. 
The findings of this study contradict with the results by Makino and Delios (1996). They
found that when foreign parent firms accumulate more experience, they become less reliant
on local parent firms and, thus, exercise more control over their IJVs. In addition, the study
extends previous studies by specifying that not all experienced firms have exercised control in
Results(n=49) Sig. at p<0.000 Sig. at p<0.000 Sig. at p<0.00 Sig. at p<0.00
performance also confirmed the support for hypotheses 7 and 8. In addition, the result showed
will use narrow, social, and loose control in IJVs if they have experiences in IJVs in foreign
performance (mean: 1,9; with 1 = total unsatisfied to 5 = totally satisfied) than with financial
The Chi square test of the relationship between parent IJV experience, IJV control, and IJV
mean of total IJV performance of all groups in the same category (4.1 and 4.3 res�pec tively)
that the more parent firms have experience in IJVs, the more they are satisfied with their IJV
performance. Parent firms who have more than 10 years IJV experience  are often more
satisfied with IJV performance than that of parent firms that have 5 to 10 years >1-4 years>
no experience (see Table 1 and Table 3). 
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the same ways, but the more experienced firms prefer to exercise less control over their IJVs. 
had more than 5 years IJV experiences and exercised social, narrow, and loose control over
their IJVs. With foreign parent firms that have less than 4 years IJV experience, IJV
performance is higher if foreign parent firms exercise formal, broad, and tight control. In
respect to a foreign parent’s contribution to IJVs, the results indicated that foreign parent
firms that have provided essential technological and financial resources for IJVs are more
satisfied with IJV performance when they exercised formal, broad, and tight control over their
IJVs. 
and of leakage to their competitors. This study has provided an important continuation to
parent firms’ contributions and experience influence the joint venture management, resulting
in joint venture performance. 
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